Line data Source code
1 : /* ssl/d1_pkt.c */
2 : /*
3 : * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 : * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
5 : */
6 : /* ====================================================================
7 : * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
8 : *
9 : * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 : * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
11 : * are met:
12 : *
13 : * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 : *
16 : * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 : * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
19 : * distribution.
20 : *
21 : * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 : * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 : * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 : * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
25 : *
26 : * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 : * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 : * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 : * openssl-core@openssl.org.
30 : *
31 : * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 : * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 : * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
34 : *
35 : * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
36 : * acknowledgment:
37 : * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 : * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
39 : *
40 : * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 : * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 : * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 : * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 : * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 : * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 : * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 : * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 : * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 : * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 : * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 : * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 : * ====================================================================
53 : *
54 : * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 : * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 : * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
57 : *
58 : */
59 : /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 : * All rights reserved.
61 : *
62 : * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 : * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 : * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
65 : *
66 : * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 : * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 : * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 : * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 : * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 : * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
72 : *
73 : * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 : * the code are not to be removed.
75 : * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 : * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 : * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 : * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
79 : *
80 : * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 : * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
82 : * are met:
83 : * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 : * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 : * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 : * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 : * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 : * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 : * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 : * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 : * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 : * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 : * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 : * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
97 : *
98 : * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 : * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 : * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 : * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 : * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 : * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 : * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 : * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 : * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 : * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
108 : * SUCH DAMAGE.
109 : *
110 : * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 : * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 : * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 : * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
114 : */
115 :
116 : #include <stdio.h>
117 : #include <errno.h>
118 : #define USE_SOCKETS
119 : #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 : #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 : #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 : #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 : #include <openssl/rand.h>
124 :
125 : /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126 0 : static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2)
127 : {
128 : int ret, sat, brw, i;
129 :
130 : if (sizeof(long) == 8)
131 : do {
132 : const union {
133 : long one;
134 : char little;
135 : } is_endian = {
136 : 1
137 : };
138 : long l;
139 :
140 : if (is_endian.little)
141 : break;
142 : /* not reached on little-endians */
143 : /*
144 : * following test is redundant, because input is always aligned,
145 : * but I take no chances...
146 : */
147 : if (((size_t)v1 | (size_t)v2) & 0x7)
148 : break;
149 :
150 : l = *((long *)v1);
151 : l -= *((long *)v2);
152 : if (l > 128)
153 : return 128;
154 : else if (l < -128)
155 : return -128;
156 : else
157 : return (int)l;
158 : } while (0);
159 :
160 0 : ret = (int)v1[7] - (int)v2[7];
161 : sat = 0;
162 0 : brw = ret >> 8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
163 0 : if (ret & 0x80) {
164 0 : for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
165 0 : brw += (int)v1[i] - (int)v2[i];
166 0 : sat |= ~brw;
167 0 : brw >>= 8;
168 : }
169 : } else {
170 0 : for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) {
171 0 : brw += (int)v1[i] - (int)v2[i];
172 0 : sat |= brw;
173 0 : brw >>= 8;
174 : }
175 : }
176 0 : brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
177 :
178 0 : if (sat & 0xff)
179 0 : return brw | 0x80;
180 : else
181 0 : return brw + (ret & 0xFF);
182 : }
183 :
184 : static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
185 : int len, int peek);
186 : static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
187 : static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
188 : static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
189 : unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
190 : #if 0
191 : static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
192 : unsigned short *priority,
193 : unsigned long *offset);
194 : #endif
195 : static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
196 : unsigned char *priority);
197 : static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
198 :
199 : /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
200 0 : static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
201 : {
202 : DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
203 :
204 0 : rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
205 :
206 0 : if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
207 0 : OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
208 :
209 0 : s->packet = rdata->packet;
210 0 : s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
211 0 : memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
212 0 : memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
213 :
214 : /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
215 0 : memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
216 :
217 0 : return (1);
218 : }
219 :
220 : static int
221 0 : dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
222 : {
223 : DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
224 : pitem *item;
225 :
226 : /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
227 0 : if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
228 : return 0;
229 :
230 0 : rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
231 0 : item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
232 0 : if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
