Line data Source code
1 : /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 : /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 : * All rights reserved.
4 : *
5 : * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 : * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 : * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 : *
9 : * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 : * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 : * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 : * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 : * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 : * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 : *
16 : * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 : * the code are not to be removed.
18 : * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 : * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 : * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 : * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 : *
23 : * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 : * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 : * are met:
26 : * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 : * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 : * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 : * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 : * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 : * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 : * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 : * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 : * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 : * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 : * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 : * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 : *
41 : * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 : * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 : * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 : * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 : * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 : * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 : * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 : * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 : * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 : * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 : * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 : *
53 : * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 : * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 : * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 : * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 : */
58 : /* ====================================================================
59 : * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 : *
61 : * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 : * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 : * are met:
64 : *
65 : * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 : *
68 : * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 : * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 : * distribution.
72 : *
73 : * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 : * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 : * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 : * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 : *
78 : * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 : * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 : * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 : * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 : *
83 : * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 : * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 : * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 : *
87 : * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 : * acknowledgment:
89 : * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 : * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 : *
92 : * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 : * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 : * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 : * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 : * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 : * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 : * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 : * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 : * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 : * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 : * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 : * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 : * ====================================================================
105 : *
106 : * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 : * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 : * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 : *
110 : */
111 :
112 : #include <stdio.h>
113 : #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 : #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 : #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
117 : #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
118 : # include <openssl/ec.h>
119 : #endif
120 : #endif
121 : #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
122 : #include <openssl/rand.h>
123 : #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 :
125 : const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 :
127 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
128 : static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
129 : const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
130 : SSL_SESSION **psess);
131 : static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
132 : int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
133 : #endif
134 :
135 : SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
136 : tls1_enc,
137 : tls1_mac,
138 : tls1_setup_key_block,
139 : tls1_generate_master_secret,
140 : tls1_change_cipher_state,
141 : tls1_final_finish_mac,
142 : TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
143 : tls1_cert_verify_mac,
144 : TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 : TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 : tls1_alert_code,
147 : tls1_export_keying_material,
148 : 0,
149 : SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
150 : ssl3_set_handshake_header,
151 : ssl3_handshake_write
152 : };
153 :
154 : SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
155 : tls1_enc,
156 : tls1_mac,
157 : tls1_setup_key_block,
158 : tls1_generate_master_secret,
159 : tls1_change_cipher_state,
160 : tls1_final_finish_mac,
161 : TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
162 : tls1_cert_verify_mac,
163 : TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 : TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 : tls1_alert_code,
166 : tls1_export_keying_material,
167 : SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
168 : SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
169 : ssl3_set_handshake_header,
170 : ssl3_handshake_write
171 : };
172 :
173 : SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
174 : tls1_enc,
175 : tls1_mac,
176 : tls1_setup_key_block,
177 : tls1_generate_master_secret,
178 : tls1_change_cipher_state,
179 : tls1_final_finish_mac,
180 : TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
181 : tls1_cert_verify_mac,
182 : TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 : TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 : tls1_alert_code,
185 : tls1_export_keying_material,
186 : SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
187 : | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
188 : SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
189 : ssl3_set_handshake_header,
190 : ssl3_handshake_write
191 : };
192 :
193 872 : long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 : {
195 : /*
196 : * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
197 : * http, the cache would over fill
198 : */
199 872 : return (60 * 60 * 2);
200 : }
201 :
202 750 : int tls1_new(SSL *s)
203 : {
204 750 : if (!ssl3_new(s))
205 : return (0);
206 750 : s->method->ssl_clear(s);
207 749 : return (1);
208 : }
209 :
210 750 : void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 : {
212 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
213 750 : if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
214 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
215 : }
216 : #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 750 : ssl3_free(s);
218 750 : }
219 :
220 2992 : void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
221 : {
222 2992 : ssl3_clear(s);
223 2995 : s->version = s->method->version;
224 2995 : }
225 :
226 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 :
228 : static int nid_list[] = {
229 : NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
230 : NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
231 : NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
232 : NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 : NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 : NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
235 : NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
236 : NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
237 : NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
238 : NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
239 : NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
240 : NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 : NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 : NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 : NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
244 : NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
245 : NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 : NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
247 : NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
248 : NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
249 : NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
250 : NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
251 : NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
252 : NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
253 : NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
254 : NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
255 : NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
256 : NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
257 : };
258 :
259 : static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
260 : TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 : TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 : TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
263 : };
264 :
265 : /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
266 : static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
267 : /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
268 : 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 : /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
270 : 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 : 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 : 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
273 : 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
274 : 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
275 : 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
276 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
277 : /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
278 : 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
279 : 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
280 : 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
281 : 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
282 : 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 : 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 : # endif
285 : };
286 :
287 : static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
288 : /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
289 : 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 : /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
291 : 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
292 : 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
293 : 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
294 : 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 : 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
296 : 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
297 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
298 : /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
299 : 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
300 : 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
301 : 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
302 : 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
303 : 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
304 : 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
305 : # endif
306 : /*
307 : * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
308 : * via an explicit callback or parameters.
309 : */
310 : 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
311 : 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
312 : 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
313 : 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
314 : 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
315 : 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
316 : 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
317 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
318 : 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
319 : 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
320 : 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 : 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
322 : 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 : 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 : 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
325 : 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
326 : # endif
327 : };
328 :
329 : static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
330 : 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
331 : 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
332 : };
333 :
334 : # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
335 : /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
336 : static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = {
337 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
338 : 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
339 : 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
340 : # endif
341 : 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
342 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
343 : 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 : 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
345 : # endif
346 : 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
347 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
348 : 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
349 : 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
350 : # endif
351 : 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
352 : 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
354 : 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
355 : 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
356 : 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
357 : # endif
358 : 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
359 : 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
360 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
361 : 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
362 : 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
363 : # endif
364 : 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
365 : 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
366 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
367 : 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
368 : 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
369 : 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
370 : # endif
371 : 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
372 : 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
373 : 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
374 : };
375 : # endif
376 :
377 370 : int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
378 : {
379 : /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
380 370 : if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
381 : sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
382 : return 0;
383 370 : return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
384 : }
385 :
386 746 : int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
387 : {
388 : /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
389 746 : switch (nid) {
390 : case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
391 : return 1;
392 : case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
393 0 : return 2;
394 : case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
395 0 : return 3;
396 : case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
397 0 : return 4;
398 : case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
399 0 : return 5;
400 : case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
401 0 : return 6;
402 : case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
403 0 : return 7;
404 : case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
405 0 : return 8;
406 : case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
407 0 : return 9;
408 : case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
409 0 : return 10;
410 : case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
411 0 : return 11;
412 : case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
413 0 : return 12;
414 : case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
415 0 : return 13;
416 : case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
417 0 : return 14;
418 : case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
419 0 : return 15;
420 : case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
421 0 : return 16;
422 : case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
423 0 : return 17;
424 : case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
425 0 : return 18;
426 : case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
427 0 : return 19;
428 : case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
429 0 : return 20;
430 : case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
431 0 : return 21;
432 : case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
433 0 : return 22;
434 : case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
435 746 : return 23;
436 : case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
437 0 : return 24;
438 : case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
439 0 : return 25;
440 : case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
441 0 : return 26;
442 : case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
443 0 : return 27;
444 : case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
445 0 : return 28;
446 : default:
447 0 : return 0;
448 : }
449 : }
450 :
451 : /*
452 : * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
453 : * preferred list.
454 : * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
455 : * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
456 : * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
457 : * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
458 : * lists in the first place.
459 : * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
460 : * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
461 : * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
462 : */
463 1489 : static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
464 : const unsigned char **pcurves,
465 : size_t *num_curves)
466 : {
467 : size_t pcurveslen = 0;
468 1489 : if (sess) {
469 373 : *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
470 373 : pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
471 : } else {
472 : /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
473 1116 : switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
474 : case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
475 0 : *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
476 : pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
477 0 : break;
478 :
479 : case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
480 0 : *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
481 : pcurveslen = 2;
482 0 : break;
483 :
484 : case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
485 0 : *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
486 : pcurveslen = 2;
487 0 : break;
488 : default:
489 1116 : *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
490 1116 : pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
491 : }
492 1116 : if (!*pcurves) {
493 : # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
494 : if (FIPS_mode()) {
495 : *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
496 : pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
497 : } else
498 : # endif
499 : {
500 1116 : if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
501 743 : *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
502 743 : pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
503 : } else {
504 373 : *pcurves = eccurves_all;
505 : pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
506 : }
507 : }
508 : }
509 : }
510 : /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
511 1489 : if (pcurveslen & 1) {
512 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
513 0 : *num_curves = 0;
514 0 : return 0;
515 : } else {
516 1489 : *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
517 1489 : return 1;
518 : }
519 : }
520 :
521 : /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
522 370 : int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
523 : {
524 : const unsigned char *curves;
525 : size_t num_curves, i;
526 370 : unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
527 370 : if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
528 : return 0;
529 : /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
530 370 : if (suiteb_flags) {
531 0 : unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
532 0 : if (p[1])
533 : return 0;
534 0 : if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
535 0 : if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
536 : return 0;
537 0 : } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
538 0 : if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
539 : return 0;
540 : } else /* Should never happen */
541 : return 0;
542 : }
543 370 : if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
544 : return 0;
545 0 : for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
546 370 : if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
547 : return 1;
548 : }
549 : return 0;
550 : }
551 :
552 : /*-
553 : * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
554 : * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
555 : * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
556 : * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
557 : */
558 0 : int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
559 : {
560 : const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
561 : size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
562 : int k;
563 : /* Can't do anything on client side */
564 0 : if (s->server == 0)
565 : return -1;
566 0 : if (nmatch == -2) {
567 0 : if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
568 : /*
569 : * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
570 : * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
571 : */
572 0 : unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
573 0 : if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
574 : return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
575 0 : if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
576 : return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
577 : /* Should never happen */
578 0 : return NID_undef;
579 : }
580 : /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
581 : nmatch = 0;
582 : }
583 : /*
584 : * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
585 : * but s->options is a long...
586 : */
587 0 : if (!tls1_get_curvelist
588 0 : (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
589 : &num_supp))
590 : /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
591 : return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
592 0 : if (!tls1_get_curvelist
593 0 : (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
594 : &num_pref))
595 : return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
596 :
597 : /*
598 : * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
599 : * are allowed.
