Line data Source code
1 : /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 : /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 : * All rights reserved.
4 : *
5 : * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 : * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 : * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 : *
9 : * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 : * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 : * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 : * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 : * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 : * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 : *
16 : * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 : * the code are not to be removed.
18 : * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 : * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 : * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 : * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 : *
23 : * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 : * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 : * are met:
26 : * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 : * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 : * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 : * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 : * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 : * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 : * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 : * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 : * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 : * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 : * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 : * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 : *
41 : * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 : * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 : * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 : * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 : * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 : * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 : * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 : * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 : * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 : * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 : * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 : *
53 : * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 : * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 : * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 : * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 : */
58 : /* ====================================================================
59 : * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 : *
61 : * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 : * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 : * are met:
64 : *
65 : * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 : *
68 : * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 : * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 : * distribution.
72 : *
73 : * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 : * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 : * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 : * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 : *
78 : * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 : * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 : * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 : * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 : *
83 : * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 : * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 : * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 : *
87 : * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 : * acknowledgment:
89 : * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 : * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 : *
92 : * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 : * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 : * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 : * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 : * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 : * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 : * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 : * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 : * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 : * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 : * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 : * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 : * ====================================================================
105 : *
106 : * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 : * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 : * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 : *
110 : */
111 : /* ====================================================================
112 : * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 : *
114 : * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 : * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 : *
117 : * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 : * license provided above.
119 : *
120 : * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 : * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 : *
123 : */
124 : /* ====================================================================
125 : * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 : *
127 : * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 : * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 : * license.
130 : *
131 : * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 : * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 : * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 : *
135 : * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 : * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 : * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 : *
139 : * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 : * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 : * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 : * to make use of the Contribution.
143 : *
144 : * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 : * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 : * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 : * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 : * OTHERWISE.
149 : */
150 :
151 : #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 : #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153 :
154 : #include <stdio.h>
155 : #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 : #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 : #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 : #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 : #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 : #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 : #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 : #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 : #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 : # include <openssl/dh.h>
166 : #endif
167 : #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 : # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 : #endif
171 : #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 :
173 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 : static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
175 :
176 0 : static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
177 : {
178 0 : if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 : return (SSLv3_server_method());
180 : else
181 0 : return (NULL);
182 : }
183 :
184 0 : IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
185 : ssl3_accept,
186 : ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
187 : #endif
188 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 373 : static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
190 : {
191 : int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
192 :
193 373 : *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
194 :
195 373 : if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 0 : (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 0 : if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
198 : /*
199 : * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
200 : * login name
201 : */
202 : ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
203 0 : *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
204 : } else {
205 0 : ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
206 : }
207 : }
208 373 : return ret;
209 : }
210 : #endif
211 :
212 740 : int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
213 : {
214 : BUF_MEM *buf;
215 740 : unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 : void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
217 : int ret = -1;
218 : int new_state, state, skip = 0;
219 :
220 740 : RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
221 740 : ERR_clear_error();
222 740 : clear_sys_error();
223 :
224 740 : if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 : cb = s->info_callback;
226 0 : else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 : cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
228 :
229 : /* init things to blank */
230 740 : s->in_handshake++;
231 740 : if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
232 373 : SSL_clear(s);
233 :
234 740 : if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
236 0 : return (-1);
237 : }
238 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
239 : /*
240 : * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 : * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
242 : * handshakes anyway.
243 : */
244 740 : if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 0 : s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
246 0 : s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
247 : }
248 : #endif
249 :
250 : for (;;) {
251 6666 : state = s->state;
252 :
253 6666 : switch (s->state) {
254 : case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
255 0 : s->renegotiate = 1;
256 : /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
257 :
258 : case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
259 : case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
260 : case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 : case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
262 :
263 373 : s->server = 1;
264 373 : if (cb != NULL)
265 373 : cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
266 :
267 373 : if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
270 0 : return -1;
271 : }
272 373 : s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
273 :
274 373 : if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
275 373 : if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
276 : ret = -1;
277 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
278 0 : goto end;
279 : }
280 373 : if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
281 0 : BUF_MEM_free(buf);
282 : ret = -1;
283 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
284 0 : goto end;
285 : }
286 373 : s->init_buf = buf;
287 : }
288 :
289 373 : if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
290 : ret = -1;
291 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
292 0 : goto end;
293 : }
294 :
295 373 : s->init_num = 0;
296 373 : s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
297 373 : s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
298 : /*
299 : * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
300 : */
301 373 : s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
302 :
303 373 : if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
304 : /*
305 : * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 : * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 : */
308 373 : if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
309 : ret = -1;
310 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
311 0 : goto end;
312 : }
313 :
314 373 : ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
315 373 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
316 373 : s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
317 0 : } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
318 0 : !(s->options &
319 : SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
320 : /*
321 : * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 : * support secure renegotiation.
323 : */
324 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
325 : SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
326 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
327 : ret = -1;
328 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
329 0 : goto end;
330 : } else {
331 : /*
332 : * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
333 : * HelloRequest
334 : */
335 0 : s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
337 : }
338 : break;
339 :
340 : case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 : case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
342 :
343 0 : s->shutdown = 0;
344 0 : ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
345 0 : if (ret <= 0)
346 : goto end;
347 0 : s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
348 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
349 0 : s->init_num = 0;
350 :
351 0 : ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
352 0 : break;
353 :
354 : case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
355 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
356 0 : break;
357 :
358 : case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
359 : case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
360 : case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
361 :
362 373 : s->shutdown = 0;
363 373 : ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
364 373 : if (ret <= 0)
365 : goto end;
366 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
367 373 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
368 : case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
369 : {
370 : int al;
371 373 : if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
372 : /*
373 : * callback indicates firther work to be done
374 : */
375 0 : s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
376 0 : goto end;
377 : }
378 373 : if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
379 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
380 : /*
381 : * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 : * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
383 : */
384 0 : if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
385 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
386 : ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
387 : ret = -1;
388 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
389 0 : goto end;
390 : }
391 : }
392 : #endif
393 :
394 373 : s->renegotiate = 2;
395 373 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
396 373 : s->init_num = 0;
397 373 : break;
398 :
399 : case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
400 : case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
401 373 : ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
402 373 : if (ret <= 0)
403 : goto end;
404 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
405 373 : if (s->hit) {
406 0 : if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
407 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
408 : else
409 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
410 : }
411 : #else
412 : if (s->hit)
413 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
414 : #endif
415 : else
416 373 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
417 373 : s->init_num = 0;
418 373 : break;
419 :
420 : case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
421 : case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
422 : /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
423 : /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
424 373 : if (!
425 373 : (s->s3->tmp.
426 373 : new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
427 : SSL_aSRP))
428 373 : && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
429 373 : ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
430 373 : if (ret <= 0)
431 : goto end;
432 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
433 373 : if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
434 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
435 : else
436 373 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
437 : } else {
438 : skip = 1;
439 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
440 : }
441 : #else
442 : } else
443 : skip = 1;
444 :
445 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
446 : #endif
447 373 : s->init_num = 0;
448 373 : break;
449 :
450 : case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
451 : case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
452 373 : alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
453 :
454 : /*
455 : * clear this, it may get reset by
456 : * send_server_key_exchange
457 : */
458 373 : s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
459 :
460 : /*
461 : * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
462 : * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
463 : * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
464 : * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
465 : * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
466 : * key exchange.
467 : */
468 373 : if (0
469 : /*
470 : * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
471 : * provided
472 : */
473 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
474 373 : || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
475 : #endif
476 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
477 : /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
478 : || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
479 : #endif
480 : || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
481 373 : || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
482 0 : || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
483 0 : && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
484 0 : || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
485 0 : && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
486 0 : [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
487 0 : 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
488 : )
489 : )
490 : )
491 : ) {
492 373 : ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
493 373 : if (ret <= 0)
494 : goto end;
495 : } else
496 : skip = 1;
497 :
498 373 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
499 373 : s->init_num = 0;
500 373 : break;
501 :
502 : case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
503 : case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
504 373 : if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 373 : !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
506 : /*
507 : * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
508 : * during re-negotiation:
509 : */
510 0 : ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
511 0 : (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
512 : /*
513 : * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
514 : * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
515 : * RFC 2246):
516 : */
517 0 : ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
518 : /*
519 : * ... except when the application insists on
520 : * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
521 : * this for SSL 3)
522 : */
523 0 : !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
524 : /*
525 : * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
526 : */
527 0 : (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
528 : /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
529 : (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
530 : /*
531 : * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
532 : * are omitted
533 : */
534 0 : || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
535 : /* no cert request */
536 : skip = 1;
537 373 : s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
538 373 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
539 373 : if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
540 0 : if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
541 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
542 0 : return -1;
543 : }
544 : }
545 : } else {
546 0 : s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
547 0 : ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
548 0 : if (ret <= 0)
549 : goto end;
550 : #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
551 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
552 : #else
553 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
554 0 : s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
555 : #endif
556 0 : s->init_num = 0;
557 : }
558 : break;
559 :
560 : case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
561 : case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
562 373 : ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
563 373 : if (ret <= 0)
564 : goto end;
565 373 : s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
566 373 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
567 373 : s->init_num = 0;
568 373 : break;
569 :
570 : case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
571 :
572 : /*
573 : * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
574 : * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
575 : * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
576 : * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
577 : * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
578 : * unconditionally.