233 0 : if (rdata != NULL)
234 0 : OPENSSL_free(rdata);
235 0 : if (item != NULL)
236 0 : pitem_free(item);
237 :
238 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
239 : return -1;
240 : }
241 :
242 0 : rdata->packet = s->packet;
243 0 : rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
244 0 : memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
245 0 : memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
246 :
247 0 : item->data = rdata;
248 :
249 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
250 : /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
251 : if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
252 : (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
253 : || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
254 : BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
255 : sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
256 : }
257 : #endif
258 :
259 0 : s->packet = NULL;
260 0 : s->packet_length = 0;
261 0 : memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
262 0 : memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
263 :
264 0 : if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
265 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
266 0 : if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
267 0 : OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
268 0 : OPENSSL_free(rdata);
269 0 : pitem_free(item);
270 : return (-1);
271 : }
272 :
273 : /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
274 0 : if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
275 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
276 0 : if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
277 0 : OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
278 0 : OPENSSL_free(rdata);
279 0 : pitem_free(item);
280 : return (-1);
281 : }
282 :
283 : return (1);
284 : }
285 :
286 0 : static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
287 : {
288 0 : pitem *item;
289 :
290 0 : item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
291 0 : if (item) {
292 0 : dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
293 :
294 0 : OPENSSL_free(item->data);
295 0 : pitem_free(item);
296 :
297 : return (1);
298 : }
299 :
300 : return (0);
301 : }
302 :
303 : /*
304 : * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
305 : * processed yet
306 : */
307 : #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
308 : dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
309 : &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
310 :
311 : /*
312 : * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
313 : * processed
314 : */
315 : #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
316 : dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
317 : &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
318 :
319 0 : static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
320 : {
321 : pitem *item;
322 :
323 0 : item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
324 0 : if (item) {
325 : /* Check if epoch is current. */
326 0 : if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
327 : return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
328 :
329 : /* Process all the records. */
330 0 : while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
331 0 : dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
332 0 : if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
333 : return (0);
334 0 : if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
335 0 : s->s3->rrec.seq_num) < 0)
336 : return -1;
337 : }
338 : }
339 :
340 : /*
341 : * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
342 : * processed
343 : */
344 0 : s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
345 0 : s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
346 :
347 0 : return (1);
348 : }
349 :
350 : #if 0
351 :
352 : static int dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
353 : {
354 : pitem *item;
355 : PQ_64BIT priority =
356 : (((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
357 : ((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
358 :
359 : /* if we're not (re)negotiating, nothing buffered */
360 : if (!SSL_in_init(s))
361 : return 0;
362 :
363 : item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
364 : if (item && item->priority == priority) {
365 : /*
366 : * Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be a
367 : * handshake record, since data records as passed up without
368 : * buffering
369 : */
370 : DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
371 : item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
372 : rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
373 :
374 : if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
375 : OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
376 :
377 : s->packet = rdata->packet;
378 : s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
379 : memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
380 : memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
381 :
382 : OPENSSL_free(item->data);
383 : pitem_free(item);
384 :
385 : /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
386 : return (1);
387 : }
388 :
389 : return 0;
390 : }
391 :
392 : #endif
393 :
394 0 : static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
395 : {
396 : int i, al;
397 : int enc_err;
398 : SSL_SESSION *sess;
399 : SSL3_RECORD *rr;
400 : unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
401 : unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
402 :
403 0 : rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
404 0 : sess = s->session;
405 :
406 : /*
407 : * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
408 : * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
409 : */
410 0 : rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
411 :
412 : /*
413 : * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
414 : * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
415 : * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
416 : * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
417 : */
418 :
419 : /*
420 : * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
421 : * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
422 : */
423 :
424 : /* check is not needed I believe */
425 0 : if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
426 : al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
427 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
428 0 : goto f_err;
429 : }
430 :
431 : /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
432 0 : rr->data = rr->input;
433 :
434 0 : enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
435 : /*-
436 : * enc_err is:
437 : * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
438 : * 1: if the padding is valid
439 : * -1: if the padding is invalid
440 : */
441 0 : if (enc_err == 0) {
442 : /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
443 0 : rr->length = 0;
444 0 : s->packet_length = 0;
445 0 : goto err;
446 : }
447 : #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
448 : printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
449 : {
450 : unsigned int z;
451 : for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
452 : printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
453 : }
454 : printf("\n");
455 : #endif
456 :
457 : /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
458 0 : if ((sess != NULL) &&
459 0 : (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
460 : /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
461 : unsigned char *mac = NULL;
462 : unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
463 0 : mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
464 0 : OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
465 :
466 : /*
467 : * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
468 : */
469 0 : orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
470 :
471 : /*
472 : * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
473 : * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
474 : * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
475 : * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
476 : */
477 0 : if (orig_len < mac_size ||
478 : /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
479 0 : (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
480 0 : orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
481 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
482 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
483 0 : goto f_err;
484 : }
485 :
486 0 : if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
487 : /*
488 : * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
489 : * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
490 : * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
491 : * contents of the padding bytes.