600 : */
601 0 : if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
602 0 : supp = eccurves_all;
603 0 : num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
604 0 : } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
605 0 : (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
606 0 : pref = eccurves_all;
607 0 : num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
608 : }
609 :
610 : k = 0;
611 0 : for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
612 0 : const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
613 0 : for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
614 0 : if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
615 0 : if (nmatch == k) {
616 0 : int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
617 0 : return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
618 : }
619 0 : k++;
620 : }
621 : }
622 : }
623 0 : if (nmatch == -1)
624 0 : return k;
625 : /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
626 : return NID_undef;
627 : }
628 :
629 0 : int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
630 : int *curves, size_t ncurves)
631 : {
632 : unsigned char *clist, *p;
633 : size_t i;
634 : /*
635 : * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
636 : * ids < 32
637 : */
638 : unsigned long dup_list = 0;
639 : # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
640 : EC_GROUP *curve;
641 : # endif
642 :
643 0 : clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
644 0 : if (!clist)
645 : return 0;
646 0 : for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
647 : unsigned long idmask;
648 : int id;
649 0 : id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
650 : # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
651 : /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
652 : if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) {
653 : OPENSSL_free(clist);
654 : return 0;
655 : }
656 : # endif
657 : # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
658 : curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
659 : if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
660 : == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
661 : if (curve)
662 : EC_GROUP_free(curve);
663 : OPENSSL_free(clist);
664 : return 0;
665 : } else
666 : EC_GROUP_free(curve);
667 : # endif
668 0 : idmask = 1L << id;
669 0 : if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
670 0 : OPENSSL_free(clist);
671 0 : return 0;
672 : }
673 0 : dup_list |= idmask;
674 0 : s2n(id, p);
675 : }
676 0 : if (*pext)
677 0 : OPENSSL_free(*pext);
678 0 : *pext = clist;
679 0 : *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
680 0 : return 1;
681 : }
682 :
683 : # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
684 :
685 : typedef struct {
686 : size_t nidcnt;
687 : int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
688 : } nid_cb_st;
689 :
690 0 : static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
691 : {
692 : nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
693 : size_t i;
694 : int nid;
695 : char etmp[20];
696 0 : if (elem == NULL)
697 : return 0;
698 0 : if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
699 : return 0;
700 0 : if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
701 : return 0;
702 0 : memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
703 0 : etmp[len] = 0;
704 0 : nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
705 0 : if (nid == NID_undef)
706 0 : nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
707 0 : if (nid == NID_undef)
708 0 : nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
709 0 : if (nid == NID_undef)
710 : return 0;
711 0 : for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
712 0 : if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
713 : return 0;
714 0 : narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
715 0 : return 1;
716 : }
717 :
718 : /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
719 0 : int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
720 : const char *str)
721 : {
722 : nid_cb_st ncb;
723 0 : ncb.nidcnt = 0;
724 0 : if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
725 : return 0;
726 0 : if (pext == NULL)
727 : return 1;
728 0 : return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
729 : }
730 :
731 : /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
732 373 : static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
733 : EC_KEY *ec)
734 : {
735 : int is_prime, id;
736 : const EC_GROUP *grp;
737 : const EC_METHOD *meth;
738 373 : if (!ec)
739 : return 0;
740 : /* Determine if it is a prime field */
741 373 : grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
742 373 : if (!grp)
743 : return 0;
744 373 : meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
745 373 : if (!meth)
746 : return 0;
747 373 : if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
748 : is_prime = 1;
749 : else
750 : is_prime = 0;
751 : /* Determine curve ID */
752 373 : id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
753 373 : id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
754 : /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
755 373 : if (id) {
756 373 : curve_id[0] = 0;
757 373 : curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
758 : } else {
759 0 : curve_id[0] = 0xff;
760 0 : if (is_prime)
761 0 : curve_id[1] = 0x01;
762 : else
763 0 : curve_id[1] = 0x02;
764 : }
765 373 : if (comp_id) {
766 0 : if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
767 : return 0;
768 0 : if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
769 0 : if (is_prime)
770 0 : *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
771 : else
772 0 : *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
773 : } else
774 0 : *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
775 : }
776 : return 1;
777 : }
778 :
779 : /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
780 373 : static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
781 : unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
782 : {
783 : const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
784 : size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
785 : int j;
786 : /*
787 : * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
788 : * supported (see RFC4492).
789 : */
790 373 : if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
791 : pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
792 0 : num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
793 0 : for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
794 0 : if (*comp_id == *pformats)
795 : break;
796 : }
797 0 : if (i == num_formats)
798 : return 0;
799 : }
800 373 : if (!curve_id)
801 : return 1;
802 : /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
803 746 : for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
804 746 : if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
805 : return 0;
806 746 : if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
807 : /*
808 : * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
809 : * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
810 : * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
811 : * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
812 : * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
813 : */
814 : break;
815 : }
816 0 : for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
817 746 : if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
818 : break;
819 : }
820 746 : if (i == num_curves)
821 : return 0;
822 : /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
823 746 : if (!s->server)
824 : return 1;
825 : }
826 : return 1;
827 : }
828 :
829 : static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
830 : size_t *num_formats)
831 : {
832 : /*
833 : * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
834 : */
835 746 : if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
836 : *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
837 0 : *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
838 : } else {
839 : *pformats = ecformats_default;
840 : /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
841 746 : if (tls1_suiteb(s))
842 : *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
843 : else
844 : *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
845 : }
846 : }
847 :
848 : /*
849 : * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
850 : * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
851 : */
852 373 : static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
853 : {
854 : unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
855 : EVP_PKEY *pkey;
856 : int rv;
857 373 : pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
858 373 : if (!pkey)
859 : return 0;
860 : /* If not EC nothing to do */
861 373 : if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
862 373 : EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
863 373 : return 1;
864 : }
865 0 : rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
866 0 : EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
867 0 : if (!rv)
868 : return 0;
869 : /*
870 : * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
871 : * curves extension.
872 : */
873 0 : rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
874 0 : if (!rv)
875 : return 0;
876 : /*
877 : * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
878 : * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
879 : */
880 0 : if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
881 : int check_md;
882 : size_t i;
883 : CERT *c = s->cert;
884 0 : if (curve_id[0])
885 : return 0;
886 : /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
887 0 : if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
888 : check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
889 0 : else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
890 : check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
891 : else
892 : return 0; /* Should never happen */
893 0 : for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
894 0 : if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
895 : break;
896 0 : if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
897 : return 0;
898 0 : if (set_ee_md == 2) {
899 0 : if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
900 0 : c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
901 : else
902 0 : c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
903 : }
904 : }
905 0 : return rv;
906 : }
907 :
908 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
909 : /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
910 373 : int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
911 : {
912 : unsigned char curve_id[2];
913 373 : EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
914 : # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
915 : /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
916 : if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
917 : return 1;
918 : # endif
919 : /*
920 : * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
921 : * curves permitted.
922 : */
923 373 : if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
924 : /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
925 0 : if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
926 0 : curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
927 0 : else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
928 0 : curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
929 : else
930 : return 0;
931 0 : curve_id[0] = 0;
932 : /* Check this curve is acceptable */
933 0 : if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
934 : return 0;
935 : /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
936 0 : if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
937 : return 1;
938 : /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
939 : else {
940 : unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
941 0 : if (!ec)
942 : return 0;
943 0 : if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
944 : return 0;
945 0 : if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
946 : return 1;
947 0 : return 0;
948 : }
949 :
950 : }
951 373 : if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
952 : /* Need a shared curve */
953 0 : if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
954 : return 1;
955 : else
956 0 : return 0;
957 : }
958 373 : if (!ec) {
959 0 : if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
960 : return 1;
961 : else
962 0 : return 0;
963 : }
964 373 : if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
965 : return 0;
966 : /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
967 : # if 0
968 : return 1;
969 : # else
970 373 : return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
971 : # endif
972 : }
973 : # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
974 :
975 : #else
976 :
977 : static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
978 : {
979 : return 1;
980 : }
981 :
982 : #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
983 :
984 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
985 :
986 : /*
987 : * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
988 : * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
989 : */
990 :
991 : # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
992 : # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
993 : # else
994 : # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
995 : # endif
996 :
997 : # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
998 : # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
999 : # else
1000 : # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
1001 : # endif
1002 :
1003 : # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1004 : # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1005 : /* */
1006 : # else
1007 : # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
1008 : # endif
1009 :
1010 : # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
1011 : tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
1012 : tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
1013 : tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1014 :
1015 : static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1016 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
1017 : tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
1018 : tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1019 : # endif
1020 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1021 : tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1022 : tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
1023 : # endif
1024 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1025 : tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
1026 : # endif
1027 : };
1028 :
1029 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1030 : static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1031 : tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1032 : tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1033 : };
1034 : # endif
1035 1489 : size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
1036 : {
1037 : /*
1038 : * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1039 : * preferences.
1040 : */
1041 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1042 1489 : switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1043 : case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1044 0 : *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1045 0 : return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
1046 :
1047 : case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1048 0 : *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1049 0 : return 2;
1050 :
1051 : case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1052 0 : *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
1053 0 : return 2;
1054 : }
1055 : # endif
1056 : /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1057 1489 : if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
1058 0 : *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1059 0 : return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1060 1489 : } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1061 0 : *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1062 0 : return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1063 : } else {
1064 1489 : *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1065 1489 : return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1066 : }
1067 : }
1068 :
1069 : /*
1070 : * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1071 : * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1072 : */
1073 370 : int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1074 : const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1075 : {
1076 : const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1077 : size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1078 : int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1079 : /* Should never happen */
1080 370 : if (sigalg == -1)
1081 : return -1;
1082 : /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1083 370 : if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1084 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1085 0 : return 0;
1086 : }
1087 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1088 370 : if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1089 : unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1090 : /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1091 0 : if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1092 0 : return 0;
1093 0 : if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1094 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1095 0 : return 0;
1096 : }
1097 : /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1098 0 : if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1099 0 : if (curve_id[0])
1100 : return 0;
1101 0 : if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1102 0 : if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1103 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1104 : SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1105 0 : return 0;
1106 : }
1107 0 : } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1108 0 : if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1109 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1110 : SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1111 0 : return 0;
1112 : }
1113 : } else
1114 : return 0;
1115 : }
1116 370 : } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1117 : return 0;
1118 : # endif
1119 :
1120 : /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1121 370 : sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1122 370 : for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1123 370 : if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1124 : break;
1125 : }
1126 : /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1127 370 : if (i == sent_sigslen
1128 0 : && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1129 0 : || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1130 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1131 0 : return 0;
1132 : }
1133 370 : *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1134 370 : if (*pmd == NULL) {
1135 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1136 0 : return 0;
1137 : }
1138 : /*
1139 : * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1140 : */
1141 370 : if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1142 370 : s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1143 : return 1;
1144 : }
1145 :
1146 : /*
1147 : * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1148 : * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1149 : * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1150 : * settings.
1151 : */
1152 373 : void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1153 : {
1154 373 : CERT *c = s->cert;
1155 : const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1156 : size_t i, sigalgslen;
1157 : int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1158 373 : c->mask_a = 0;
1159 373 : c->mask_k = 0;
1160 : /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1161 373 : if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1162 0 : c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1163 : else
1164 373 : c->mask_ssl = 0;
1165 : /*
1166 : * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1167 : * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2.