579 : */
580 :
581 740 : s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
582 740 : if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
583 : ret = -1;
584 : goto end;
585 : }
586 740 : s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
587 :
588 740 : s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
589 740 : break;
590 :
591 : case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
592 : case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
593 373 : if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
594 0 : ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
595 0 : if (ret <= 0)
596 : goto end;
597 : }
598 373 : s->init_num = 0;
599 373 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
600 373 : break;
601 :
602 : case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
603 : case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
604 740 : ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
605 740 : if (ret <= 0)
606 : goto end;
607 367 : if (ret == 2) {
608 : /*
609 : * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
610 : * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
611 : * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
612 : * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
613 : */
614 : #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
615 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
616 : #else
617 0 : if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
618 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
619 : else
620 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
621 : #endif
622 0 : s->init_num = 0;
623 367 : } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
624 367 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
625 367 : s->init_num = 0;
626 367 : if (!s->session->peer)
627 : break;
628 : /*
629 : * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
630 : * digest cached records.
631 : */
632 0 : if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
633 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
634 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
635 0 : return -1;
636 : }
637 0 : s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
638 0 : if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
639 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
640 0 : return -1;
641 : }
642 : } else {
643 : int offset = 0;
644 : int dgst_num;
645 :
646 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
647 0 : s->init_num = 0;
648 :
649 : /*
650 : * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
651 : * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
652 : * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
653 : * step
654 : */
655 0 : if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
656 0 : if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
657 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
658 0 : return -1;
659 : }
660 : }
661 0 : for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
662 0 : if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
663 : int dgst_size;
664 :
665 0 : s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
666 : EVP_MD_CTX_type
667 : (s->
668 : s3->handshake_dgst
669 : [dgst_num]),
670 : &(s->s3->
671 : tmp.cert_verify_md
672 : [offset]));
673 0 : dgst_size =
674 0 : EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
675 0 : if (dgst_size < 0) {
676 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
677 : ret = -1;
678 0 : goto end;
679 : }
680 0 : offset += dgst_size;
681 : }
682 : }
683 : break;
684 :
685 : case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
686 : case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
687 367 : ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
688 367 : if (ret <= 0)
689 : goto end;
690 :
691 : #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
692 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
693 : #else
694 367 : if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
695 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
696 : else
697 367 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
698 : #endif
699 367 : s->init_num = 0;
700 367 : break;
701 :
702 : #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
703 : case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
704 : case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
705 : /*
706 : * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
707 : * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
708 : * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
709 : * cautious.
710 : * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
711 : * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
712 : * the client's Finished message is read.
713 : */
714 0 : if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
715 0 : s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
716 :
717 0 : ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
718 0 : if (ret <= 0)
719 : goto end;
720 0 : s->init_num = 0;
721 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
722 0 : break;
723 : #endif
724 :
725 : case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
726 : case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
727 : /*
728 : * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
729 : * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
730 : * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
731 : * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
732 : * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
733 : * the client's Finished message is read.
734 : */
735 367 : if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
736 367 : s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
737 367 : ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
738 : SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
739 367 : if (ret <= 0)
740 : goto end;
741 367 : if (s->hit)
742 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
743 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
744 367 : else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
745 367 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
746 : #endif
747 : else
748 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
749 367 : s->init_num = 0;
750 367 : break;
751 :
752 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
753 : case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
754 : case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
755 367 : ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
756 367 : if (ret <= 0)
757 : goto end;
758 367 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
759 367 : s->init_num = 0;
760 367 : break;
761 :
762 : case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
763 : case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
764 0 : ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
765 0 : if (ret <= 0)
766 : goto end;
767 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
768 0 : s->init_num = 0;
769 0 : break;
770 :
771 : #endif
772 :
773 : case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
774 : case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
775 :
776 367 : s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
777 367 : if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
778 : ret = -1;
779 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
780 0 : goto end;
781 : }
782 :
783 367 : ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
784 : SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
785 : SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
786 :
787 367 : if (ret <= 0)
788 : goto end;
789 367 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
790 367 : s->init_num = 0;
791 :
792 367 : if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
793 : SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
794 : {
795 : ret = -1;
796 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
797 0 : goto end;
798 : }
799 :
800 : break;
801 :
802 : case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
803 : case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
804 367 : ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
805 : SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
806 : SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
807 : s->method->
808 : ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
809 367 : s->method->
810 : ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
811 367 : if (ret <= 0)
812 : goto end;
813 367 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
814 367 : if (s->hit) {
815 : #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
816 : s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
817 : #else
818 0 : if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
819 0 : s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
820 : } else
821 0 : s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
822 : #endif
823 : } else
824 367 : s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
825 367 : s->init_num = 0;
826 367 : break;
827 :
828 : case SSL_ST_OK:
829 : /* clean a few things up */
830 367 : ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
831 :
832 367 : BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
833 367 : s->init_buf = NULL;
834 :
835 : /* remove buffering on output */
836 367 : ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
837 :
838 367 : s->init_num = 0;
839 :
840 367 : if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
841 : * HelloRequest */
842 367 : s->renegotiate = 0;
843 367 : s->new_session = 0;
844 :
845 367 : ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
846 :
847 367 : s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
848 : /* s->server=1; */
849 367 : s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
850 :
851 367 : if (cb != NULL)
852 367 : cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
853 : }
854 :
855 : ret = 1;
856 : goto end;
857 : /* break; */
858 :
859 : case SSL_ST_ERR:
860 : default:
861 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
862 : ret = -1;
863 0 : goto end;
864 : /* break; */
865 : }
866 :
867 5926 : if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
868 5553 : if (s->debug) {
869 0 : if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
870 : goto end;
871 : }
872 :
873 5553 : if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
874 : new_state = s->state;
875 5553 : s->state = state;
876 5553 : cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
877 5553 : s->state = new_state;
878 : }
879 : }
880 : skip = 0;
881 : }
882 : end:
883 : /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
884 :
885 740 : s->in_handshake--;
886 740 : if (cb != NULL)
887 740 : cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
888 740 : return (ret);
889 : }
890 :
891 0 : int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
892 : {
893 :
894 0 : if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
895 0 : ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
896 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
897 : }
898 :
899 : /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
900 0 : return ssl_do_write(s);
901 : }
902 :
903 373 : int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
904 : {
905 : int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
906 : unsigned int cookie_len;
907 : long n;
908 : unsigned long id;
909 : unsigned char *p, *d;
910 : SSL_CIPHER *c;
911 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
912 : unsigned char *q;
913 : SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
914 : #endif
915 373 : STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
916 :
917 373 : if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
918 : goto retry_cert;
919 :
920 : /*
921 : * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
922 : * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
923 : * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
924 : * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
925 : */
926 373 : if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
927 373 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
928 : }
929 373 : s->first_packet = 1;
930 373 : n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
931 : SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
932 : SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
933 : SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
934 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
935 :
936 373 : if (!ok)
937 0 : return ((int)n);
938 373 : s->first_packet = 0;
939 373 : d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
940 :
941 : /*
942 : * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
943 : * for session id length
944 : */
945 373 : if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
946 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
947 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
948 0 : goto f_err;
949 : }
950 :
951 : /*
952 : * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
953 : * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
954 : */
955 373 : s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
956 373 : p += 2;
957 :
958 746 : if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
959 0 : s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
960 373 : : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
961 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
962 0 : if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
963 0 : !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
964 : /*
965 : * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
966 : * number
967 : */
968 0 : s->version = s->client_version;
969 : }
970 : al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
971 : goto f_err;
972 : }
973 :
974 : /*
975 : * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
976 : * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
977 : * cookie length...
978 : */
979 373 : if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
980 : unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
981 :
982 0 : session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
983 :
984 0 : if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
985 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
986 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
987 0 : goto f_err;
988 : }
989 0 : cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
990 :
991 0 : if (cookie_length == 0)
992 : return 1;
993 : }
994 :
995 : /* load the client random */
996 373 : memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
997 373 : p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
998 :
999 : /* get the session-id */
1000 373 : j = *(p++);
1001 :
1002 373 : if (p + j > d + n) {
1003 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1004 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1005 0 : goto f_err;
1006 : }
1007 :
1008 373 : s->hit = 0;
1009 : /*
1010 : * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1011 : * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1012 : * ignore resumption requests with flag
1013 : * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1014 : * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1015 : * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1016 : * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1017 : * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1018 : * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1019 : * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1020 : */
1021 373 : if ((s->new_session
1022 0 : && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1023 0 : if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1024 : goto err;
1025 : } else {
1026 373 : i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1027 : /*
1028 : * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1029 : * version.