492 : */
493 : mac = mac_tmp;
494 0 : ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
495 0 : rr->length -= mac_size;
496 : } else {
497 : /*
498 : * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
499 : * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
500 : * |mac_size| above.
501 : */
502 0 : rr->length -= mac_size;
503 0 : mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
504 : }
505 :
506 0 : i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
507 0 : if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
508 0 : || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
509 : enc_err = -1;
510 0 : if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
511 : enc_err = -1;
512 : }
513 :
514 0 : if (enc_err < 0) {
515 : /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
516 0 : rr->length = 0;
517 0 : s->packet_length = 0;
518 0 : goto err;
519 : }
520 :
521 : /* r->length is now just compressed */
522 0 : if (s->expand != NULL) {
523 0 : if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
524 : al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
525 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
526 : SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
527 0 : goto f_err;
528 : }
529 0 : if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
530 : al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
531 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
532 0 : goto f_err;
533 : }
534 : }
535 :
536 0 : if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
537 : al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
538 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
539 0 : goto f_err;
540 : }
541 :
542 0 : rr->off = 0;
543 : /*-
544 : * So at this point the following is true
545 : * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
546 : * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
547 : * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
548 : * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
549 : * after use :-).
550 : */
551 :
552 : /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
553 0 : s->packet_length = 0;
554 0 : return (1);
555 :
556 : f_err:
557 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
558 : err:
559 : return (0);
560 : }
561 :
562 : /*-
563 : * Call this to get a new input record.
564 : * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
565 : * or non-blocking IO.
566 : * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
567 : * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
568 : * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
569 : * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
570 : */
571 : /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
572 0 : int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
573 : {
574 : int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
575 : int i, n;
576 0 : SSL3_RECORD *rr;
577 : unsigned char *p = NULL;
578 : unsigned short version;
579 : DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
580 : unsigned int is_next_epoch;
581 :
582 0 : rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
583 :
584 : /*
585 : * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
586 : * This is a non-blocking operation.
587 : */
588 0 : if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
589 : return -1;
590 :
591 : /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
592 0 : if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
593 : return 1;
594 :
595 : /* get something from the wire */
596 : again:
597 : /* check if we have the header */
598 0 : if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
599 0 : (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
600 0 : n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
601 : /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
602 0 : if (n <= 0)
603 : return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
604 :
605 : /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
606 0 : if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
607 0 : s->packet_length = 0;
608 0 : goto again;
609 : }
610 :
611 0 : s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
612 :
613 0 : p = s->packet;
614 :
615 0 : if (s->msg_callback)
616 0 : s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
617 : s, s->msg_callback_arg);
618 :
619 : /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
620 0 : rr->type = *(p++);
621 0 : ssl_major = *(p++);
622 0 : ssl_minor = *(p++);
623 0 : version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
624 :
625 : /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
626 0 : n2s(p, rr->epoch);
627 :
628 0 : memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
629 : p += 6;
630 :
631 0 : n2s(p, rr->length);
632 :
633 : /* Lets check version */
634 0 : if (!s->first_packet) {
635 0 : if (version != s->version) {
636 : /* unexpected version, silently discard */
637 0 : rr->length = 0;
638 0 : s->packet_length = 0;
639 0 : goto again;
640 : }
641 : }
642 :
643 0 : if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
644 : /* wrong version, silently discard record */
645 0 : rr->length = 0;
646 0 : s->packet_length = 0;
647 0 : goto again;
648 : }
649 :
650 0 : if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
651 : /* record too long, silently discard it */
652 0 : rr->length = 0;
653 0 : s->packet_length = 0;
654 0 : goto again;
655 : }
656 :
657 : /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
658 : }
659 :
660 : /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
661 :
662 0 : if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
663 : /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
664 0 : i = rr->length;
665 0 : n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
666 : /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
667 0 : if (n != i) {
668 0 : rr->length = 0;
669 0 : s->packet_length = 0;
670 0 : goto again;
671 : }
672 :
673 : /*
674 : * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
675 : * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
676 : */
677 : }
678 0 : s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
679 :
680 : /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
681 : bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
682 0 : if (bitmap == NULL) {
683 0 : rr->length = 0;
684 0 : s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
685 0 : goto again; /* get another record */
686 : }
687 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
688 : /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
689 : if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
690 : #endif
691 : /*
692 : * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if
693 : * we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look
694 : * as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different
695 : * connections and would be dropped unnecessarily.