1168 : */
1169 373 : sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1170 5968 : for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
1171 5595 : switch (sigalgs[1]) {
1172 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1173 : case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1174 : have_rsa = 1;
1175 1865 : break;
1176 : # endif
1177 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1178 : case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1179 : have_dsa = 1;
1180 1865 : break;
1181 : # endif
1182 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1183 : case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1184 : have_ecdsa = 1;
1185 1865 : break;
1186 : # endif
1187 : }
1188 : }
1189 : /*
1190 : * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1191 : * signature algorithms.
1192 : */
1193 373 : if (!have_rsa) {
1194 0 : c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1195 0 : c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1196 : }
1197 373 : if (!have_dsa) {
1198 0 : c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1199 0 : c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1200 : }
1201 373 : if (!have_ecdsa) {
1202 0 : c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1203 0 : c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1204 : }
1205 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1206 : if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1207 : c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1208 : c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1209 : }
1210 : # endif
1211 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1212 : /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1213 373 : if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1214 373 : c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1215 373 : c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1216 : }
1217 : # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1218 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1219 373 : if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1220 373 : c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1221 373 : c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1222 : }
1223 : # endif
1224 373 : c->valid = 1;
1225 373 : }
1226 :
1227 373 : unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1228 : unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1229 : {
1230 : int extdatalen = 0;
1231 : unsigned char *orig = buf;
1232 373 : unsigned char *ret = buf;
1233 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1234 : /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1235 : int using_ecc = 0;
1236 373 : if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1237 : int i;
1238 : unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1239 373 : STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1240 :
1241 373 : for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1242 373 : SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1243 :
1244 373 : alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1245 373 : alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1246 373 : if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1247 0 : || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1248 : using_ecc = 1;
1249 : break;
1250 : }
1251 : }
1252 : }
1253 : # endif
1254 :
1255 : /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1256 373 : if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1257 : return orig;
1258 :
1259 373 : ret += 2;
1260 :
1261 373 : if (ret >= limit)
1262 : return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1263 :
1264 373 : if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1265 : /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1266 : unsigned long size_str;
1267 : long lenmax;
1268 :
1269 : /*-
1270 : * check for enough space.
1271 : * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1272 : * 2 for servernamelist length
1273 : * 1 for the hostname type
1274 : * 2 for hostname length
1275 : * + hostname length
1276 : */
1277 :
1278 373 : if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1279 746 : || (size_str =
1280 373 : strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1281 : return NULL;
1282 :
1283 : /* extension type and length */
1284 373 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1285 373 : s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1286 :
1287 : /* length of servername list */
1288 373 : s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1289 :
1290 : /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1291 373 : *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1292 373 : s2n(size_str, ret);
1293 373 : memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1294 373 : ret += size_str;
1295 : }
1296 :
1297 : /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1298 373 : if (s->renegotiate) {
1299 : int el;
1300 :
1301 0 : if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1302 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1303 0 : return NULL;
1304 : }
1305 :
1306 0 : if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1307 : return NULL;
1308 :
1309 0 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1310 0 : s2n(el, ret);
1311 :
1312 0 : if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1313 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1314 0 : return NULL;
1315 : }
1316 :
1317 0 : ret += el;
1318 : }
1319 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1320 : /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1321 373 : if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1322 : * Client Hello message */
1323 :
1324 0 : int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1325 0 : if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1326 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1327 0 : return NULL;
1328 : }
1329 :
1330 : /*-
1331 : * check for enough space.
1332 : * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1333 : * 1 for the srp user identity
1334 : * + srp user identity length
1335 : */
1336 0 : if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1337 : return NULL;
1338 :
1339 : /* fill in the extension */
1340 0 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1341 0 : s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1342 0 : (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1343 0 : memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1344 0 : ret += login_len;
1345 : }
1346 : # endif
1347 :
1348 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1349 373 : if (using_ecc) {
1350 : /*
1351 : * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1352 : */
1353 : long lenmax;
1354 : const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1355 : size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1356 :
1357 : tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1358 :
1359 373 : if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1360 0 : return NULL;
1361 373 : if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1362 : return NULL;
1363 373 : if (num_formats > 255) {
1364 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1365 0 : return NULL;
1366 : }
1367 :
1368 373 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1369 : /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1370 373 : s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1371 373 : *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1372 373 : memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1373 373 : ret += num_formats;
1374 :
1375 : /*
1376 : * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1377 : */
1378 373 : pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1379 373 : if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1380 : return NULL;
1381 :
1382 373 : if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1383 : return NULL;
1384 373 : if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1385 : return NULL;
1386 373 : if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1387 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1388 0 : return NULL;
1389 : }
1390 373 : curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves;
1391 373 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1392 373 : s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1393 373 : s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1394 373 : memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
1395 373 : ret += curves_list_len;
1396 : }
1397 : # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1398 :
1399 373 : if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1400 : int ticklen;
1401 373 : if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1402 0 : ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1403 373 : else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1404 0 : s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1405 0 : ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1406 0 : s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1407 0 : if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1408 : return NULL;
1409 0 : memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1410 0 : s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1411 0 : s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1412 : } else
1413 : ticklen = 0;
1414 373 : if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1415 0 : s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1416 : goto skip_ext;
1417 : /*
1418 : * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1419 : * ticket
1420 : */
1421 373 : if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1422 : return NULL;
1423 373 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1424 373 : s2n(ticklen, ret);
1425 373 : if (ticklen) {
1426 0 : memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1427 0 : ret += ticklen;
1428 : }
1429 : }
1430 : skip_ext:
1431 :
1432 373 : if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1433 : size_t salglen;
1434 : const unsigned char *salg;
1435 373 : salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1436 373 : if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1437 0 : return NULL;
1438 373 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1439 373 : s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1440 373 : s2n(salglen, ret);
1441 373 : memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1442 373 : ret += salglen;
1443 : }
1444 : # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1445 : if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1446 : size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1447 :
1448 : if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1449 : return NULL;
1450 : if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1451 : return NULL;
1452 :
1453 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1454 : s2n(col + 2, ret);
1455 : s2n(col, ret);
1456 : memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1457 : ret += col;
1458 : }
1459 : # endif
1460 :
1461 373 : if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1462 : int i;
1463 : long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1464 : OCSP_RESPID *id;
1465 :
1466 : idlen = 0;
1467 0 : for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1468 0 : id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1469 0 : itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1470 0 : if (itmp <= 0)
1471 : return NULL;
1472 0 : idlen += itmp + 2;
1473 : }
1474 :
1475 0 : if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1476 0 : extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1477 0 : if (extlen < 0)
1478 : return NULL;
1479 : } else
1480 : extlen = 0;
1481 :
1482 0 : if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1483 : return NULL;
1484 0 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1485 0 : if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1486 : return NULL;
1487 0 : s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1488 0 : *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1489 0 : s2n(idlen, ret);
1490 0 : for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1491 : /* save position of id len */
1492 0 : unsigned char *q = ret;
1493 0 : id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1494 : /* skip over id len */
1495 0 : ret += 2;
1496 0 : itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1497 : /* write id len */
1498 0 : s2n(itmp, q);
1499 : }
1500 0 : s2n(extlen, ret);
1501 0 : if (extlen > 0)
1502 0 : i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1503 : }
1504 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1505 : /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1506 373 : if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1507 : return NULL;
1508 373 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1509 373 : s2n(1, ret);
1510 : /*-
1511 : * Set mode:
1512 : * 1: peer may send requests
1513 : * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1514 : */
1515 373 : if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1516 0 : *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1517 : else
1518 373 : *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1519 : # endif
1520 :
1521 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1522 373 : if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1523 : /*
1524 : * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1525 : * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1526 : */
1527 373 : if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1528 : return NULL;
1529 373 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1530 373 : s2n(0, ret);
1531 : }
1532 : # endif
1533 :
1534 373 : if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1535 373 : if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1536 : return NULL;
1537 373 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1538 373 : s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1539 373 : s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1540 373 : memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1541 373 : ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1542 : }
1543 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1544 373 : if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1545 : int el;
1546 :
1547 0 : ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1548 :
1549 0 : if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1550 0 : return NULL;
1551 :
1552 0 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1553 0 : s2n(el, ret);
1554 :
1555 0 : if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1556 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1557 0 : return NULL;
1558 : }
1559 0 : ret += el;
1560 : }
1561 : # endif
1562 373 : custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1563 : /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1564 373 : if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1565 : return NULL;
1566 :
1567 : /*
1568 : * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1569 : * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1570 : * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1571 : * appear last.
1572 : */
1573 373 : if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1574 0 : int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1575 : /*
1576 : * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1577 : * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1578 : * does not.