1030 : * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1031 : * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1032 : * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1033 : * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1034 : * will abort the handshake with an error.
1035 : */
1036 373 : if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1037 : * session */
1038 0 : s->hit = 1;
1039 373 : } else if (i == -1)
1040 : goto err;
1041 : else { /* i == 0 */
1042 :
1043 373 : if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1044 : goto err;
1045 : }
1046 : }
1047 :
1048 373 : p += j;
1049 :
1050 373 : if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1051 : /* cookie stuff */
1052 0 : if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1053 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1054 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1055 0 : goto f_err;
1056 : }
1057 0 : cookie_len = *(p++);
1058 :
1059 0 : if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1060 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1061 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1062 0 : goto f_err;
1063 : }
1064 :
1065 : /*
1066 : * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1067 : * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1068 : * does not cause an overflow.
1069 : */
1070 0 : if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1071 : /* too much data */
1072 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1073 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1074 0 : goto f_err;
1075 : }
1076 :
1077 : /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1078 0 : if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1079 0 : memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1080 :
1081 0 : if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1082 0 : if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1083 : cookie_len) == 0) {
1084 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1085 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1086 : SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1087 0 : goto f_err;
1088 : }
1089 : /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1090 : }
1091 : /* default verification */
1092 0 : else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1093 0 : s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1094 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1095 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1096 0 : goto f_err;
1097 : }
1098 : /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1099 : ret = -2;
1100 : }
1101 :
1102 0 : p += cookie_len;
1103 0 : if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1104 : /* Select version to use */
1105 0 : if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1106 0 : !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1107 0 : s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1108 0 : s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1109 0 : } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1110 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1111 : SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1112 0 : s->version = s->client_version;
1113 : al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1114 0 : goto f_err;
1115 0 : } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1116 0 : !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1117 0 : s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1118 0 : s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1119 : } else {
1120 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1121 : SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1122 0 : s->version = s->client_version;
1123 : al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1124 0 : goto f_err;
1125 : }
1126 0 : s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1127 : }
1128 : }
1129 :
1130 373 : if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1131 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1132 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1133 0 : goto f_err;
1134 : }
1135 373 : n2s(p, i);
1136 :
1137 373 : if (i == 0) {
1138 : al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1139 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1140 0 : goto f_err;
1141 : }
1142 :
1143 : /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1144 373 : if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1145 : /* not enough data */
1146 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1147 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1148 0 : goto f_err;
1149 : }
1150 373 : if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1151 : goto err;
1152 : }
1153 373 : p += i;
1154 :
1155 : /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1156 373 : if (s->hit) {
1157 : j = 0;
1158 0 : id = s->session->cipher->id;
1159 :
1160 : #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1161 : fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1162 : sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1163 : #endif
1164 0 : for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1165 0 : c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1166 : #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1167 : fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1168 : i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1169 : #endif
1170 0 : if (c->id == id) {
1171 : j = 1;
1172 : break;
1173 : }
1174 : }
1175 : /*
1176 : * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1177 : * CVE-2010-4180.
1178 : */
1179 : #if 0
1180 : if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1181 : && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1182 : /*
1183 : * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1184 : * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1185 : * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1186 : * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1187 : * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1188 : */
1189 : c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1190 : if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1191 : s->session->cipher = c;
1192 : j = 1;
1193 : }
1194 : }
1195 : #endif
1196 0 : if (j == 0) {
1197 : /*
1198 : * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1199 : * to reuse it
1200 : */
1201 : al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1202 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1203 : SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1204 0 : goto f_err;
1205 : }
1206 : }
1207 :
1208 : /* compression */
1209 373 : i = *(p++);
1210 373 : if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1211 : /* not enough data */
1212 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1213 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1214 0 : goto f_err;
1215 : }
1216 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1217 : q = p;
1218 : #endif
1219 0 : for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1220 373 : if (p[j] == 0)
1221 : break;
1222 : }
1223 :
1224 373 : p += i;
1225 373 : if (j >= i) {
1226 : /* no compress */
1227 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1228 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1229 0 : goto f_err;
1230 : }
1231 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1232 : /* TLS extensions */
1233 373 : if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1234 373 : if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1235 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1236 0 : goto err;
1237 : }
1238 : }
1239 :
1240 : /*
1241 : * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1242 : * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1243 : * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1244 : * processing to use it in key derivation.
1245 : */
1246 : {
1247 : unsigned char *pos;
1248 373 : pos = s->s3->server_random;
1249 373 : if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1250 : goto f_err;
1251 : }
1252 : }
1253 :
1254 373 : if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1255 0 : SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1256 :
1257 0 : s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1258 0 : if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1259 : &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1260 : &pref_cipher,
1261 : s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1262 0 : s->hit = 1;
1263 0 : s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1264 0 : s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1265 :
1266 0 : ciphers = NULL;
1267 :
1268 : /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1269 0 : pref_cipher =
1270 0 : pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1271 0 : s->
1272 : session->ciphers,
1273 : SSL_get_ciphers
1274 : (s));
1275 0 : if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1276 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1277 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1278 0 : goto f_err;
1279 : }
1280 :
1281 0 : s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1282 :
1283 0 : if (s->cipher_list)
1284 0 : sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1285 :
1286 0 : if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1287 0 : sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1288 :
1289 0 : s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1290 0 : s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1291 : }
1292 : }
1293 : #endif
1294 :
1295 : /*
1296 : * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1297 : * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1298 : * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1299 : */
1300 373 : s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1301 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1302 : /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1303 373 : if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1304 0 : int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1305 : /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1306 : /* Can't disable compression */
1307 0 : if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1308 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1309 : SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1310 0 : goto f_err;
1311 : }
1312 : /* Look for resumed compression method */
1313 0 : for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1314 0 : comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1315 0 : if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1316 0 : s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1317 0 : break;
1318 : }
1319 : }
1320 0 : if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1321 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1322 : SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1323 0 : goto f_err;
1324 : }
1325 : /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1326 0 : for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1327 0 : if (q[m] == comp_id)
1328 : break;
1329 : }
1330 0 : if (m >= i) {
1331 : al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1332 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1333 : SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1334 0 : goto f_err;
1335 : }
1336 373 : } else if (s->hit)
1337 : comp = NULL;
1338 373 : else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1339 : /* See if we have a match */
1340 : int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1341 :
1342 373 : nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1343 373 : for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1344 0 : comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1345 0 : v = comp->id;
1346 0 : for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1347 0 : if (v == q[o]) {
1348 : done = 1;
1349 : break;
1350 : }
1351 : }
1352 0 : if (done)
1353 : break;
1354 : }
1355 373 : if (done)
1356 0 : s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1357 : else
1358 : comp = NULL;
1359 : }
1360 : #else
1361 : /*
1362 : * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1363 : * using compression.
1364 : */
1365 : if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1366 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1367 : goto f_err;
1368 : }
1369 : #endif
1370 :
1371 : /*
1372 : * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1373 : */
1374 :
1375 373 : if (!s->hit) {
1376 : #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1377 : s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1378 : #else
1379 373 : s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1380 : #endif
1381 373 : if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1382 0 : sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1383 373 : s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1384 373 : if (ciphers == NULL) {
1385 : al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1386 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1387 0 : goto f_err;
1388 : }
1389 373 : ciphers = NULL;
1390 373 : if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1391 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1392 0 : goto err;
1393 : }
1394 : /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1395 : retry_cert:
1396 373 : if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1397 0 : int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1398 0 : if (rv == 0) {
1399 : al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1400 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1401 0 : goto f_err;
1402 : }
1403 0 : if (rv < 0) {
1404 0 : s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1405 0 : return -1;
1406 : }
1407 0 : s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1408 : }
1409 373 : c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1410 :
1411 373 : if (c == NULL) {
1412 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1413 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1414 0 : goto f_err;
1415 : }
1416 373 : s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1417 : } else {
1418 : /* Session-id reuse */
1419 : #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1420 : STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1421 : SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1422 : SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1423 :
1424 0 : if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1425 0 : sk = s->session->ciphers;
1426 0 : for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1427 0 : c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1428 0 : if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1429 : nc = c;
1430 0 : if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1431 : ec = c;
1432 : }
1433 0 : if (nc != NULL)
1434 0 : s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1435 0 : else if (ec != NULL)
1436 0 : s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1437 : else
1438 0 : s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1439 : } else
1440 : #endif
1441 0 : s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1442 : }
1443 :
1444 373 : if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1445 373 : if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1446 : goto f_err;
1447 : }
1448 :
1449 : /*-
1450 : * we now have the following setup.