696 : */
697 0 : if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
698 0 : s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
699 0 : s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
700 0 : !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
701 0 : rr->length = 0;
702 0 : s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
703 0 : goto again; /* get another record */
704 : }
705 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
706 : }
707 : #endif
708 :
709 : /* just read a 0 length packet */
710 0 : if (rr->length == 0)
711 : goto again;
712 :
713 : /*
714 : * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
715 : * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
716 : * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while
717 : * listening.
718 : */
719 0 : if (is_next_epoch) {
720 0 : if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) {
721 0 : if (dtls1_buffer_record
722 0 : (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0)
723 : return -1;
724 : /* Mark receipt of record. */
725 0 : dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
726 : }
727 0 : rr->length = 0;
728 0 : s->packet_length = 0;
729 0 : goto again;
730 : }
731 :
732 0 : if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) {
733 0 : rr->length = 0;
734 0 : s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
735 0 : goto again; /* get another record */
736 : }
737 0 : dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */
738 :
739 0 : return (1);
740 :
741 : }
742 :
743 : /*-
744 : * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
745 : * 'type' is one of the following:
746 : *
747 : * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
748 : * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
749 : * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
750 : *
751 : * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
752 : * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
753 : *
754 : * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
755 : * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
756 : * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
757 : * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
758 : * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
759 : * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
760 : * Change cipher spec protocol
761 : * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
762 : * Alert protocol
763 : * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
764 : * Handshake protocol
765 : * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
766 : * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
767 : * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
768 : * Application data protocol
769 : * none of our business
770 : */
771 0 : int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
772 : {
773 : int al, i, j, ret;
774 : unsigned int n;
775 : SSL3_RECORD *rr;
776 : void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
777 :
778 0 : if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
779 0 : if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
780 : return (-1);
781 :
782 : /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
783 0 : if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
784 0 : (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
785 0 : (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
786 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
787 0 : return -1;
788 : }
789 :
790 : /*
791 : * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
792 : */
793 0 : if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
794 : return ret;
795 :
796 : /*
797 : * Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
798 : */
799 :
800 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
801 : /*
802 : * Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
803 : * SCTP.
804 : */
805 : if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
806 : (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
807 : (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
808 : || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)
809 : && s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
810 : #else
811 0 : if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
812 : #endif
813 : {
814 : /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
815 0 : i = s->handshake_func(s);
816 0 : if (i < 0)
817 : return (i);
818 0 : if (i == 0) {
819 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
820 0 : return (-1);
821 : }
822 : }
823 :
824 : start:
825 0 : s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
826 :
827 : /*-
828 : * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
829 : * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
830 : * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
831 : * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
832 : */
833 0 : rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
834 :
835 : /*
836 : * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
837 : * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
838 : */
839 0 : if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) {
840 0 : pitem *item;
841 0 : item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
842 0 : if (item) {
843 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
844 : /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
845 : if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
846 : DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
847 : BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
848 : sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
849 : }
850 : #endif
851 :
852 0 : dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
853 :
854 0 : OPENSSL_free(item->data);
855 0 : pitem_free(item);
856 : }
857 : }
858 :
859 : /* Check for timeout */
860 0 : if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
861 : goto start;
862 :
863 : /* get new packet if necessary */
864 0 : if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
865 0 : ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
866 0 : if (ret <= 0) {
867 0 : ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
868 : /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
869 0 : if (ret <= 0)
870 : return (ret);
871 : else
872 : goto start;
873 : }
874 : }
875 :
876 0 : if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
877 0 : rr->length = 0;
878 0 : goto start;
879 : }
880 :
881 : /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
882 :
883 0 : if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
884 : * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
885 0 : && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
886 : /*
887 : * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
888 : * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
889 : * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
890 : */
891 0 : if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num) <
892 : 0) {
893 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
894 0 : return -1;
895 : }
896 0 : rr->length = 0;
897 0 : goto start;
898 : }
899 :
900 : /*
901 : * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
902 : * 'peek' mode)
903 : */
904 0 : if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
905 0 : rr->length = 0;
906 0 : s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
907 0 : return (0);
908 : }
909 :
910 0 : if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
911 : * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
912 : /*
913 : * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
914 : * doing a handshake for the first time
915 : */
916 0 : if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
917 0 : (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
918 : al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
919 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
920 0 : goto f_err;
921 : }
922 :
923 0 : if (len <= 0)
924 : return (len);
925 :
926 0 : if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
927 : n = rr->length;
928 : else
929 : n = (unsigned int)len;
930 :
931 0 : memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
932 0 : if (!peek) {
933 0 : rr->length -= n;
934 0 : rr->off += n;
935 0 : if (rr->length == 0) {
936 0 : s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
937 0 : rr->off = 0;
938 : }
939 : }
940 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
941 : /*
942 : * We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application
943 : * data first, so retry.