1579 : */
1580 0 : if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1581 0 : hlen -= 5;
1582 0 : if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1583 0 : hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1584 0 : if (hlen >= 4)
1585 0 : hlen -= 4;
1586 : else
1587 : hlen = 0;
1588 :
1589 0 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1590 0 : s2n(hlen, ret);
1591 0 : memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1592 0 : ret += hlen;
1593 : }
1594 : }
1595 :
1596 373 : if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1597 : return orig;
1598 :
1599 373 : s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1600 373 : return ret;
1601 : }
1602 :
1603 373 : unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1604 : unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1605 : {
1606 : int extdatalen = 0;
1607 : unsigned char *orig = buf;
1608 373 : unsigned char *ret = buf;
1609 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1610 : int next_proto_neg_seen;
1611 : # endif
1612 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1613 373 : unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1614 373 : unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1615 373 : int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1616 373 : || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1617 373 : using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1618 : # endif
1619 : /*
1620 : * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
1621 : */
1622 373 : if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1623 : return orig;
1624 :
1625 373 : ret += 2;
1626 373 : if (ret >= limit)
1627 : return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1628 :
1629 373 : if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1630 373 : && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1631 373 : if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1632 : return NULL;
1633 :
1634 373 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1635 373 : s2n(0, ret);
1636 : }
1637 :
1638 373 : if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1639 : int el;
1640 :
1641 373 : if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1642 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1643 0 : return NULL;
1644 : }
1645 :
1646 373 : if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1647 : return NULL;
1648 :
1649 373 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1650 373 : s2n(el, ret);
1651 :
1652 373 : if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1653 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1654 0 : return NULL;
1655 : }
1656 :
1657 373 : ret += el;
1658 : }
1659 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1660 373 : if (using_ecc) {
1661 : const unsigned char *plist;
1662 : size_t plistlen;
1663 : /*
1664 : * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1665 : */
1666 : long lenmax;
1667 :
1668 : tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1669 :
1670 373 : if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1671 : return NULL;
1672 373 : if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1673 : return NULL;
1674 373 : if (plistlen > 255) {
1675 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1676 0 : return NULL;
1677 : }
1678 :
1679 373 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1680 373 : s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1681 373 : *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1682 373 : memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1683 373 : ret += plistlen;
1684 :
1685 : }
1686 : /*
1687 : * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1688 : * extension
1689 : */
1690 : # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1691 :
1692 373 : if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1693 373 : if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1694 : return NULL;
1695 373 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1696 373 : s2n(0, ret);
1697 : }
1698 :
1699 373 : if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1700 0 : if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1701 : return NULL;
1702 0 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1703 0 : s2n(0, ret);
1704 : }
1705 : # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1706 : if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1707 : size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1708 :
1709 : if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1710 : return NULL;
1711 : if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1712 : return NULL;
1713 :
1714 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1715 : s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1716 : s2n(sol, ret);
1717 : memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1718 : ret += sol;
1719 : }
1720 : # endif
1721 :
1722 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1723 373 : if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1724 : int el;
1725 :
1726 0 : ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1727 :
1728 0 : if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1729 0 : return NULL;
1730 :
1731 0 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1732 0 : s2n(el, ret);
1733 :
1734 0 : if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1735 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1736 0 : return NULL;
1737 : }
1738 0 : ret += el;
1739 : }
1740 : # endif
1741 :
1742 746 : if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1743 373 : || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1744 0 : && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1745 0 : const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1746 : 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1747 : 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1748 : 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1749 : 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1750 : 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1751 : 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1752 : };
1753 0 : if (limit - ret < 36)
1754 0 : return NULL;
1755 : memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1756 0 : ret += 36;
1757 :
1758 : }
1759 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1760 : /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1761 373 : if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1762 373 : if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1763 : return NULL;
1764 373 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1765 373 : s2n(1, ret);
1766 : /*-
1767 : * Set mode:
1768 : * 1: peer may send requests
1769 : * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1770 : */
1771 373 : if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1772 0 : *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1773 : else
1774 373 : *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1775 :
1776 : }
1777 : # endif
1778 :
1779 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1780 373 : next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1781 373 : s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1782 373 : if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1783 : const unsigned char *npa;
1784 : unsigned int npalen;
1785 : int r;
1786 :
1787 0 : r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1788 : s->
1789 : ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1790 0 : if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1791 0 : if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1792 0 : return NULL;
1793 0 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1794 0 : s2n(npalen, ret);
1795 0 : memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1796 0 : ret += npalen;
1797 0 : s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1798 : }
1799 : }
1800 : # endif
1801 373 : if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1802 : return NULL;
1803 :
1804 373 : if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1805 : const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1806 373 : unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1807 :
1808 373 : if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1809 : return NULL;
1810 373 : s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1811 373 : s2n(3 + len, ret);
1812 373 : s2n(1 + len, ret);
1813 373 : *ret++ = len;
1814 373 : memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1815 373 : ret += len;
1816 : }
1817 :
1818 373 : if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1819 : return orig;
1820 :
1821 373 : s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1822 373 : return ret;
1823 : }
1824 :
1825 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1826 : /*-
1827 : * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1828 : * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1829 : * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1830 : * SNI,
1831 : * elliptic_curves
1832 : * ec_point_formats
1833 : *
1834 : * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1835 : * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1836 : * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1837 : * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1838 : */
1839 0 : static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1840 : const unsigned char *d, int n)
1841 : {
1842 : unsigned short type, size;
1843 : static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1844 : 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1845 : 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1846 : 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1847 : 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1848 : 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1849 : 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1850 :
1851 : 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1852 : 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1853 : 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1854 : 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1855 : };
1856 :
1857 : /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1858 : static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1859 : 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1860 : 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1861 : 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1862 : 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1863 : 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1864 : 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1865 : 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1866 : 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1867 : };
1868 :
1869 0 : if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1870 : return;
1871 0 : data += 2;
1872 :
1873 0 : if (data > (d + n - 4))
1874 : return;
1875 0 : n2s(data, type);
1876 0 : n2s(data, size);
1877 :
1878 0 : if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1879 : return;
1880 :
1881 0 : if (data + size > d + n)
1882 : return;
1883 : data += size;
1884 :
1885 0 : if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1886 : const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1887 : const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1888 :
1889 0 : if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1890 : return;
1891 0 : if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1892 : return;
1893 0 : if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1894 : return;
1895 : } else {
1896 : const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1897 :
1898 0 : if (data + len != d + n)
1899 : return;
1900 0 : if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1901 : return;
1902 : }
1903 :
1904 0 : s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1905 : }
1906 : # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1907 :
1908 : /*
1909 : * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1910 : * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1911 : * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1912 : * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1913 : * success.
1914 : */
1915 373 : static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1916 : unsigned data_len, int *al)
1917 : {
1918 : unsigned i;
1919 : unsigned proto_len;
1920 : const unsigned char *selected;
1921 : unsigned char selected_len;
1922 : int r;
1923 :
1924 373 : if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1925 : return 0;
1926 :
1927 373 : if (data_len < 2)
1928 : goto parse_error;
1929 :
1930 : /*
1931 : * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1932 : * length-prefixed strings.
1933 : */
1934 373 : i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1935 373 : data_len -= 2;
1936 373 : data += 2;
1937 373 : if (data_len != i)
1938 : goto parse_error;
1939 :
1940 373 : if (data_len < 2)
1941 : goto parse_error;
1942 :
1943 746 : for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1944 373 : proto_len = data[i];
1945 373 : i++;
1946 :
1947 373 : if (proto_len == 0)
1948 : goto parse_error;
1949 :
1950 373 : if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1951 : goto parse_error;
1952 :
1953 : i += proto_len;
1954 : }
1955 :
1956 373 : r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1957 : s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1958 373 : if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1959 373 : if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1960 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1961 373 : s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1962 373 : if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1963 0 : *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1964 0 : return -1;
1965 : }
1966 373 : memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1967 373 : s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1968 : }
1969 : return 0;
1970 :
1971 : parse_error:
1972 0 : *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1973 0 : return -1;
1974 : }
1975 :
1976 373 : static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1977 : unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1978 : {
1979 : unsigned short type;
1980 : unsigned short size;
1981 : unsigned short len;
1982 373 : unsigned char *data = *p;
1983 : int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1984 :
1985 373 : s->servername_done = 0;
1986 373 : s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1987 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1988 373 : s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1989 : # endif
1990 :
1991 373 : if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1992 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1993 0 : s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1994 : }
1995 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1996 373 : s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1997 : SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1998 : # endif
1999 :
2000 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2001 373 : if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2002 0 : ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
2003 : # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2004 :
2005 : /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2006 373 : if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2007 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2008 0 : s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2009 : }
2010 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2011 373 : if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2012 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2013 0 : s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2014 : }
2015 : # endif
2016 :
2017 373 : s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2018 :
2019 373 : if (data == d + n)
2020 : goto ri_check;
2021 :
2022 373 : if (data > (d + n - 2))
2023 : goto err;
2024 :
2025 373 : n2s(data, len);
2026 :
2027 373 : if (data > (d + n - len))
2028 : goto err;
2029 :
2030 3357 : while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2031 2984 : n2s(data, type);
2032 2984 : n2s(data, size);
2033 :
2034 2984 : if (data + size > (d + n))
2035 : goto err;
2036 : # if 0
2037 : fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
2038 : # endif
2039 2984 : if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2040 0 : s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2041 : /*-
2042 : * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2043 : *
2044 : * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2045 : * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2046 : * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2047 : * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2048 : * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2049 : * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2050 : * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2051 : * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2052 : * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2053 : * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2054 : * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2055 : * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2056 : * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2057 : * the value of the Host: field.
2058 : * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2059 : * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2060 : * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2061 : * extension.
2062 : * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2063 : *
2064 : */
2065 :
2066 2984 : if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2067 : unsigned char *sdata;
2068 : int servname_type;
2069 : int dsize;
2070 :
2071 373 : if (size < 2)
2072 : goto err;
2073 373 : n2s(data, dsize);
2074 373 : size -= 2;
2075 373 : if (dsize > size)
2076 : goto err;
2077 :
2078 : sdata = data;
2079 746 : while (dsize > 3) {
2080 373 : servname_type = *(sdata++);
2081 373 : n2s(sdata, len);
2082 373 : dsize -= 3;
2083 :
2084 373 : if (len > dsize)
2085 : goto err;
2086 :
2087 373 : if (s->servername_done == 0)
2088 373 : switch (servname_type) {
2089 : case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2090 373 : if (!s->hit) {
2091 373 : if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2092 : goto err;
2093 :
2094 373 : if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2095 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2096 0 : return 0;
2097 : }
2098 373 : if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2099 373 : OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2100 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2101 0 : return 0;
2102 : }
2103 373 : memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2104 373 : s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2105 373 : if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2106 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2107 0 : s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2108 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2109 0 : return 0;
2110 : }
2111 373 : s->servername_done = 1;
2112 :
2113 : } else
2114 0 : s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2115 0 : && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2116 0 : && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2117 : (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2118 :
2119 : break;
2120 :
2121 : default:
2122 : break;
2123 : }
2124 :
2125 373 : dsize -= len;
2126 : }
2127 373 : if (dsize != 0)
2128 : goto err;
2129 :
2130 : }
2131 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2132 2611 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2133 0 : if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1))
2134 : goto err;
2135 0 : if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2136 : goto err;
2137 0 : if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2138 : return -1;
2139 0 : memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2140 0 : s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2141 :
2142 0 : if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2143 : goto err;
2144 : }
2145 : # endif
2146 :
2147 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2148 2611 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2149 : unsigned char *sdata = data;
2150 373 : int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2151 :
2152 373 : if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2153 : ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2154 : goto err;
2155 373 : if (!s->hit) {
2156 373 : if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2157 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2158 0 : s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2159 : }
2160 373 : s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2161 373 : if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2162 373 : OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2163 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2164 0 : return 0;
2165 : }
2166 373 : s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2167 : ecpointformatlist_length;
2168 373 : memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2169 : ecpointformatlist_length);
2170 : }
2171 : # if 0
2172 : fprintf(stderr,
2173 : "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
2174 : s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2175 : sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2176 : for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2177 : fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2178 : fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2179 : # endif
2180 2238 : } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2181 : unsigned char *sdata = data;
2182 373 : int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2183 373 : ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2184 :
2185 373 : if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2186 373 : ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2187 : /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2188 373 : ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2189 : goto err;
2190 :
2191 373 : if (!s->hit) {
2192 373 : if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2193 : goto err;
2194 :
2195 373 : s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2196 373 : if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2197 373 : OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2198 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2199 0 : return 0;
2200 : }
2201 373 : s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2202 : ellipticcurvelist_length;
2203 373 : memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2204 : ellipticcurvelist_length);
2205 : }
2206 : # if 0
2207 : fprintf(stderr,
2208 : "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
2209 : s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2210 : sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2211 : for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2212 : fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2213 : fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2214 : # endif
2215 : }
2216 : # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2217 : # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2218 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2219 : unsigned char *sdata = data;
2220 :
2221 : if (size < 2) {
2222 : *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2223 : return 0;
2224 : }
2225 : n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2226 : if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2227 : *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2228 : return 0;
2229 : }
2230 :
2231 : if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2232 : /* shouldn't really happen */
2233 : OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2234 : }
2235 :
2236 : /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2237 : if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2238 : s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2239 : else
2240 : s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2241 : BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2242 : if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2243 : *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2244 : return 0;
2245 : }
2246 : }
2247 : # endif
2248 1865 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2249 373 : if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2250 0 : !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2251 : s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2252 : {
2253 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2254 0 : return 0;
2255 : }
2256 1492 : } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2257 0 : if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2258 : return 0;
2259 : renegotiate_seen = 1;
2260 1492 : } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2261 : int dsize;
2262 373 : if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2263 : goto err;
2264 373 : n2s(data, dsize);
2265 373 : size -= 2;
2266 373 : if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2267 : goto err;
2268 373 : if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2269 : goto err;
2270 1119 : } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2271 :
2272 0 : if (size < 5)
2273 : goto err;
2274 :
2275 0 : s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2276 0 : size--;
2277 0 : if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2278 : const unsigned char *sdata;
2279 : int dsize;
2280 : /* Read in responder_id_list */
2281 0 : n2s(data, dsize);
2282 0 : size -= 2;
2283 0 : if (dsize > size)
2284 : goto err;
2285 0 : while (dsize > 0) {
2286 : OCSP_RESPID *id;
2287 : int idsize;
2288 0 : if (dsize < 4)
2289 : goto err;
2290 0 : n2s(data, idsize);
2291 0 : dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2292 0 : size -= 2 + idsize;
2293 0 : if (dsize < 0)
2294 : goto err;
2295 0 : sdata = data;
2296 0 : data += idsize;
2297 0 : id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2298 0 : if (!id)
2299 : goto err;
2300 0 : if (data != sdata) {
2301 0 : OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2302 0 : goto err;
2303 : }
2304 0 : if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2305 0 : && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2306 0 : sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2307 0 : OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2308 0 : *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2309 0 : return 0;
2310 : }
2311 0 : if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2312 0 : OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2313 0 : *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2314 0 : return 0;
2315 : }
2316 : }
2317 :
2318 : /* Read in request_extensions */
2319 0 : if (size < 2)
2320 : goto err;
2321 0 : n2s(data, dsize);
2322 0 : size -= 2;
2323 0 : if (dsize != size)
2324 : goto err;
2325 0 : sdata = data;
2326 0 : if (dsize > 0) {
2327 0 : if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2328 0 : sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2329 : X509_EXTENSION_free);
2330 : }
2331 :
2332 0 : s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2333 0 : d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2334 0 : if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2335 : goto err;
2336 : }
2337 : }
2338 : /*
2339 : * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2340 : */
2341 : else
2342 0 : s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2343 : }
2344 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2345 1119 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2346 373 : switch (data[0]) {
2347 : case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2348 373 : s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2349 373 : break;
2350 : case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2351 0 : s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2352 0 : s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2353 0 : break;
2354 : default:
2355 0 : *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2356 0 : return 0;
2357 : }
2358 : }
2359 : # endif
2360 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2361 1119 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2362 746 : s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2363 373 : s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2364 : /*-
2365 : * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2366 : * renegotiation.