1451 : * client_random
1452 : * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1453 : * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1454 : * compression - basically ignored right now
1455 : * ssl version is set - sslv3
1456 : * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1457 : * s->hit - session reuse flag
1458 : * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1459 : */
1460 :
1461 : /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1462 373 : if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1463 373 : if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1464 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1465 0 : goto err;
1466 : }
1467 : }
1468 :
1469 : if (ret < 0)
1470 373 : ret = -ret;
1471 : if (0) {
1472 : f_err:
1473 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1474 : err:
1475 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1476 : }
1477 :
1478 373 : if (ciphers != NULL)
1479 0 : sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1480 373 : return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1481 : }
1482 :
1483 373 : int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1484 : {
1485 : unsigned char *buf;
1486 : unsigned char *p, *d;
1487 : int i, sl;
1488 373 : int al = 0;
1489 : unsigned long l;
1490 :
1491 373 : if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1492 373 : buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1493 : #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1494 : p = s->s3->server_random;
1495 : if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1496 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1497 : return -1;
1498 : }
1499 : #endif
1500 : /* Do the message type and length last */
1501 373 : d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1502 :
1503 373 : *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1504 373 : *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1505 :
1506 : /* Random stuff */
1507 373 : memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1508 : p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1509 :
1510 : /*-
1511 : * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1512 : * back in the server hello:
1513 : * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1514 : * we send back the old session ID.
1515 : * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1516 : * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1517 : * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1518 : * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1519 : * session ID.
1520 : * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1521 : * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1522 : * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1523 : * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1524 : * to send back.
1525 : */
1526 373 : if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1527 0 : && !s->hit)
1528 0 : s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1529 :
1530 373 : sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1531 373 : if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1532 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1533 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1534 0 : return -1;
1535 : }
1536 373 : *(p++) = sl;
1537 373 : memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1538 373 : p += sl;
1539 :
1540 : /* put the cipher */
1541 373 : i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1542 373 : p += i;
1543 :
1544 : /* put the compression method */
1545 : #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1546 : *(p++) = 0;
1547 : #else
1548 373 : if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1549 373 : *(p++) = 0;
1550 : else
1551 0 : *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1552 : #endif
1553 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1554 373 : if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1555 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1556 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1557 0 : return -1;
1558 : }
1559 373 : if ((p =
1560 373 : ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1561 : &al)) == NULL) {
1562 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1563 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1565 0 : return -1;
1566 : }
1567 : #endif
1568 : /* do the header */
1569 373 : l = (p - d);
1570 373 : ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1571 373 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1572 : }
1573 :
1574 : /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1575 373 : return ssl_do_write(s);
1576 : }
1577 :
1578 373 : int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1579 : {
1580 :
1581 373 : if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1582 373 : ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1583 373 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1584 : }
1585 :
1586 : /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1587 373 : return ssl_do_write(s);
1588 : }
1589 :
1590 373 : int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1591 : {
1592 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1593 : unsigned char *q;
1594 : int j, num;
1595 : RSA *rsa;
1596 : unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1597 : unsigned int u;
1598 : #endif
1599 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1600 : DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1601 : #endif
1602 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1603 : EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1604 : unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1605 : int encodedlen = 0;
1606 : int curve_id = 0;
1607 : BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1608 : #endif
1609 : EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1610 373 : const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1611 : unsigned char *p, *d;
1612 : int al, i;
1613 : unsigned long type;
1614 : int n;
1615 : CERT *cert;
1616 : BIGNUM *r[4];
1617 : int nr[4], kn;
1618 : BUF_MEM *buf;
1619 : EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1620 :
1621 373 : EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1622 373 : if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1623 373 : type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1624 373 : cert = s->cert;
1625 :
1626 373 : buf = s->init_buf;
1627 :
1628 373 : r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1629 : n = 0;
1630 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1631 373 : if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1632 0 : rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1633 0 : if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1634 0 : rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1635 : SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1636 : tmp.new_cipher),
1637 0 : SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1638 : tmp.new_cipher));
1639 0 : if (rsa == NULL) {
1640 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1641 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1642 : SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1643 0 : goto f_err;
1644 : }
1645 0 : RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1646 0 : cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1647 : }
1648 0 : if (rsa == NULL) {
1649 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1650 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1651 : SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1652 0 : goto f_err;
1653 : }
1654 0 : r[0] = rsa->n;
1655 0 : r[1] = rsa->e;
1656 0 : s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1657 : } else
1658 : #endif
1659 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1660 373 : if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1661 0 : dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1662 0 : if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1663 0 : dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1664 : SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1665 : tmp.new_cipher),
1666 0 : SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1667 : tmp.new_cipher));
1668 0 : if (dhp == NULL) {
1669 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1670 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1671 : SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1672 0 : goto f_err;
1673 : }
1674 :
1675 0 : if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1676 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1677 : ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1678 0 : goto err;
1679 : }
1680 :
1681 0 : if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1682 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1683 0 : goto err;
1684 : }
1685 :
1686 0 : s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
1687 0 : if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1688 0 : dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1689 0 : (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1690 0 : if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1691 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1692 0 : goto err;
1693 : }
1694 : } else {
1695 0 : dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1696 0 : dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1697 0 : if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1698 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1699 0 : goto err;
1700 : }
1701 : }
1702 0 : r[0] = dh->p;
1703 0 : r[1] = dh->g;
1704 0 : r[2] = dh->pub_key;
1705 : } else
1706 : #endif
1707 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1708 373 : if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1709 : const EC_GROUP *group;
1710 :
1711 373 : ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1712 373 : if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1713 : /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1714 0 : int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1715 0 : if (nid != NID_undef)
1716 0 : ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1717 373 : } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1718 0 : ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1719 : SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1720 : tmp.new_cipher),
1721 0 : SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1722 : s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1723 : }
1724 373 : if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1725 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1726 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1727 : SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1728 0 : goto f_err;
1729 : }
1730 :
1731 373 : if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1732 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1733 : ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1734 0 : goto err;
1735 : }
1736 :
1737 : /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1738 373 : if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1739 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1740 0 : goto err;
1741 : }
1742 373 : if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1743 : ecdh = ecdhp;
1744 373 : else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1745 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1746 0 : goto err;
1747 : }
1748 :
1749 373 : s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1750 746 : if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1751 746 : (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1752 373 : (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1753 373 : if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1754 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1755 : ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1756 0 : goto err;
1757 : }
1758 : }
1759 :
1760 746 : if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1761 746 : (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1762 373 : (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1763 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1764 0 : goto err;
1765 : }
1766 :
1767 373 : if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1768 0 : (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1769 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1770 : SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1771 0 : goto err;
1772 : }
1773 :
1774 : /*
1775 : * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1776 : * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1777 : * non-zero.
1778 : */
1779 373 : if ((curve_id =
1780 373 : tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1781 : == 0) {
1782 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1783 : SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1784 0 : goto err;
1785 : }
1786 :
1787 : /*
1788 : * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1789 : * allocate memory accordingly.
1790 : */
1791 373 : encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1792 : EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1793 : POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1794 : NULL, 0, NULL);
1795 :
1796 373 : encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1797 : OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1798 373 : bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1799 373 : if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1800 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1801 : ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1802 0 : goto err;
1803 : }
1804 :
1805 373 : encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1806 : EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1807 : POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1808 : encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1809 :
1810 373 : if (encodedlen == 0) {
1811 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1812 0 : goto err;
1813 : }
1814 :
1815 373 : BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1816 : bn_ctx = NULL;
1817 :
1818 : /*
1819 : * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1820 : * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1821 : * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1822 : * structure.