944 : */
945 : if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
946 : rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
947 : (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
948 : || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)) {
949 : s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
950 : BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
951 : BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
952 : }
953 :
954 : /*
955 : * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
956 : * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
957 : * anymore, finally set shutdown.
958 : */
959 : if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
960 : s->d1->shutdown_received
961 : && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
962 : s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
963 : return (0);
964 : }
965 : #endif
966 0 : return (n);
967 : }
968 :
969 : /*
970 : * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
971 : * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
972 : */
973 :
974 : /*
975 : * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
976 : * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
977 : */
978 : {
979 : unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
980 : unsigned char *dest = NULL;
981 : unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
982 :
983 0 : if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
984 : dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
985 0 : dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
986 0 : dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
987 0 : } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
988 : dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
989 0 : dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
990 0 : dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
991 : }
992 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
993 0 : else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
994 0 : dtls1_process_heartbeat(s);
995 :
996 : /* Exit and notify application to read again */
997 0 : rr->length = 0;
998 0 : s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
999 0 : BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1000 0 : BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1001 0 : return (-1);
1002 : }
1003 : #endif
1004 : /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
1005 0 : else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1006 : /*
1007 : * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again
1008 : * reading.
1009 : */
1010 0 : if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
1011 : BIO *bio;
1012 0 : s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1013 0 : bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1014 0 : s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1015 0 : BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1016 0 : BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1017 0 : return (-1);
1018 : }
1019 :
1020 : /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
1021 : al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1022 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1023 0 : goto f_err;
1024 : }
1025 :
1026 0 : if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1027 : /*
1028 : * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be
1029 : * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
1030 : */
1031 0 : if (rr->length < dest_maxlen) {
1032 : #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1033 : /*
1034 : * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
1035 : * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
1036 : * non-existing alert...
1037 : */
1038 : FIX ME
1039 : #endif
1040 0 : s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1041 0 : rr->length = 0;
1042 0 : goto start;
1043 : }
1044 :
1045 : /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1046 0 : for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
1047 0 : dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1048 0 : rr->length--;
1049 : }
1050 0 : *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
1051 : }
1052 : }
1053 :
1054 : /*-
1055 : * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1056 : * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1057 : * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1058 : */
1059 :
1060 : /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1061 0 : if ((!s->server) &&
1062 0 : (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1063 0 : (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1064 0 : (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1065 0 : s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1066 :
1067 0 : if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1068 0 : (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1069 : (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1070 : al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1071 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1072 0 : goto f_err;
1073 : }
1074 :
1075 : /*
1076 : * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages
1077 : */
1078 :
1079 0 : if (s->msg_callback)
1080 0 : s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1081 0 : s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1082 : s->msg_callback_arg);
1083 :
1084 0 : if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1085 0 : !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1086 0 : !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1087 0 : s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1088 0 : s->new_session = 1;
1089 0 : ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1090 0 : if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1091 0 : i = s->handshake_func(s);
1092 0 : if (i < 0)
1093 : return (i);
1094 0 : if (i == 0) {
1095 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
1096 : SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1097 0 : return (-1);
1098 : }
1099 :
1100 0 : if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1101 0 : if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1102 : BIO *bio;
1103 : /*
1104 : * In the case where we try to read application data,
1105 : * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1106 : * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1107 : * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1108 : */
1109 0 : s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1110 0 : bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1111 0 : BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1112 0 : BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1113 0 : return (-1);
1114 : }
1115 : }
1116 : }
1117 : }
1118 : /*
1119 : * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1120 : * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1121 : */
1122 : goto start;
1123 : }
1124 :
1125 0 : if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1126 0 : int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
1127 0 : int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
1128 :
1129 0 : s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1130 :
1131 0 : if (s->msg_callback)
1132 0 : s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1133 0 : s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1134 :
1135 0 : if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1136 : cb = s->info_callback;
1137 0 : else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1138 : cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1139 :
1140 0 : if (cb != NULL) {
1141 0 : j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1142 0 : cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1143 : }
1144 :
1145 0 : if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1146 0 : s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1147 0 : if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1148 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1149 : /*
1150 : * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
1151 : * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
1152 : * that nothing gets discarded.