2367 : *
2368 : * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2369 : * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2370 : * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2371 : * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2372 : * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2373 : * anything like that, but this might change).
2374 : *
2375 : * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2376 : * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2377 : * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2378 : * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2379 : * Finished message could have been computed.)
2380 : */
2381 373 : s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2382 : }
2383 : # endif
2384 :
2385 746 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2386 746 : s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2387 373 : if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2388 : return 0;
2389 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2390 : /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2391 373 : s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2392 : # endif
2393 : }
2394 :
2395 : /* session ticket processed earlier */
2396 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2397 0 : else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2398 0 : && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2399 0 : if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2400 : return 0;
2401 : }
2402 : # endif
2403 :
2404 2984 : data += size;
2405 : }
2406 :
2407 : /* Spurious data on the end */
2408 373 : if (data != d + n)
2409 : goto err;
2410 :
2411 373 : *p = data;
2412 :
2413 : ri_check:
2414 :
2415 : /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2416 :
2417 373 : if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2418 0 : !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2419 0 : *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2420 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2421 : SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2422 0 : return 0;
2423 : }
2424 :
2425 : return 1;
2426 : err:
2427 0 : *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2428 0 : return 0;
2429 : }
2430 :
2431 : /*
2432 : * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2433 : * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2434 : */
2435 :
2436 373 : static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
2437 : const unsigned char *data,
2438 : const unsigned char *limit,
2439 : int *al)
2440 : {
2441 : unsigned short type, size, len;
2442 : /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2443 373 : if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2444 : return 1;
2445 :
2446 0 : if (data >= limit - 2)
2447 : return 1;
2448 0 : n2s(data, len);
2449 :
2450 0 : if (data > limit - len)
2451 : return 1;
2452 :
2453 0 : while (data <= limit - 4) {
2454 0 : n2s(data, type);
2455 0 : n2s(data, size);
2456 :
2457 0 : if (data + size > limit)
2458 : return 1;
2459 0 : if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2460 : return 0;
2461 :
2462 : data += size;
2463 : }
2464 :
2465 : return 1;
2466 : }
2467 :
2468 373 : int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2469 : int n)
2470 : {
2471 373 : int al = -1;
2472 373 : unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2473 : /*
2474 : * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2475 : * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2476 : * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2477 : * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2478 : */
2479 373 : if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2480 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2481 0 : return 0;
2482 : }
2483 :
2484 373 : if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2485 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2486 0 : return 0;
2487 : }
2488 :
2489 373 : custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2490 373 : if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, d + n, &al) <= 0) {
2491 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2492 0 : return 0;
2493 : }
2494 :
2495 : return 1;
2496 : }
2497 :
2498 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2499 : /*
2500 : * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2501 : * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2502 : * fill the length of the block.
2503 : */
2504 : static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2505 : {
2506 : unsigned int off = 0;
2507 :
2508 0 : while (off < len) {
2509 0 : if (d[off] == 0)
2510 : return 0;
2511 0 : off += d[off];
2512 0 : off++;
2513 : }
2514 :
2515 0 : return off == len;
2516 : }
2517 : # endif
2518 :
2519 370 : static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2520 : unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2521 : {
2522 : unsigned short length;
2523 : unsigned short type;
2524 : unsigned short size;
2525 370 : unsigned char *data = *p;
2526 : int tlsext_servername = 0;
2527 : int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2528 :
2529 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2530 370 : s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2531 : # endif
2532 370 : s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2533 :
2534 370 : if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2535 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2536 0 : s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2537 : }
2538 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2539 370 : s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2540 : SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2541 : # endif
2542 :
2543 370 : if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2544 : goto ri_check;
2545 :
2546 370 : n2s(data, length);
2547 370 : if (data + length != d + n) {
2548 0 : *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2549 0 : return 0;
2550 : }
2551 :
2552 2590 : while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2553 2220 : n2s(data, type);
2554 2220 : n2s(data, size);
2555 :
2556 2220 : if (data + size > (d + n))
2557 : goto ri_check;
2558 :
2559 2220 : if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2560 0 : s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2561 :
2562 2220 : if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2563 370 : if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2564 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2565 0 : return 0;
2566 : }
2567 : tlsext_servername = 1;
2568 : }
2569 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2570 1850 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2571 : unsigned char *sdata = data;
2572 370 : int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2573 :
2574 370 : if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2575 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2576 0 : return 0;
2577 : }
2578 370 : if (!s->hit) {
2579 370 : s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2580 370 : if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2581 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2582 740 : if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2583 370 : OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2584 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2585 0 : return 0;
2586 : }
2587 370 : s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2588 : ecpointformatlist_length;
2589 370 : memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2590 : ecpointformatlist_length);
2591 : }
2592 : # if 0
2593 : fprintf(stderr,
2594 : "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2595 : sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2596 : for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2597 : fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2598 : fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2599 : # endif
2600 : }
2601 : # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2602 :
2603 1480 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2604 370 : if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2605 0 : !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2606 : s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2607 : {
2608 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2609 0 : return 0;
2610 : }
2611 370 : if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2612 370 : || (size > 0)) {
2613 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2614 0 : return 0;
2615 : }
2616 370 : s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2617 : }
2618 : # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2619 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2620 : unsigned char *sdata = data;
2621 :
2622 : if (size < 2) {
2623 : *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2624 : return 0;
2625 : }
2626 : n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2627 : if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2628 : *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2629 : return 0;
2630 : }
2631 :
2632 : if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2633 : /* shouldn't really happen */
2634 : OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2635 : }
2636 : if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2637 : /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2638 : s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2639 : } else {
2640 : s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2641 : BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2642 : }
2643 :
2644 : if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2645 : *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2646 : return 0;
2647 : }
2648 : }
2649 : # endif
2650 1110 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2651 : /*
2652 : * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2653 : * request message.
2654 : */
2655 0 : if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2656 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2657 0 : return 0;
2658 : }
2659 : /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2660 0 : s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2661 : }
2662 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2663 1110 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2664 0 : s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2665 : unsigned char *selected;
2666 : unsigned char selected_len;
2667 :
2668 : /* We must have requested it. */
2669 0 : if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2670 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2671 0 : return 0;
2672 : }
2673 : /* The data must be valid */
2674 0 : if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2675 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2676 0 : return 0;
2677 : }
2678 0 : if (s->
2679 0 : ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2680 : size,
2681 : s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2682 : SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2683 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2684 0 : return 0;
2685 : }
2686 0 : s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2687 0 : if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2688 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2689 0 : return 0;
2690 : }
2691 0 : memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2692 0 : s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2693 0 : s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2694 : }
2695 : # endif
2696 :
2697 1110 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2698 : unsigned len;
2699 :
2700 : /* We must have requested it. */
2701 370 : if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2702 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2703 0 : return 0;
2704 : }
2705 370 : if (size < 4) {
2706 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2707 0 : return 0;
2708 : }
2709 : /*-
2710 : * The extension data consists of:
2711 : * uint16 list_length
2712 : * uint8 proto_length;
2713 : * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2714 : */
2715 370 : len = data[0];
2716 370 : len <<= 8;
2717 370 : len |= data[1];
2718 370 : if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2719 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2720 0 : return 0;
2721 : }
2722 370 : len = data[2];
2723 370 : if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2724 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2725 0 : return 0;
2726 : }
2727 370 : if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2728 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2729 370 : s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2730 370 : if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2731 0 : *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2732 0 : return 0;
2733 : }
2734 370 : memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2735 370 : s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2736 : }
2737 :
2738 740 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2739 370 : if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2740 : return 0;
2741 : renegotiate_seen = 1;
2742 : }
2743 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2744 370 : else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2745 370 : switch (data[0]) {
2746 : case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2747 370 : s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2748 370 : break;
2749 : case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2750 0 : s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2751 0 : s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2752 0 : break;
2753 : default:
2754 0 : *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2755 0 : return 0;
2756 : }
2757 : }
2758 : # endif
2759 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2760 0 : else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2761 0 : if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2762 : return 0;
2763 : }
2764 : # endif
2765 : /*
2766 : * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2767 : * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2768 : */
2769 0 : else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2770 : return 0;
2771 :
2772 : data += size;
2773 : }
2774 :
2775 370 : if (data != d + n) {
2776 0 : *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2777 0 : return 0;
2778 : }
2779 :
2780 370 : if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2781 370 : if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2782 370 : if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2783 370 : s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2784 370 : if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2785 0 : *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2786 0 : return 0;
2787 : }
2788 : } else {
2789 0 : *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2790 0 : return 0;
2791 : }
2792 : }
2793 : }
2794 :
2795 370 : *p = data;
2796 :
2797 : ri_check:
2798 :
2799 : /*
2800 : * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2801 : * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2802 : * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2803 : * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2804 : * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2805 : * initial connect only.