1823 : */
1824 373 : n = 4 + encodedlen;
1825 :
1826 : /*
1827 : * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1828 : * can set these to NULLs
1829 : */
1830 373 : r[0] = NULL;
1831 373 : r[1] = NULL;
1832 373 : r[2] = NULL;
1833 373 : r[3] = NULL;
1834 : } else
1835 : #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1836 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1837 0 : if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1838 : /*
1839 : * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1840 : */
1841 0 : n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1842 : } else
1843 : #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1844 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1845 0 : if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1846 0 : if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1847 0 : (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1848 0 : (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1849 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1850 : SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1851 0 : goto err;
1852 : }
1853 0 : r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1854 0 : r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1855 0 : r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1856 0 : r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1857 : } else
1858 : #endif
1859 : {
1860 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1861 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1862 : SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1863 0 : goto f_err;
1864 : }
1865 373 : for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1866 0 : nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1867 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1868 0 : if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1869 0 : n += 1 + nr[i];
1870 : else
1871 : #endif
1872 0 : n += 2 + nr[i];
1873 : }
1874 :
1875 373 : if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1876 373 : && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1877 373 : if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1878 : == NULL) {
1879 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1880 : goto f_err;
1881 : }
1882 373 : kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1883 : } else {
1884 : pkey = NULL;
1885 : kn = 0;
1886 : }
1887 :
1888 373 : if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1889 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1890 0 : goto err;
1891 : }
1892 373 : d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1893 :
1894 373 : for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1895 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1896 0 : if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1897 0 : *p = nr[i];
1898 0 : p++;
1899 : } else
1900 : #endif
1901 0 : s2n(nr[i], p);
1902 0 : BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
1903 0 : p += nr[i];
1904 : }
1905 :
1906 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1907 373 : if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1908 : /*
1909 : * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1910 : * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1911 : * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1912 : * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1913 : */
1914 373 : *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1915 : p += 1;
1916 373 : *p = 0;
1917 : p += 1;
1918 373 : *p = curve_id;
1919 : p += 1;
1920 373 : *p = encodedlen;
1921 373 : p += 1;
1922 373 : memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1923 : (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1924 373 : OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1925 : encodedPoint = NULL;
1926 373 : p += encodedlen;
1927 : }
1928 : #endif
1929 :
1930 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1931 373 : if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1932 : /* copy PSK identity hint */
1933 0 : s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1934 0 : strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1935 0 : strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1936 0 : p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1937 : }
1938 : #endif
1939 :
1940 : /* not anonymous */
1941 373 : if (pkey != NULL) {
1942 : /*
1943 : * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1944 : * points to the space at the end.
1945 : */
1946 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1947 373 : if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1948 : q = md_buf;
1949 : j = 0;
1950 0 : for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1951 0 : EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1952 : EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1953 0 : EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1954 0 : ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1955 0 : EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1956 : SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1957 0 : EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1958 : SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1959 0 : EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1960 0 : EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1961 0 : q += i;
1962 0 : j += i;
1963 : }
1964 0 : if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1965 0 : &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1966 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1967 0 : goto err;
1968 : }
1969 0 : s2n(u, p);
1970 0 : n += u + 2;
1971 : } else
1972 : #endif
1973 373 : if (md) {
1974 : /* send signature algorithm */
1975 373 : if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1976 373 : if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1977 : /* Should never happen */
1978 : al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1979 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1980 : ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1981 0 : goto f_err;
1982 : }
1983 373 : p += 2;
1984 : }
1985 : #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
1986 : fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1987 : #endif
1988 373 : EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1989 373 : EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1990 : SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1991 373 : EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1992 : SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1993 373 : EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1994 373 : if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1995 : (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
1996 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1997 0 : goto err;
1998 : }
1999 373 : s2n(i, p);
2000 373 : n += i + 2;
2001 373 : if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2002 373 : n += 2;
2003 : } else {
2004 : /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2005 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2006 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2007 : SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2008 0 : goto f_err;
2009 : }
2010 : }
2011 :
2012 373 : ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2013 : }
2014 :
2015 373 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2016 373 : EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2017 373 : return ssl_do_write(s);
2018 : f_err:
2019 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2020 : err:
2021 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2022 0 : if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2023 0 : OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2024 0 : BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2025 : #endif
2026 0 : EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2027 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2028 0 : return (-1);
2029 : }
2030 :
2031 0 : int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2032 : {
2033 : unsigned char *p, *d;
2034 : int i, j, nl, off, n;
2035 : STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2036 : X509_NAME *name;
2037 : BUF_MEM *buf;
2038 :
2039 0 : if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2040 0 : buf = s->init_buf;
2041 :
2042 0 : d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2043 :
2044 : /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2045 0 : p++;
2046 0 : n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2047 0 : d[0] = n;
2048 0 : p += n;
2049 0 : n++;
2050 :
2051 0 : if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2052 : const unsigned char *psigs;
2053 0 : nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2054 0 : s2n(nl, p);
2055 0 : memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2056 0 : p += nl;
2057 0 : n += nl + 2;
2058 : }
2059 :
2060 : off = n;
2061 0 : p += 2;
2062 0 : n += 2;
2063 :
2064 0 : sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2065 : nl = 0;
2066 0 : if (sk != NULL) {
2067 0 : for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2068 0 : name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2069 0 : j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2070 0 : if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2071 0 : (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2072 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2073 : ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2074 0 : goto err;
2075 : }
2076 0 : p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2077 0 : if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2078 0 : s2n(j, p);
2079 0 : i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2080 0 : n += 2 + j;
2081 0 : nl += 2 + j;
2082 : } else {
2083 : d = p;
2084 0 : i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2085 0 : j -= 2;
2086 0 : s2n(j, d);
2087 : j += 2;
2088 0 : n += j;
2089 0 : nl += j;
2090 : }
2091 : }
2092 : }
2093 : /* else no CA names */
2094 0 : p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2095 0 : s2n(nl, p);
2096 :
2097 0 : ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2098 :
2099 : #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2100 0 : if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2101 0 : if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2102 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2103 0 : goto err;
2104 : }
2105 0 : p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2106 : /* do the header */
2107 0 : *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2108 0 : *(p++) = 0;
2109 0 : *(p++) = 0;
2110 0 : *(p++) = 0;
2111 0 : s->init_num += 4;
2112 : }
2113 : #endif
2114 :
2115 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2116 : }
2117 :
2118 : /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2119 0 : return ssl_do_write(s);
2120 : err:
2121 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2122 0 : return (-1);
2123 : }
2124 :
2125 740 : int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2126 : {
2127 : int i, al, ok;
2128 : long n;
2129 : unsigned long alg_k;
2130 : unsigned char *p;
2131 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2132 : RSA *rsa = NULL;
2133 : EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2134 : #endif
2135 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2136 : BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
2137 : DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2138 : #endif
2139 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2140 : KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2141 : #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2142 :
2143 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2144 : EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2145 : EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2146 : EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2147 : BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2148 : #endif
2149 :
2150 740 : n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2151 : SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2152 : SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2153 : SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2154 :
2155 740 : if (!ok)
2156 373 : return ((int)n);
2157 367 : p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2158 :
2159 367 : alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2160 :
2161 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2162 367 : if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2163 : unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2164 : int decrypt_len;
2165 : unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2166 : size_t j;
2167 :
2168 : /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2169 0 : if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2170 0 : if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2171 : rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2172 : /*
2173 : * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2174 : */
2175 0 : if (rsa == NULL) {
2176 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2177 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2178 : SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2179 0 : goto f_err;
2180 :
2181 : }
2182 : } else {
2183 0 : pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2184 0 : if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2185 0 : (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2186 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2187 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2188 : SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2189 0 : goto f_err;
2190 : }
2191 : rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2192 : }
2193 :
2194 : /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2195 0 : if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2196 0 : n2s(p, i);
2197 0 : if (n != i + 2) {
2198 0 : if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2199 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2200 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2201 : SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2202 0 : goto f_err;
2203 : } else
2204 0 : p -= 2;
2205 : } else
2206 0 : n = i;
2207 : }
2208 :
2209 : /*
2210 : * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2211 : * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2212 : * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2213 : * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2214 : * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2215 : */
2216 0 : if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2217 : al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2218 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2219 : SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2220 0 : goto f_err;
2221 : }
2222 :
2223 : /*
2224 : * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2225 : * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2226 : * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2227 : * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2228 : * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2229 : */
2230 :
2231 : /*
2232 : * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2233 : */
2234 0 : if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2235 : sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2236 : goto err;
2237 0 : decrypt_len =
2238 0 : RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2239 0 : ERR_clear_error();
2240 :
2241 : /*
2242 : * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2243 : * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2244 : */
2245 : decrypt_good =
2246 : constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2247 :
2248 : /*
2249 : * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2250 : * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2251 : * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2252 : * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2253 : * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2254 : * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2255 : */
2256 : version_good =
2257 0 : constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2258 0 : version_good &=
2259 0 : constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2260 :
2261 : /*
2262 : * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2263 : * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2264 : * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2265 : * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2266 : * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2267 : * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2268 : * clients.
2269 : */
2270 0 : if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2271 : unsigned char workaround_good;
2272 : workaround_good =
2273 0 : constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2274 0 : workaround_good &=
2275 0 : constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2276 0 : version_good |= workaround_good;
2277 : }
2278 :
2279 : /*
2280 : * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2281 : * remain non-zero (0xff).