1153 : */
1154 : if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
1155 : BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1156 : s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
1157 : s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1158 : BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1159 : BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1160 : return -1;
1161 : }
1162 : #endif
1163 0 : s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1164 0 : return (0);
1165 : }
1166 : #if 0
1167 : /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1168 : /* now check if it's a missing record */
1169 : if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
1170 : unsigned short seq;
1171 : unsigned int frag_off;
1172 : unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1173 :
1174 : n2s(p, seq);
1175 : n2l3(p, frag_off);
1176 :
1177 : dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1178 : dtls1_get_queue_priority
1179 : (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off,
1180 : &found);
1181 : if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1182 : /*
1183 : * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s));
1184 : */
1185 : /*
1186 : * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert
1187 : * ourselves
1188 : */
1189 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1190 : DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1191 : }
1192 : }
1193 : #endif
1194 0 : } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1195 : char tmp[16];
1196 :
1197 0 : s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1198 0 : s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1199 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
1200 : SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1201 0 : BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1202 0 : ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1203 0 : s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1204 0 : SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1205 : return (0);
1206 : } else {
1207 : al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1208 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1209 0 : goto f_err;
1210 : }
1211 :
1212 : goto start;
1213 : }
1214 :
1215 0 : if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1216 : * shutdown */
1217 0 : s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1218 0 : rr->length = 0;
1219 0 : return (0);
1220 : }
1221 :
1222 0 : if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1223 : struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1224 : unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1225 :
1226 0 : dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1227 :
1228 0 : if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1229 : ccs_hdr_len = 3;
1230 :
1231 : /*
1232 : * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1233 : * what the record payload has to look like
1234 : */
1235 : /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1236 0 : if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1237 0 : (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1238 : i = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1239 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1240 0 : goto err;
1241 : }
1242 :
1243 0 : rr->length = 0;
1244 :
1245 0 : if (s->msg_callback)
1246 0 : s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1247 : rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1248 :
1249 : /*
1250 : * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
1251 : * are still missing, so just drop it.
1252 : */
1253 0 : if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) {
1254 : goto start;
1255 : }
1256 :
1257 0 : s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1258 :
1259 0 : s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1260 0 : if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1261 : goto err;
1262 :
1263 : /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1264 0 : dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1265 :
1266 0 : if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1267 0 : s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1268 :
1269 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1270 : /*
1271 : * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
1272 : * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
1273 : * SCTP is used
1274 : */
1275 : BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
1276 : #endif
1277 :
1278 : goto start;
1279 : }
1280 :
1281 : /*
1282 : * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1283 : */
1284 0 : if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1285 0 : !s->in_handshake) {
1286 : struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1287 :
1288 : /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1289 0 : dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1290 0 : if (rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) {
1291 0 : rr->length = 0;
1292 0 : goto start;
1293 : }
1294 :
1295 : /*
1296 : * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
1297 : * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1298 : */
1299 0 : if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
1300 0 : if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1301 0 : return -1;
1302 :
1303 0 : dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1304 0 : rr->length = 0;
1305 0 : goto start;
1306 : }
1307 :
1308 0 : if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1309 0 : !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1310 : #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
1311 : * are not as expected (and because this is
1312 : * not really needed for clients except for
1313 : * detecting protocol violations): */
1314 : s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server)
1315 : ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1316 : #else
1317 0 : s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1318 : #endif
1319 0 : s->renegotiate = 1;
1320 0 : s->new_session = 1;
1321 : }
1322 0 : i = s->handshake_func(s);
1323 0 : if (i < 0)
1324 : return (i);
1325 0 : if (i == 0) {
1326 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1327 0 : return (-1);
1328 : }
1329 :
1330 0 : if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1331 0 : if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1332 : BIO *bio;
1333 : /*
1334 : * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1335 : * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1336 : * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1337 : * problems in the blocking world
1338 : */
1339 0 : s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1340 0 : bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1341 0 : BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1342 0 : BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1343 0 : return (-1);
1344 : }
1345 : }
1346 : goto start;
1347 : }
1348 :
1349 0 : switch (rr->type) {
1350 : default:
1351 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1352 : /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1353 0 : if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
1354 0 : rr->length = 0;
1355 0 : goto start;
1356 : }
1357 : #endif
1358 : al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1359 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1360 0 : goto f_err;
1361 : case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1362 : case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1363 : case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1364 : /*
1365 : * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1366 : * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1367 : * happen when type != rr->type
1368 : */
1369 : al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1370 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1371 0 : goto f_err;
1372 : case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1373 : /*
1374 : * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1375 : * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1376 : * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1377 : * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1378 : * started), we will indulge it.