2806 : */
2807 370 : if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2808 0 : && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2809 0 : *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2810 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2811 : SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2812 0 : return 0;
2813 : }
2814 :
2815 : return 1;
2816 : }
2817 :
2818 373 : int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2819 : {
2820 :
2821 : # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2822 : {
2823 : int r = 1;
2824 :
2825 : if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2826 : r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2827 : s->
2828 : ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2829 : if (!r)
2830 : return -1;
2831 : }
2832 :
2833 : if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2834 : if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2835 : /* shouldn't really happen */
2836 : OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2837 : }
2838 :
2839 : if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2840 : /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2841 : s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2842 : } else {
2843 : s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2844 : BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2845 : s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2846 : }
2847 : if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2848 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2849 : ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2850 : return -1;
2851 : }
2852 : s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
2853 : s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2854 : }
2855 :
2856 : if (r == 2)
2857 : /*
2858 : * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
2859 : * server opaque PRF input
2860 : */
2861 : s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2862 : s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2863 : }
2864 : # endif
2865 :
2866 373 : return 1;
2867 : }
2868 :
2869 373 : int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2870 : {
2871 373 : return 1;
2872 : }
2873 :
2874 373 : static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2875 : {
2876 : int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2877 373 : int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2878 :
2879 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2880 : /*
2881 : * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2882 : * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2883 : */
2884 : /*
2885 : * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2886 : * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2887 : */
2888 : # endif
2889 :
2890 373 : if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2891 373 : ret =
2892 373 : s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2893 : s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2894 0 : else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2895 0 : && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2896 0 : ret =
2897 0 : s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2898 : s->
2899 : initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2900 :
2901 : # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2902 : {
2903 : /*
2904 : * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
2905 : * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
2906 : * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
2907 : */
2908 :
2909 : int r = 1;
2910 :
2911 : if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2912 : r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2913 : s->
2914 : ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2915 : if (!r) {
2916 : ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2917 : al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2918 : goto err;
2919 : }
2920 : }
2921 :
2922 : if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2923 : /* shouldn't really happen */
2924 : OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2925 : }
2926 : s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2927 :
2928 : if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2929 : if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2930 : s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
2931 : s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
2932 : /*
2933 : * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
2934 : * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
2935 : */
2936 :
2937 : if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2938 : /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2939 : s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2940 : } else {
2941 : s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2942 : BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2943 : s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2944 : }
2945 : if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2946 : ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2947 : al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2948 : goto err;
2949 : }
2950 : s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2951 : s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2952 : }
2953 : }
2954 :
2955 : if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2956 : /*
2957 : * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
2958 : * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
2959 : * handshake.
2960 : */
2961 : ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2962 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2963 : }
2964 : }
2965 :
2966 : err:
2967 : # endif
2968 373 : switch (ret) {
2969 : case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2970 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2971 0 : return -1;
2972 :
2973 : case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2974 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2975 0 : return 1;
2976 :
2977 : case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2978 0 : s->servername_done = 0;
2979 : default:
2980 : return 1;
2981 : }
2982 : }
2983 :
2984 373 : int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2985 : {
2986 : int al;
2987 : size_t i;
2988 : /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2989 373 : if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2990 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2991 0 : s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2992 0 : s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2993 : }
2994 : /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2995 2984 : for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2996 2984 : s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2997 2984 : s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2998 : }
2999 :
3000 : /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3001 373 : if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
3002 373 : if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
3003 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3004 : al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3005 0 : goto err;
3006 : }
3007 : /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3008 373 : if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
3009 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3010 : SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3011 : al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3012 0 : goto err;
3013 : }
3014 : } else
3015 0 : ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3016 : return 1;
3017 : err:
3018 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3019 0 : return 0;
3020 : }
3021 :
3022 373 : int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3023 : {
3024 : int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3025 : int al;
3026 :
3027 : /*
3028 : * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
3029 : * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
3030 : * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
3031 : * influence which certificate is sent
3032 : */
3033 373 : if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3034 : int r;
3035 : CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3036 0 : certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3037 : /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3038 0 : if (certpkey == NULL) {
3039 0 : s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3040 0 : return 1;
3041 : }
3042 : /*
3043 : * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
3044 : * et al can pick it up.
3045 : */
3046 0 : s->cert->key = certpkey;
3047 0 : r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3048 0 : switch (r) {
3049 : /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3050 : case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3051 0 : s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3052 0 : break;
3053 : /* status request response should be sent */
3054 : case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3055 0 : if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3056 0 : s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3057 : else
3058 0 : s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3059 : break;
3060 : /* something bad happened */
3061 : case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3062 : ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3063 : al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3064 0 : goto err;
3065 : }
3066 : } else
3067 373 : s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3068 :
3069 : err:
3070 373 : switch (ret) {
3071 : case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3072 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3073 0 : return -1;
3074 :
3075 : case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3076 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3077 0 : return 1;
3078 :
3079 : default:
3080 : return 1;
3081 : }
3082 : }
3083 :
3084 370 : int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3085 : {
3086 : int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3087 370 : int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3088 :
3089 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3090 : /*
3091 : * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3092 : * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3093 : * must contain uncompressed.
3094 : */
3095 370 : unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3096 370 : unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3097 370 : if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3098 0 : && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3099 0 : && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3100 0 : && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3101 0 : && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
3102 0 : || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3103 : /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3104 : size_t i;
3105 : unsigned char *list;
3106 : int found_uncompressed = 0;
3107 : list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3108 0 : for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3109 0 : if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3110 : found_uncompressed = 1;
3111 : break;
3112 : }
3113 : }
3114 0 : if (!found_uncompressed) {
3115 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3116 : SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3117 0 : return -1;
3118 : }
3119 : }
3120 : ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3121 : # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3122 :
3123 370 : if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3124 0 : ret =
3125 0 : s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3126 : s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3127 370 : else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3128 370 : && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3129 0 : ret =
3130 0 : s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3131 : s->
3132 : initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3133 :
3134 : # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3135 : if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
3136 : /*
3137 : * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
3138 : * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
3139 : * value from the server too.
3140 : */
3141 :
3142 : if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3143 : ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3144 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3145 : }
3146 :
3147 : /*
3148 : * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
3149 : * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
3150 : */
3151 : if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3152 : s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
3153 : s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
3154 : ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3155 : al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3156 : }
3157 : }
3158 : # endif
3159 :
3160 : /*
3161 : * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
3162 : * callback
3163 : */
3164 370 : if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3165 0 : && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3166 : int r;
3167 : /*
3168 : * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
3169 : * response.
3170 : */
3171 0 : if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
3172 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3173 0 : s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3174 : }
3175 0 : s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3176 0 : r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3177 0 : if (r == 0) {
3178 0 : al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3179 : ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3180 : }
3181 0 : if (r < 0) {
3182 0 : al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3183 : ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3184 : }
3185 : }
3186 :
3187 370 : switch (ret) {
3188 : case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3189 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3190 0 : return -1;
3191 :
3192 : case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3193 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3194 0 : return 1;
3195 :
3196 : case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3197 0 : s->servername_done = 0;
3198 : default:
3199 : return 1;
3200 : }
3201 : }
3202 :
3203 370 : int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
3204 : int n)
3205 : {
3206 370 : int al = -1;
3207 370 : if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3208 : return 1;
3209 370 : if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
3210 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3211 0 : return 0;
3212 : }
3213 :
3214 370 : if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3215 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3216 0 : return 0;
3217 : }
3218 : return 1;
3219 : }
3220 :
3221 : /*-
3222 : * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3223 : * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3224 : * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3225 : *
3226 : * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3227 : * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3228 : * extension, if any.
3229 : * len: the length of the session ID.
3230 : * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3231 : * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3232 : * point to the resulting session.
3233 : *
3234 : * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3235 : * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3236 : * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3237 : *
3238 : * Returns:
3239 : * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3240 : * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3241 : * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3242 : * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3243 : * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3244 : * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3245 : * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3246 : *
3247 : * Side effects:
3248 : * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3249 : * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3250 : * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3251 : * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3252 : * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3253 : * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3254 : */
3255 373 : int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3256 : const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3257 : {
3258 : /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3259 373 : const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3260 : unsigned short i;
3261 :
3262 373 : *ret = NULL;
3263 373 : s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3264 :
3265 : /*
3266 : * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3267 : * resumption.
3268 : */
3269 373 : if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3270 : return 0;
3271 373 : if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3272 : return 0;
3273 373 : if (p >= limit)
3274 : return -1;
3275 : /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3276 373 : if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3277 0 : i = *(p++);
3278 0 : p += i;
3279 0 : if (p >= limit)
3280 : return -1;
3281 : }
3282 : /* Skip past cipher list */
3283 373 : n2s(p, i);
3284 373 : p += i;
3285 373 : if (p >= limit)
3286 : return -1;
3287 : /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3288 373 : i = *(p++);
3289 373 : p += i;
3290 373 : if (p > limit)
3291 : return -1;
3292 : /* Now at start of extensions */
3293 373 : if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3294 : return 0;
3295 : n2s(p, i);
3296 1492 : while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
3297 : unsigned short type, size;
3298 1492 : n2s(p, type);
3299 1492 : n2s(p, size);
3300 1492 : if (p + size > limit)
3301 : return 0;
3302 1492 : if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3303 : int r;
3304 373 : if (size == 0) {
3305 : /*
3306 : * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3307 : * one.
3308 : */
3309 373 : s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3310 373 : return 1;
3311 : }
3312 0 : if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3313 : /*
3314 : * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3315 : * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3316 : * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3317 : * calculate the master secret later.
3318 : */
3319 : return 2;
3320 : }
3321 0 : r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3322 0 : switch (r) {
3323 : case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3324 0 : s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3325 0 : return 2;
3326 : case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3327 0 : return r;
3328 : case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3329 0 : s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3330 0 : return 3;
3331 : default: /* fatal error */
3332 : return -1;
3333 : }
3334 : }
3335 : p += size;
3336 : }
3337 : return 0;
3338 : }
3339 :
3340 : /*-
3341 : * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3342 : *
3343 : * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3344 : * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3345 : * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3346 : * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3347 : * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3348 : * point to the resulting session.