2282 : */
2283 0 : decrypt_good &= version_good;
2284 :
2285 : /*
2286 : * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2287 : * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2288 : * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2289 : * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2290 : */
2291 0 : for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2292 0 : p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2293 0 : rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2294 : }
2295 :
2296 0 : s->session->master_key_length =
2297 0 : s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2298 0 : s->
2299 : session->master_key,
2300 : p,
2301 : sizeof
2302 : (rand_premaster_secret));
2303 0 : OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2304 : } else
2305 : #endif
2306 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2307 367 : if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2308 : int idx = -1;
2309 : EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2310 0 : if (n > 1) {
2311 0 : n2s(p, i);
2312 : } else {
2313 0 : if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
2314 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2315 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2316 : SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2317 0 : goto f_err;
2318 : }
2319 : i = 0;
2320 : }
2321 0 : if (n && n != i + 2) {
2322 0 : if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2323 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2324 : SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2325 0 : goto err;
2326 : } else {
2327 0 : p -= 2;
2328 0 : i = (int)n;
2329 : }
2330 : }
2331 0 : if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2332 : idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2333 0 : else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2334 : idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2335 0 : if (idx >= 0) {
2336 0 : skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2337 0 : if ((skey == NULL) ||
2338 0 : (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2339 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2340 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2341 : SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2342 0 : goto f_err;
2343 : }
2344 : dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2345 0 : } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2346 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2347 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2348 : SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2349 0 : goto f_err;
2350 : } else
2351 : dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2352 :
2353 0 : if (n == 0L) {
2354 : /* Get pubkey from cert */
2355 0 : EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2356 0 : if (clkey) {
2357 0 : if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2358 0 : dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2359 : }
2360 0 : if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2361 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2362 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2363 : SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2364 0 : goto f_err;
2365 : }
2366 0 : EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2367 0 : pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2368 : } else
2369 0 : pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2370 0 : if (pub == NULL) {
2371 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2372 0 : goto err;
2373 : }
2374 :
2375 0 : i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2376 :
2377 0 : if (i <= 0) {
2378 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2379 0 : BN_clear_free(pub);
2380 0 : goto err;
2381 : }
2382 :
2383 0 : DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2384 0 : s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2385 0 : if (dh_clnt)
2386 0 : DH_free(dh_clnt);
2387 : else
2388 0 : BN_clear_free(pub);
2389 : pub = NULL;
2390 0 : s->session->master_key_length =
2391 0 : s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2392 0 : s->
2393 : session->master_key,
2394 : p, i);
2395 0 : OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2396 0 : if (dh_clnt)
2397 : return 2;
2398 : } else
2399 : #endif
2400 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2401 : if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2402 : krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2403 : krb5_data enc_ticket;
2404 : krb5_data authenticator;
2405 : krb5_data enc_pms;
2406 : KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2407 : EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2408 : const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2409 : unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2410 : unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2411 : int padl, outl;
2412 : krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2413 : krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2414 : int kerr = 0;
2415 :
2416 : EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2417 :
2418 : if (!kssl_ctx)
2419 : kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2420 :
2421 : n2s(p, i);
2422 : enc_ticket.length = i;
2423 :
2424 : if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2425 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2426 : SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2427 : goto err;
2428 : }
2429 :
2430 : enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2431 : p += enc_ticket.length;
2432 :
2433 : n2s(p, i);
2434 : authenticator.length = i;
2435 :
2436 : if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2437 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 : SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2439 : goto err;
2440 : }
2441 :
2442 : authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2443 : p += authenticator.length;
2444 :
2445 : n2s(p, i);
2446 : enc_pms.length = i;
2447 : enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2448 : p += enc_pms.length;
2449 :
2450 : /*
2451 : * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2452 : */
2453 : if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2454 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2455 : SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2456 : goto err;
2457 : }
2458 :
2459 : if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2460 : enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2461 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2462 : SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2463 : goto err;
2464 : }
2465 :
2466 : if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2467 : &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2468 : # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2469 : fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2470 : krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2471 : if (kssl_err.text)
2472 : fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2473 : # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2474 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2475 : goto err;
2476 : }
2477 :
2478 : /*
2479 : * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2480 : * return authtime == 0.
2481 : */
2482 : if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2483 : &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2484 : # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2485 : fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2486 : krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2487 : if (kssl_err.text)
2488 : fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2489 : # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2490 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2491 : goto err;
2492 : }
2493 :
2494 : if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2495 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2496 : goto err;
2497 : }
2498 : # ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2499 : kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2500 : # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2501 :
2502 : enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2503 : if (enc == NULL)
2504 : goto err;
2505 :
2506 : memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2507 :
2508 : if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2509 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2510 : SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2511 : goto err;
2512 : }
2513 : if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2514 : (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2515 : {
2516 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2517 : SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2518 : kerr = 1;
2519 : goto kclean;
2520 : }
2521 : if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2522 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2523 : SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2524 : kerr = 1;
2525 : goto kclean;
2526 : }
2527 : if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2528 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2529 : SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2530 : kerr = 1;
2531 : goto kclean;
2532 : }
2533 : outl += padl;
2534 : if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2535 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2536 : SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2537 : kerr = 1;
2538 : goto kclean;
2539 : }
2540 : if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2541 : && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2542 : /*
2543 : * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2544 : * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2545 : * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2546 : * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2547 : * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2548 : * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2549 : * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2550 : * cipher)
2551 : */
2552 : if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2553 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2554 : SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2555 : kerr = 1;
2556 : goto kclean;
2557 : }
2558 : }
2559 :
2560 : EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2561 :
2562 : s->session->master_key_length =
2563 : s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2564 : s->
2565 : session->master_key,
2566 : pms, outl);
2567 :
2568 : if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2569 : size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2570 : if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2571 : s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2572 : memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2573 : len);
2574 : }
2575 : }
2576 :
2577 : /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2578 : * but it caused problems for apache.
2579 : * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2580 : * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2581 : */
2582 :
2583 : kclean:
2584 : OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
2585 : if (kerr)
2586 : goto err;
2587 : } else
2588 : #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2589 :
2590 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2591 367 : if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2592 : int ret = 1;
2593 : int field_size = 0;
2594 : const EC_KEY *tkey;
2595 : const EC_GROUP *group;
2596 : const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2597 :
2598 : /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2599 367 : if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2600 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2601 0 : goto err;
2602 : }
2603 :
2604 : /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2605 367 : if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2606 : /* use the certificate */
2607 0 : tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2608 : } else {
2609 : /*
2610 : * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2611 : * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2612 : */
2613 367 : tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2614 : }
2615 :
2616 367 : group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2617 367 : priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2618 :
2619 734 : if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2620 367 : !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2621 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2622 0 : goto err;
2623 : }
2624 :
2625 : /* Let's get client's public key */
2626 367 : if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2627 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2628 0 : goto err;
2629 : }
2630 :
2631 367 : if (n == 0L) {
2632 : /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2633 :
2634 0 : if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2635 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2636 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2637 : SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2638 0 : goto f_err;
2639 : }
2640 0 : if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2641 0 : == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2642 : /*
2643 : * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2644 : * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2645 : * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2646 : * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2647 : * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2648 : * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2649 : */
2650 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2651 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2652 : SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2653 0 : goto f_err;
2654 : }
2655 :
2656 0 : if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2657 : EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2658 0 : pkey.ec)) == 0) {
2659 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2660 0 : goto err;
2661 : }
2662 : ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2663 : } else {
2664 : /*
2665 : * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2666 : * ClientKeyExchange message.