1379 : */
1380 0 : if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1381 0 : (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1382 0 : (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1383 0 : (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1384 : (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1385 0 : ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1386 0 : (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1387 : (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1388 : )
1389 : )) {
1390 0 : s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1391 0 : return (-1);
1392 : } else {
1393 : al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1394 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1395 0 : goto f_err;
1396 : }
1397 : }
1398 : /* not reached */
1399 :
1400 : f_err:
1401 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1402 : err:
1403 : return (-1);
1404 : }
1405 :
1406 0 : int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1407 : {
1408 : int i;
1409 :
1410 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1411 : /*
1412 : * Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake for reading
1413 : * belated app data with SCTP.
1414 : */
1415 : if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) ||
1416 : (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1417 : (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
1418 : || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)))
1419 : #else
1420 0 : if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1421 : #endif
1422 : {
1423 0 : i = s->handshake_func(s);
1424 0 : if (i < 0)
1425 : return (i);
1426 0 : if (i == 0) {
1427 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,
1428 : SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1429 0 : return -1;
1430 : }
1431 : }
1432 :
1433 0 : if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
1434 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1435 0 : return -1;
1436 : }
1437 :
1438 0 : i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1439 0 : return i;
1440 : }
1441 :
1442 : /*
1443 : * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1444 : * is started.
1445 : */
1446 : static int
1447 0 : have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1448 : int len, int peek)
1449 : {
1450 :
1451 0 : if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1452 : /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1453 : {
1454 0 : unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1455 : unsigned char *dst = buf;
1456 : unsigned int k, n;
1457 :
1458 : /* peek == 0 */
1459 : n = 0;
1460 0 : while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1461 0 : *dst++ = *src++;
1462 0 : len--;
1463 0 : s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1464 0 : n++;
1465 : }
1466 : /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1467 0 : for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1468 0 : s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1469 0 : return n;
1470 : }
1471 :
1472 : return 0;
1473 : }
1474 :
1475 : /*
1476 : * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
1477 : * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1478 : */
1479 0 : int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1480 : {
1481 : int i;
1482 :
1483 0 : OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1484 0 : s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1485 0 : i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1486 0 : return i;
1487 : }
1488 :
1489 0 : int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1490 : unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1491 : {
1492 : unsigned char *p, *pseq;
1493 : int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
1494 : int prefix_len = 0;
1495 : int eivlen;
1496 : SSL3_RECORD *wr;
1497 : SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
1498 : SSL_SESSION *sess;
1499 :
1500 : /*
1501 : * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
1502 : * will happen with non blocking IO
1503 : */
1504 0 : if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) {
1505 0 : OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1506 0 : return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
1507 : }
1508 :
1509 : /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1510 0 : if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
1511 0 : i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1512 0 : if (i <= 0)
1513 : return (i);
1514 : /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1515 : }
1516 :
1517 0 : if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1518 : return 0;
1519 :
1520 0 : wr = &(s->s3->wrec);
1521 : wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
1522 0 : sess = s->session;
1523 :
1524 0 : if ((sess == NULL) ||
1525 0 : (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1526 : clear = 1;
1527 :
1528 0 : if (clear)
1529 : mac_size = 0;
1530 : else {
1531 0 : mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1532 0 : if (mac_size < 0)
1533 : goto err;
1534 : }
1535 :
1536 : /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1537 : #if 0
1538 : /*
1539 : * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
1540 : */
1541 : if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1542 : && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1543 : {
1544 : /*
1545 : * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
1546 : * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1547 : */
1548 :
1549 : if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
1550 : /*
1551 : * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
1552 : * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
1553 : * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
1554 : * payload)
1555 : */
1556 : prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1557 : if (prefix_len <= 0)
1558 : goto err;
1559 :