3349 : *
3350 : * Returns:
3351 : * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3352 : * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3353 : * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3354 : * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3355 : */
3356 0 : static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3357 : int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3358 : int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3359 : {
3360 : SSL_SESSION *sess;
3361 : unsigned char *sdec;
3362 : const unsigned char *p;
3363 : int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3364 : unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3365 : HMAC_CTX hctx;
3366 : EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3367 0 : SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3368 : /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3369 0 : if (eticklen < 48)
3370 : return 2;
3371 : /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3372 0 : HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3373 0 : EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3374 0 : if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3375 : unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3376 0 : int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3377 : &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3378 0 : if (rv < 0)
3379 : return -1;
3380 0 : if (rv == 0)
3381 : return 2;
3382 0 : if (rv == 2)
3383 : renew_ticket = 1;
3384 : } else {
3385 : /* Check key name matches */
3386 0 : if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3387 : return 2;
3388 0 : HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3389 : tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3390 0 : EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3391 0 : tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3392 : }
3393 : /*
3394 : * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3395 : * checks on ticket.
3396 : */
3397 0 : mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3398 0 : if (mlen < 0) {
3399 0 : EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3400 0 : return -1;
3401 : }
3402 0 : eticklen -= mlen;
3403 : /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3404 0 : HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3405 0 : HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3406 0 : HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3407 0 : if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3408 0 : EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3409 0 : return 2;
3410 : }
3411 : /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3412 : /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3413 0 : p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3414 0 : eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3415 0 : sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3416 0 : if (!sdec) {
3417 0 : EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3418 0 : return -1;
3419 : }
3420 0 : EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3421 0 : if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3422 0 : EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3423 0 : OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3424 0 : return 2;
3425 : }
3426 0 : slen += mlen;
3427 0 : EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3428 0 : p = sdec;
3429 :
3430 0 : sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3431 0 : OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3432 0 : if (sess) {
3433 : /*
3434 : * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3435 : * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3436 : * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3437 : * standard.
3438 : */
3439 0 : if (sesslen)
3440 0 : memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3441 0 : sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3442 0 : *psess = sess;
3443 0 : if (renew_ticket)
3444 : return 4;
3445 : else
3446 0 : return 3;
3447 : }
3448 0 : ERR_clear_error();
3449 : /*
3450 : * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3451 : */
3452 0 : return 2;
3453 : }
3454 :
3455 : /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3456 :
3457 : typedef struct {
3458 : int nid;
3459 : int id;
3460 : } tls12_lookup;
3461 :
3462 : static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3463 : {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3464 : {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3465 : {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3466 : {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3467 : {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3468 : {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3469 : };
3470 :
3471 : static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3472 : {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3473 : {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3474 : {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3475 : };
3476 :
3477 : static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3478 : {
3479 : size_t i;
3480 1865 : for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3481 2981 : if (table[i].nid == nid)
3482 1116 : return table[i].id;
3483 : }
3484 : return -1;
3485 : }
3486 :
3487 : static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3488 : {
3489 : size_t i;
3490 22380 : for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3491 33570 : if ((table[i].id) == id)
3492 11190 : return table[i].nid;
3493 : }
3494 : return NID_undef;
3495 : }
3496 :
3497 373 : int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3498 : const EVP_MD *md)
3499 : {
3500 : int sig_id, md_id;
3501 373 : if (!md)
3502 : return 0;
3503 373 : md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3504 : sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3505 373 : if (md_id == -1)
3506 : return 0;
3507 : sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3508 373 : if (sig_id == -1)
3509 : return 0;
3510 373 : p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3511 373 : p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3512 373 : return 1;
3513 : }
3514 :
3515 0 : int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3516 : {
3517 743 : return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3518 : sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3519 : }
3520 :
3521 12679 : const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3522 : {
3523 12679 : switch (hash_alg) {
3524 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3525 : case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3526 : # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3527 : if (FIPS_mode())
3528 : return NULL;
3529 : # endif
3530 0 : return EVP_md5();
3531 : # endif
3532 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3533 : case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3534 2238 : return EVP_sha1();
3535 : # endif
3536 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3537 : case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3538 2238 : return EVP_sha224();
3539 :
3540 : case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3541 2238 : return EVP_sha256();
3542 : # endif
3543 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3544 : case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3545 2238 : return EVP_sha384();
3546 :
3547 : case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3548 3727 : return EVP_sha512();
3549 : # endif
3550 : default:
3551 : return NULL;
3552 :
3553 : }
3554 : }
3555 :
3556 : static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3557 : {
3558 : switch (sig_alg) {
3559 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3560 : case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3561 : return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3562 : # endif
3563 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3564 : case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3565 : return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3566 : # endif
3567 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3568 : case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3569 : return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3570 : # endif
3571 : }
3572 : return -1;
3573 : }
3574 :
3575 : /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3576 5595 : static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3577 : int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3578 : {
3579 : int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3580 5595 : if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3581 5595 : return;
3582 5595 : if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3583 5595 : hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3584 : sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3585 5595 : if (phash_nid)
3586 5595 : *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3587 : }
3588 5595 : if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3589 5595 : sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3590 : sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3591 5595 : if (psign_nid)
3592 5595 : *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3593 : }
3594 5595 : if (psignhash_nid) {
3595 5595 : if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3596 5595 : OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3597 : else
3598 0 : *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3599 : }
3600 : }
3601 :
3602 : /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3603 746 : static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3604 : const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3605 : const unsigned char *allow,
3606 : size_t allowlen)
3607 : {
3608 : const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3609 : size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3610 11936 : for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3611 : /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3612 11190 : if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3613 0 : continue;
3614 11190 : if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3615 0 : continue;
3616 78330 : for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3617 89520 : if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3618 11190 : nmatch++;
3619 11190 : if (shsig) {
3620 5595 : shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3621 5595 : shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3622 5595 : tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3623 : &shsig->sign_nid,
3624 : &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3625 5595 : shsig++;
3626 : }
3627 : break;
3628 : }
3629 : }
3630 : }
3631 746 : return nmatch;
3632 : }
3633 :
3634 : /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3635 373 : static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3636 : {
3637 : const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3638 : size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3639 : size_t nmatch;
3640 : TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3641 373 : CERT *c = s->cert;
3642 373 : unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3643 373 : if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3644 0 : OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3645 0 : c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3646 0 : c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3647 : }
3648 : /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3649 373 : if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3650 0 : conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3651 0 : conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3652 373 : } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3653 0 : conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3654 0 : conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3655 : } else
3656 373 : conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3657 373 : if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3658 0 : pref = conf;
3659 : preflen = conflen;
3660 0 : allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3661 0 : allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3662 : } else {
3663 373 : allow = conf;
3664 : allowlen = conflen;
3665 373 : pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3666 373 : preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3667 : }
3668 373 : nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3669 373 : if (nmatch) {
3670 373 : salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3671 373 : if (!salgs)
3672 : return 0;
3673 373 : nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3674 : } else {
3675 : salgs = NULL;
3676 : }
3677 373 : c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3678 373 : c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3679 373 : return 1;
3680 : }
3681 :
3682 : /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3683 :
3684 373 : int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3685 : {
3686 373 : CERT *c = s->cert;
3687 : /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3688 373 : if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3689 : return 1;
3690 : /* Should never happen */
3691 373 : if (!c)
3692 : return 0;
3693 :
3694 373 : if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3695 0 : OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3696 373 : c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3697 373 : if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3698 : return 0;
3699 373 : c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3700 : memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3701 373 : return 1;
3702 : }
3703 :
3704 373 : int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3705 : {
3706 : int idx;
3707 : size_t i;
3708 : const EVP_MD *md;
3709 373 : CERT *c = s->cert;
3710 : TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3711 373 : if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3712 : return 0;
3713 :
3714 : # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3715 : if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3716 : /*
3717 : * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3718 : * ignoring any peer preferences.
3719 : */
3720 : const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3721 : if (s->server)
3722 : sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3723 : else
3724 : sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3725 : if (sigs) {
3726 : idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3727 : md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3728 : c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3729 : c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3730 : if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3731 : c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3732 : CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3733 : c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3734 : }
3735 : }
3736 : }
3737 : # endif
3738 :
3739 6341 : for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3740 5595 : i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3741 5595 : idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3742 5595 : if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3743 1119 : md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3744 1119 : c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3745 1119 : c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3746 1119 : if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3747 373 : c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3748 : CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3749 373 : c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3750 : }
3751 : }
3752 :
3753 : }
3754 : /*
3755 : * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3756 : * the certificate for signing.
3757 : */
3758 373 : if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3759 : /*
3760 : * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3761 : * supported it stays as NULL.
3762 : */
3763 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3764 373 : if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3765 0 : c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3766 : # endif
3767 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3768 373 : if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3769 0 : c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3770 0 : c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3771 : }
3772 : # endif
3773 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3774 373 : if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3775 0 : c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3776 : # endif
3777 : }
3778 : return 1;
3779 : }
3780 :
3781 0 : int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3782 : int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3783 : unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3784 : {
3785 0 : const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3786 0 : if (psig == NULL)
3787 : return 0;
3788 0 : if (idx >= 0) {
3789 0 : idx <<= 1;
3790 0 : if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3791 : return 0;
3792 0 : psig += idx;
3793 0 : if (rhash)
3794 0 : *rhash = psig[0];
3795 0 : if (rsig)
3796 0 : *rsig = psig[1];
3797 0 : tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3798 : }
3799 0 : return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3800 : }
3801 :
3802 0 : int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3803 : int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3804 : unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3805 : {
3806 0 : TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3807 0 : if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3808 : return 0;
3809 0 : shsigalgs += idx;
3810 0 : if (phash)
3811 0 : *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3812 0 : if (psign)
3813 0 : *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3814 0 : if (psignhash)
3815 0 : *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3816 0 : if (rsig)
3817 0 : *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3818 0 : if (rhash)
3819 0 : *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3820 0 : return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3821 : }
3822 :
3823 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3824 0 : int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3825 : {
3826 0 : unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3827 : unsigned short hbtype;
3828 : unsigned int payload;
3829 : unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3830 :
3831 0 : if (s->msg_callback)
3832 0 : s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3833 0 : &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3834 : s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3835 :
3836 : /* Read type and payload length first */
3837 0 : if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3838 : return 0; /* silently discard */
3839 0 : hbtype = *p++;
3840 0 : n2s(p, payload);
3841 0 : if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3842 : return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3843 0 : pl = p;
3844 :
3845 0 : if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3846 : unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3847 : int r;
3848 :
3849 : /*
3850 : * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3851 : * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3852 : */
3853 0 : buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3854 : bp = buffer;
3855 :
3856 : /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3857 0 : *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3858 0 : s2n(payload, bp);
3859 0 : memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3860 0 : bp += payload;
3861 : /* Random padding */
3862 0 : if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
3863 0 : OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3864 0 : return -1;
3865 : }
3866 :
3867 0 : r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3868 : 3 + payload + padding);
3869 :
3870 0 : if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3871 0 : s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3872 : buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3873 : s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3874 :
3875 0 : OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3876 :
3877 0 : if (r < 0)
3878 0 : return r;
3879 0 : } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3880 : unsigned int seq;
3881 :
3882 : /*
3883 : * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3884 : * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3885 : */
3886 0 : n2s(pl, seq);
3887 :
3888 0 : if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3889 0 : s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
3890 0 : s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3891 : }
3892 : }
3893 :
3894 : return 0;
3895 : }
3896 :
3897 0 : int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3898 : {
3899 : unsigned char *buf, *p;
3900 : int ret = -1;
3901 : unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3902 : unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3903 :
3904 : /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3905 0 : if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3906 : s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3907 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3908 0 : return -1;
3909 : }
3910 :
3911 : /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3912 0 : if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3913 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3914 0 : return -1;
3915 : }
3916 :
3917 : /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3918 0 : if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3919 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3920 0 : return -1;
3921 : }
3922 :
3923 : /*
3924 : * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3925 : * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3926 : */
3927 : OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3928 :
3929 : /*-
3930 : * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3931 : * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3932 : * some random stuff.