2667 : */
2668 367 : if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2669 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2670 : ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2671 0 : goto err;
2672 : }
2673 :
2674 : /* Get encoded point length */
2675 367 : i = *p;
2676 367 : p += 1;
2677 367 : if (n != 1 + i) {
2678 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2679 0 : goto err;
2680 : }
2681 367 : if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2682 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2683 0 : goto err;
2684 : }
2685 : /*
2686 : * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2687 : * to the start
2688 : */
2689 367 : p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2690 : }
2691 :
2692 : /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2693 367 : field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2694 367 : if (field_size <= 0) {
2695 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2696 0 : goto err;
2697 : }
2698 367 : i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2699 : NULL);
2700 367 : if (i <= 0) {
2701 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2702 0 : goto err;
2703 : }
2704 :
2705 367 : EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2706 367 : EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2707 367 : EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2708 367 : BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2709 367 : EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2710 367 : s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2711 :
2712 : /* Compute the master secret */
2713 367 : s->session->master_key_length =
2714 734 : s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2715 367 : s->
2716 : session->master_key,
2717 : p, i);
2718 :
2719 367 : OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2720 367 : return (ret);
2721 : } else
2722 : #endif
2723 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2724 0 : if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2725 : unsigned char *t = NULL;
2726 : unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2727 : unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2728 : int psk_err = 1;
2729 : char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2730 :
2731 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2732 :
2733 0 : n2s(p, i);
2734 0 : if (n != i + 2) {
2735 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2736 0 : goto psk_err;
2737 : }
2738 0 : if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2739 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2740 : SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2741 0 : goto psk_err;
2742 : }
2743 0 : if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2744 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2745 : SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2746 0 : goto psk_err;
2747 : }
2748 :
2749 : /*
2750 : * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2751 : */
2752 0 : memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2753 0 : memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2754 0 : psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2755 : psk_or_pre_ms,
2756 : sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2757 0 : OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2758 :
2759 0 : if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2760 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2761 0 : goto psk_err;
2762 0 : } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2763 : /*
2764 : * PSK related to the given identity not found
2765 : */
2766 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2767 : SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2768 : al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2769 0 : goto psk_err;
2770 : }
2771 :
2772 : /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2773 0 : pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2774 : t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2775 0 : memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2776 0 : s2n(psk_len, t);
2777 : memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2778 0 : t += psk_len;
2779 0 : s2n(psk_len, t);
2780 :
2781 0 : if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2782 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2783 0 : s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
2784 0 : if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2785 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2786 0 : goto psk_err;
2787 : }
2788 :
2789 0 : if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2790 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2791 0 : s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2792 0 : if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2793 0 : s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2794 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2795 0 : goto psk_err;
2796 : }
2797 :
2798 0 : s->session->master_key_length =
2799 0 : s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2800 0 : s->
2801 : session->master_key,
2802 : psk_or_pre_ms,
2803 : pre_ms_len);
2804 : psk_err = 0;
2805 : psk_err:
2806 0 : OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2807 0 : if (psk_err != 0)
2808 : goto f_err;
2809 : } else
2810 : #endif
2811 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2812 0 : if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2813 : int param_len;
2814 :
2815 0 : n2s(p, i);
2816 0 : param_len = i + 2;
2817 0 : if (param_len > n) {
2818 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2819 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2820 : SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2821 0 : goto f_err;
2822 : }
2823 0 : if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2824 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2825 0 : goto err;
2826 : }
2827 0 : if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2828 0 : || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2829 : al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2830 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2831 : SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2832 0 : goto f_err;
2833 : }
2834 0 : if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2835 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2836 0 : s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2837 0 : if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2838 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2839 0 : goto err;
2840 : }
2841 :
2842 0 : if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2843 0 : SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2844 0 : s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2845 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2846 0 : goto err;
2847 : }
2848 :
2849 : p += i;
2850 : } else
2851 : #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2852 0 : if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2853 : int ret = 0;
2854 : EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2855 : EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2856 : unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2857 0 : size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2858 : unsigned long alg_a;
2859 : int Ttag, Tclass;
2860 : long Tlen;
2861 :
2862 : /* Get our certificate private key */
2863 0 : alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2864 0 : if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2865 0 : pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2866 0 : else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2867 0 : pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2868 :
2869 0 : pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2870 0 : EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2871 : /*
2872 : * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2873 : * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2874 : * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2875 : * client certificate for authorization only.
2876 : */
2877 0 : client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2878 0 : if (client_pub_pkey) {
2879 0 : if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2880 0 : ERR_clear_error();
2881 : }
2882 : /* Decrypt session key */
2883 0 : if (ASN1_get_object
2884 0 : ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2885 0 : n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2886 0 : || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2887 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2888 : SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2889 0 : goto gerr;
2890 : }
2891 0 : start = p;
2892 0 : inlen = Tlen;
2893 0 : if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2894 0 : (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2895 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2896 : SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2897 0 : goto gerr;
2898 : }
2899 : /* Generate master secret */
2900 0 : s->session->master_key_length =
2901 0 : s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2902 0 : s->
2903 : session->master_key,
2904 : premaster_secret, 32);
2905 0 : OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
2906 : /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2907 0 : if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2908 0 : (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2909 : ret = 2;
2910 : else
2911 : ret = 1;
2912 : gerr:
2913 0 : EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2914 0 : EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2915 0 : if (ret)
2916 0 : return ret;
2917 : else
2918 : goto err;
2919 : } else {
2920 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2921 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2922 0 : goto f_err;
2923 : }
2924 :
2925 : return (1);
2926 : f_err:
2927 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2928 : #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2929 : err:
2930 : #endif
2931 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2932 0 : EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2933 0 : EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2934 0 : if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2935 0 : EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2936 0 : BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2937 : #endif
2938 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2939 0 : return (-1);
2940 : }
2941 :
2942 367 : int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2943 : {
2944 : EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2945 : unsigned char *p;
2946 : int al, ok, ret = 0;
2947 : long n;
2948 : int type = 0, i, j;
2949 : X509 *peer;
2950 367 : const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2951 : EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2952 367 : EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2953 :
2954 : /*
2955 : * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2956 : * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2957 : * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2958 : * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2959 : * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2960 : * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2961 : */
2962 367 : if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2963 : ret = 1;
2964 : goto end;
2965 : }
2966 :
2967 0 : n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2968 : SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2969 : SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2970 : SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2971 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2972 :
2973 0 : if (!ok)
2974 0 : return ((int)n);
2975 :
2976 0 : peer = s->session->peer;
2977 0 : pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2978 0 : type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2979 :
2980 0 : if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2981 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2982 : SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2983 : al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2984 0 : goto f_err;
2985 : }
2986 :
2987 : /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2988 0 : p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2989 : /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2990 : /*
2991 : * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2992 : * length field
2993 : */
2994 0 : if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2995 : pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
2996 : i = 64;
2997 : } else {
2998 0 : if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2999 0 : int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3000 0 : if (rv == -1) {
3001 : al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3002 : goto f_err;
3003 0 : } else if (rv == 0) {
3004 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3005 : goto f_err;
3006 : }
3007 : #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3008 : fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3009 : #endif
3010 0 : p += 2;
3011 0 : n -= 2;
3012 : }
3013 0 : n2s(p, i);
3014 0 : n -= 2;
3015 0 : if (i > n) {
3016 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3017 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3018 0 : goto f_err;
3019 : }
3020 : }
3021 0 : j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3022 0 : if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3023 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3024 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3025 0 : goto f_err;
3026 : }
3027 :
3028 0 : if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3029 : long hdatalen = 0;
3030 : void *hdata;
3031 0 : hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3032 0 : if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3033 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3034 : al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3035 0 : goto f_err;
3036 : }
3037 : #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3038 : fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3039 : EVP_MD_name(md));
3040 : #endif
3041 0 : if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3042 0 : || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3043 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3044 : al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3045 0 : goto f_err;
3046 : }
3047 :
3048 0 : if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3049 : al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3050 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3051 0 : goto f_err;
3052 : }
3053 : } else
3054 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3055 0 : if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3056 0 : i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3057 : MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3058 0 : pkey->pkey.rsa);
3059 0 : if (i < 0) {
3060 : al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3061 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3062 0 : goto f_err;
3063 : }
3064 0 : if (i == 0) {
3065 : al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3066 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3067 0 : goto f_err;
3068 : }
3069 : } else
3070 : #endif
3071 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3072 0 : if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3073 0 : j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3074 0 : &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3075 0 : SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3076 0 : if (j <= 0) {
3077 : /* bad signature */
3078 : al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3079 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3080 0 : goto f_err;
3081 : }
3082 : } else
3083 : #endif
3084 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3085 0 : if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3086 0 : j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3087 0 : &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3088 0 : SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3089 0 : if (j <= 0) {
3090 : /* bad signature */
3091 : al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3092 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3093 0 : goto f_err;
3094 : }
3095 : } else
3096 : #endif
3097 0 : if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3098 0 : || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3099 : unsigned char signature[64];
3100 : int idx;
3101 0 : EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3102 0 : EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3103 0 : if (i != 64) {
3104 0 : fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3105 : }
3106 0 : for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3107 0 : signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3108 : }
3109 0 : j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3110 : 32);
3111 0 : EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3112 0 : if (j <= 0) {
3113 : al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3114 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3115 0 : goto f_err;
3116 : }
3117 : } else {
3118 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3119 : al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3120 0 : goto f_err;
3121 : }
3122 :
3123 : ret = 1;
3124 : if (0) {
3125 : f_err:
3126 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3127 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3128 : }
3129 : end:
3130 367 : if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3131 0 : BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3132 0 : s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3133 0 : s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3134 : }
3135 367 : EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3136 367 : EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3137 367 : return (ret);
3138 : }
3139 :
3140 0 : int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3141 : {
3142 : int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3143 : X509 *x = NULL;
3144 : unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3145 : const unsigned char *p, *q;
3146 : unsigned char *d;
3147 : STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3148 :
3149 0 : n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3150 : SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3151 : SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3152 : -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3153 :
3154 0 : if (!ok)
3155 0 : return ((int)n);
3156 :
3157 0 : if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3158 0 : if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3159 : (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3160 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3161 : SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3162 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3163 0 : goto f_err;
3164 : }
3165 : /*
3166 : * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3167 : */
3168 0 : if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3169 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3170 : SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3171 : al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3172 0 : goto f_err;
3173 : }
3174 0 : s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3175 0 : return (1);
3176 : }
3177 :
3178 0 : if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3179 : al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3180 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3181 0 : goto f_err;
3182 : }
3183 0 : p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3184 :
3185 0 : if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3186 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3187 0 : goto err;
3188 : }
3189 :
3190 0 : n2l3(p, llen);
3191 0 : if (llen + 3 != n) {
3192 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3193 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3194 0 : goto f_err;
3195 : }
3196 0 : for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3197 0 : n2l3(p, l);
3198 0 : if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3199 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3200 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3201 : SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3202 0 : goto f_err;
3203 : }
3204 :
3205 : q = p;
3206 0 : x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3207 0 : if (x == NULL) {
3208 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3209 0 : goto err;
3210 : }
3211 0 : if (p != (q + l)) {
3212 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3213 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3214 : SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3215 0 : goto f_err;
3216 : }
3217 0 : if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3218 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3219 0 : goto err;
3220 : }
3221 : x = NULL;
3222 : nc += l + 3;
3223 : }
3224 :
3225 0 : if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3226 : /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3227 0 : if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3228 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3229 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3230 : SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3231 0 : goto f_err;
3232 : }
3233 : /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3234 0 : else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3235 : (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3236 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3237 : SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3238 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3239 0 : goto f_err;
3240 : }
3241 : /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3242 0 : if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3243 : al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3244 : goto f_err;
3245 : }
3246 : } else {
3247 0 : i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3248 0 : if (i <= 0) {
3249 0 : al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3250 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3251 : SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3252 0 : goto f_err;
3253 : }
3254 : }
3255 :
3256 0 : if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3257 0 : X509_free(s->session->peer);
3258 0 : s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3259 0 : s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3260 :
3261 : /*
3262 : * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3263 : * arrive here.