3933 : * - Message Type, 1 byte
3934 : * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3935 : * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3936 : * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3937 : * - Padding
3938 : */
3939 0 : buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3940 : p = buf;
3941 : /* Message Type */
3942 0 : *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3943 : /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3944 0 : s2n(payload, p);
3945 : /* Sequence number */
3946 0 : s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3947 : /* 16 random bytes */
3948 0 : if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) {
3949 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3950 0 : goto err;
3951 : }
3952 0 : p += 16;
3953 : /* Random padding */
3954 0 : if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) {
3955 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3956 0 : goto err;
3957 : }
3958 :
3959 0 : ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3960 0 : if (ret >= 0) {
3961 0 : if (s->msg_callback)
3962 0 : s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3963 : buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3964 : s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3965 :
3966 0 : s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3967 : }
3968 :
3969 : err:
3970 0 : OPENSSL_free(buf);
3971 :
3972 0 : return ret;
3973 : }
3974 : # endif
3975 :
3976 : # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3977 :
3978 : typedef struct {
3979 : size_t sigalgcnt;
3980 : int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3981 : } sig_cb_st;
3982 :
3983 0 : static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3984 : {
3985 : sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3986 : size_t i;
3987 : char etmp[20], *p;
3988 : int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3989 0 : if (elem == NULL)
3990 : return 0;
3991 0 : if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3992 : return 0;
3993 0 : if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3994 : return 0;
3995 0 : memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3996 0 : etmp[len] = 0;
3997 0 : p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3998 0 : if (!p)
3999 : return 0;
4000 0 : *p = 0;
4001 0 : p++;
4002 0 : if (!*p)
4003 : return 0;
4004 :
4005 0 : if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4006 : sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4007 0 : else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4008 : sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4009 0 : else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4010 : sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4011 : else
4012 : return 0;
4013 :
4014 0 : hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4015 0 : if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4016 0 : hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4017 0 : if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4018 : return 0;
4019 :
4020 0 : for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
4021 0 : if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4022 : return 0;
4023 : }
4024 0 : sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4025 0 : sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4026 0 : return 1;
4027 : }
4028 :
4029 : /*
4030 : * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
4031 : * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
4032 : */
4033 0 : int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4034 : {
4035 : sig_cb_st sig;
4036 0 : sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
4037 0 : if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4038 : return 0;
4039 0 : if (c == NULL)
4040 : return 1;
4041 0 : return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4042 : }
4043 :
4044 0 : int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
4045 : int client)
4046 : {
4047 : unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4048 : int rhash, rsign;
4049 : size_t i;
4050 0 : if (salglen & 1)
4051 : return 0;
4052 0 : sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4053 0 : if (sigalgs == NULL)
4054 : return 0;
4055 0 : for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
4056 0 : rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4057 : sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4058 0 : rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4059 : sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4060 :
4061 0 : if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4062 : goto err;
4063 0 : *sptr++ = rhash;
4064 0 : *sptr++ = rsign;
4065 : }
4066 :
4067 0 : if (client) {
4068 0 : if (c->client_sigalgs)
4069 0 : OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4070 0 : c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4071 0 : c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4072 : } else {
4073 0 : if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4074 0 : OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4075 0 : c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4076 0 : c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4077 : }
4078 :
4079 : return 1;
4080 :
4081 : err:
4082 0 : OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4083 0 : return 0;
4084 : }
4085 :
4086 0 : static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4087 : {
4088 : int sig_nid;
4089 : size_t i;
4090 0 : if (default_nid == -1)
4091 : return 1;
4092 0 : sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4093 0 : if (default_nid)
4094 0 : return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4095 0 : for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4096 0 : if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4097 : return 1;
4098 : return 0;
4099 : }
4100 :
4101 : /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4102 0 : static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4103 : {
4104 : X509_NAME *nm;
4105 : int i;
4106 0 : nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4107 0 : for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4108 0 : if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4109 : return 1;
4110 : }
4111 : return 0;
4112 : }
4113 :
4114 : /*
4115 : * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4116 : * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4117 : * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4118 : * attempting to use them.
4119 : */
4120 :
4121 : /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4122 :
4123 : # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4124 : (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4125 : /* Strict mode flags */
4126 : # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4127 : (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4128 : | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4129 :
4130 2238 : int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4131 : int idx)
4132 : {
4133 : int i;
4134 : int rv = 0;
4135 : int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4136 : CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4137 2238 : CERT *c = s->cert;
4138 2238 : unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4139 : /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4140 2238 : if (idx != -1) {
4141 : /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4142 2238 : if (idx == -2) {
4143 0 : cpk = c->key;
4144 0 : idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4145 : } else
4146 2238 : cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4147 2238 : x = cpk->x509;
4148 2238 : pk = cpk->privatekey;
4149 2238 : chain = cpk->chain;
4150 2238 : strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4151 : /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4152 2238 : if (!x || !pk)
4153 : goto end;
4154 : # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4155 : /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4156 : if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
4157 : rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
4158 : CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4159 : cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4160 : return rv;
4161 : }
4162 : # endif
4163 : } else {
4164 0 : if (!x || !pk)
4165 : return 0;
4166 0 : idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4167 0 : if (idx == -1)
4168 : return 0;
4169 0 : cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4170 0 : if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4171 : check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4172 : else
4173 : check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4174 : strict_mode = 1;
4175 : }
4176 :
4177 373 : if (suiteb_flags) {
4178 : int ok;
4179 0 : if (check_flags)
4180 0 : check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4181 0 : ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4182 0 : if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4183 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4184 0 : else if (!check_flags)
4185 : goto end;
4186 : }
4187 :
4188 : /*
4189 : * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4190 : * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4191 : */
4192 373 : if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4193 : int default_nid;
4194 : unsigned char rsign = 0;
4195 0 : if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4196 : default_nid = 0;
4197 : /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4198 : else {
4199 : switch (idx) {
4200 : case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4201 : case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4202 : case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4203 : rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4204 : default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4205 : break;
4206 :
4207 : case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4208 : case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4209 : rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4210 : default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4211 0 : break;
4212 :
4213 : case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4214 : rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4215 : default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4216 0 : break;
4217 :
4218 : default:
4219 : default_nid = -1;
4220 0 : break;
4221 : }
4222 : }
4223 : /*
4224 : * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4225 : * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4226 : */
4227 0 : if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4228 : size_t j;
4229 : const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4230 0 : for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4231 0 : if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4232 : break;
4233 : }
4234 0 : if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4235 0 : if (check_flags)
4236 : goto skip_sigs;
4237 : else
4238 : goto end;
4239 : }
4240 : }
4241 : /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4242 0 : if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4243 0 : if (!check_flags)
4244 : goto end;
4245 : } else
4246 0 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4247 0 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4248 0 : for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4249 0 : if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4250 0 : if (check_flags) {
4251 0 : rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4252 0 : break;
4253 : } else
4254 : goto end;
4255 : }
4256 : }
4257 : }
4258 : /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4259 373 : else if (check_flags)
4260 0 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4261 : skip_sigs:
4262 : /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4263 373 : if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4264 373 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4265 0 : else if (!check_flags)
4266 : goto end;
4267 373 : if (!s->server)
4268 0 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4269 : /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4270 373 : else if (strict_mode) {
4271 0 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4272 0 : for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4273 0 : X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4274 0 : if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4275 0 : if (check_flags) {
4276 0 : rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4277 0 : break;
4278 : } else
4279 : goto end;
4280 : }
4281 : }
4282 : }
4283 373 : if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4284 : STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4285 : int check_type = 0;
4286 0 : switch (pk->type) {
4287 : case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4288 : check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4289 0 : break;
4290 : case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4291 : check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4292 0 : break;
4293 : case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4294 : check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4295 0 : break;
4296 : case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4297 : case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4298 : {
4299 0 : int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4300 0 : if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4301 : check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4302 0 : if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4303 : check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4304 : }
4305 : }
4306 0 : if (check_type) {
4307 : const unsigned char *ctypes;
4308 : int ctypelen;
4309 0 : if (c->ctypes) {
4310 : ctypes = c->ctypes;
4311 0 : ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4312 : } else {
4313 0 : ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4314 0 : ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4315 : }
4316 0 : for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4317 0 : if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4318 0 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4319 0 : break;
4320 : }
4321 : }
4322 0 : if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4323 : goto end;
4324 : } else
4325 0 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4326 :
4327 0 : ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4328 :
4329 0 : if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4330 0 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4331 :
4332 0 : if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4333 0 : if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4334 0 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4335 : }
4336 0 : if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4337 0 : for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4338 0 : X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4339 0 : if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4340 0 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4341 0 : break;
4342 : }
4343 : }
4344 : }
4345 0 : if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4346 : goto end;
4347 : } else
4348 373 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4349 :
4350 373 : if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4351 373 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4352 :
4353 : end:
4354 :
4355 2238 : if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4356 2238 : if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4357 1492 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4358 746 : else if (cpk->digest)
4359 0 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4360 : } else
4361 0 : rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4362 :
4363 : /*
4364 : * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4365 : * chain is invalid.
4366 : */
4367 2238 : if (!check_flags) {
4368 2238 : if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4369 373 : cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4370 : else {
4371 : /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4372 1865 : cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4373 1865 : return 0;
4374 : }
4375 : }
4376 373 : return rv;
4377 : }
4378 :
4379 : /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4380 373 : void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4381 : {
4382 373 : tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4383 373 : tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4384 373 : tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4385 373 : tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4386 373 : tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4387 373 : tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4388 373 : }
4389 :
4390 : /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4391 0 : int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4392 : {
4393 0 : return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4394 : }
4395 :
4396 : #endif
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