3264 : */
3265 0 : if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3266 0 : s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3267 0 : if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3268 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3269 0 : goto err;
3270 : }
3271 : }
3272 0 : if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3273 0 : sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3274 0 : s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3275 : /*
3276 : * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3277 : * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3278 : */
3279 :
3280 : sk = NULL;
3281 :
3282 : ret = 1;
3283 : if (0) {
3284 : f_err:
3285 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3286 : err:
3287 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3288 : }
3289 :
3290 0 : if (x != NULL)
3291 0 : X509_free(x);
3292 0 : if (sk != NULL)
3293 0 : sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3294 0 : return (ret);
3295 : }
3296 :
3297 373 : int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3298 : {
3299 : CERT_PKEY *cpk;
3300 :
3301 373 : if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3302 373 : cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3303 373 : if (cpk == NULL) {
3304 : /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3305 0 : if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3306 0 : (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3307 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3308 : ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3309 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3310 0 : return (0);
3311 : }
3312 : }
3313 :
3314 373 : if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3315 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3316 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3317 0 : return (0);
3318 : }
3319 373 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3320 : }
3321 :
3322 : /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3323 373 : return ssl_do_write(s);
3324 : }
3325 :
3326 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3327 : /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3328 367 : int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3329 : {
3330 : unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3331 : EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3332 : HMAC_CTX hctx;
3333 :
3334 367 : if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3335 : unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3336 : const unsigned char *const_p;
3337 : int len, slen_full, slen;
3338 : SSL_SESSION *sess;
3339 : unsigned int hlen;
3340 367 : SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3341 : unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3342 : unsigned char key_name[16];
3343 :
3344 : /* get session encoding length */
3345 367 : slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3346 : /*
3347 : * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3348 : * long
3349 : */
3350 367 : if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3351 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3352 0 : return -1;
3353 : }
3354 367 : senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3355 367 : if (!senc) {
3356 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3357 0 : return -1;
3358 : }
3359 :
3360 367 : EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3361 367 : HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3362 :
3363 367 : p = senc;
3364 367 : if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3365 : goto err;
3366 :
3367 : /*
3368 : * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3369 : */
3370 367 : const_p = senc;
3371 367 : sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3372 367 : if (sess == NULL)
3373 : goto err;
3374 367 : sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3375 :
3376 367 : slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3377 367 : if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3378 0 : SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3379 0 : goto err;
3380 : }
3381 367 : p = senc;
3382 367 : if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3383 0 : SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3384 0 : goto err;
3385 : }
3386 367 : SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3387 :
3388 : /*-
3389 : * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3390 : * follows handshake_header_length +
3391 : * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3392 : * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3393 : * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3394 : * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3395 : */
3396 367 : if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3397 367 : SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3398 367 : EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3399 : goto err;
3400 :
3401 367 : p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3402 : /*
3403 : * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3404 : * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3405 : */
3406 367 : if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3407 0 : if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3408 : &hctx, 1) < 0)
3409 : goto err;
3410 : } else {
3411 367 : if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3412 : goto err;
3413 367 : if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3414 367 : tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3415 : goto err;
3416 367 : if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3417 : tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3418 : goto err;
3419 : memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3420 : }
3421 :
3422 : /*
3423 : * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3424 : * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3425 : * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3426 : */
3427 367 : l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3428 :
3429 : /* Skip ticket length for now */
3430 367 : p += 2;
3431 : /* Output key name */
3432 : macstart = p;
3433 : memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3434 367 : p += 16;
3435 : /* output IV */
3436 367 : memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3437 367 : p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3438 : /* Encrypt session data */
3439 367 : if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3440 : goto err;
3441 367 : p += len;
3442 367 : if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3443 : goto err;
3444 367 : p += len;
3445 :
3446 367 : if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3447 : goto err;
3448 367 : if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3449 : goto err;
3450 :
3451 367 : EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3452 367 : HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3453 :
3454 367 : p += hlen;
3455 : /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3456 : /* Total length */
3457 367 : len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3458 : /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3459 367 : p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3460 367 : s2n(len - 6, p);
3461 367 : ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3462 367 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3463 367 : OPENSSL_free(senc);
3464 : }
3465 :
3466 : /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3467 367 : return ssl_do_write(s);
3468 : err:
3469 0 : if (senc)
3470 0 : OPENSSL_free(senc);
3471 0 : EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3472 0 : HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3473 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3474 0 : return -1;
3475 : }
3476 :
3477 0 : int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3478 : {
3479 0 : if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3480 : unsigned char *p;
3481 : /*-
3482 : * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3483 : * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3484 : * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3485 : * + (ocsp response)
3486 : */
3487 0 : if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3488 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3489 0 : return -1;
3490 : }
3491 :
3492 0 : p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3493 :
3494 : /* do the header */
3495 0 : *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3496 : /* message length */
3497 0 : l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3498 : /* status type */
3499 0 : *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3500 : /* length of OCSP response */
3501 0 : l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3502 : /* actual response */
3503 0 : memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3504 : /* number of bytes to write */
3505 0 : s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3506 0 : s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3507 0 : s->init_off = 0;
3508 : }
3509 :
3510 : /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3511 0 : return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3512 : }
3513 :
3514 : # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3515 : /*
3516 : * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3517 : * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3518 : */
3519 0 : int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3520 : {
3521 : int ok;
3522 : int proto_len, padding_len;
3523 : long n;
3524 : const unsigned char *p;
3525 :
3526 : /*
3527 : * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3528 : * extension in their ClientHello
3529 : */
3530 0 : if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3531 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3532 : SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3533 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3534 0 : return -1;
3535 : }
3536 :
3537 : /* See the payload format below */
3538 0 : n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3539 : SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3540 : SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3541 : SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3542 :
3543 0 : if (!ok)
3544 0 : return ((int)n);
3545 :
3546 : /*
3547 : * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3548 : * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3549 : * ssl3_get_finished).
3550 : */
3551 0 : if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3552 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3553 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3554 0 : return -1;
3555 : }
3556 :
3557 0 : if (n < 2) {
3558 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3559 0 : return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3560 : }
3561 :
3562 0 : p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3563 :
3564 : /*-
3565 : * The payload looks like:
3566 : * uint8 proto_len;
3567 : * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3568 : * uint8 padding_len;
3569 : * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3570 : */
3571 0 : proto_len = p[0];
3572 0 : if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3573 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3574 0 : return 0;
3575 : }
3576 0 : padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3577 0 : if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3578 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3579 0 : return 0;
3580 : }
3581 :
3582 0 : s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3583 0 : if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3584 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3585 0 : s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3586 0 : return 0;
3587 : }
3588 0 : memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3589 0 : s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3590 :
3591 0 : return 1;
3592 : }
3593 : # endif
3594 :
3595 : #endif
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