1560 : if (s->s3->wbuf.len <
1561 : (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) {
1562 : /* insufficient space */
1563 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 : goto err;
1565 : }
1566 : }
1567 :
1568 : s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1569 : }
1570 : #endif
1571 0 : p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1572 :
1573 : /* write the header */
1574 :
1575 0 : *(p++) = type & 0xff;
1576 0 : wr->type = type;
1577 : /*
1578 : * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
1579 : * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
1580 : * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
1581 : */
1582 0 : if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1583 0 : *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
1584 0 : *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
1585 : } else {
1586 0 : *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1587 0 : *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1588 : }
1589 :
1590 : /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1591 : pseq = p;
1592 0 : p += 10;
1593 :
1594 : /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1595 0 : if (s->enc_write_ctx) {
1596 0 : int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1597 0 : if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
1598 0 : eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1599 0 : if (eivlen <= 1)
1600 : eivlen = 0;
1601 : }
1602 : /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1603 0 : else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1604 : eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1605 : else
1606 : eivlen = 0;
1607 : } else
1608 : eivlen = 0;
1609 :
1610 : /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1611 0 : wr->data = p + eivlen; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1612 0 : wr->length = (int)len;
1613 0 : wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
1614 :
1615 : /*
1616 : * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1617 : */
1618 :
1619 : /* first we compress */
1620 0 : if (s->compress != NULL) {
1621 0 : if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
1622 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1623 0 : goto err;
1624 : }
1625 : } else {
1626 0 : memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
1627 0 : wr->input = wr->data;
1628 : }
1629 :
1630 : /*
1631 : * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1632 : * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1633 : * wb->buf
1634 : */
1635 :
1636 0 : if (mac_size != 0) {
1637 0 : if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
1638 : goto err;
1639 0 : wr->length += mac_size;
1640 : }
1641 :
1642 : /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1643 0 : wr->input = p;
1644 0 : wr->data = p;
1645 :
1646 0 : if (eivlen)
1647 0 : wr->length += eivlen;
1648 :
1649 0 : if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
1650 : goto err;
1651 :
1652 : /* record length after mac and block padding */
1653 : /*
1654 : * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && !
1655 : * SSL_in_init(s)))
1656 : */
1657 :
1658 : /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1659 :
1660 0 : s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1661 :
1662 : /* XDTLS: ?? */
1663 : /*
1664 : * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
1665 : */
1666 :
1667 0 : memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1668 : pseq += 6;
1669 0 : s2n(wr->length, pseq);
1670 :
1671 0 : if (s->msg_callback)
1672 0 : s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
1673 : DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1674 :
1675 : /*
1676 : * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1677 : * wr->length long
1678 : */
1679 0 : wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1680 0 : wr->length += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1681 :
1682 : #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1683 : /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1684 : if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1685 : dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1686 : *((PQ_64BIT *) & (s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1687 : #endif
1688 :
1689 0 : ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1690 :
1691 0 : if (create_empty_fragment) {
1692 : /*
1693 : * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1694 : * out anything here
1695 : */
1696 0 : return wr->length;
1697 : }
1698 :
1699 : /* now let's set up wb */
1700 0 : wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1701 0 : wb->offset = 0;
1702 :
1703 : /*
1704 : * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1705 : * retries later
1706 : */
1707 0 : s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
1708 0 : s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
1709 0 : s->s3->wpend_type = type;
1710 0 : s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
1711 :
1712 : /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1713 0 : return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
1714 : err:
1715 : return -1;
1716 : }
1717 :
1718 0 : static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1719 : {
1720 : int cmp;
1721 : unsigned int shift;
1722 0 : const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1723 :
1724 0 : cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
1725 0 : if (cmp > 0) {
1726 0 : memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
1727 : return 1; /* this record in new */
1728 : }
1729 0 : shift = -cmp;
1730 0 : if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1731 : return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1732 0 : else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift))
1733 : return 0; /* record previously received */
1734 :
1735 0 : memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
1736 : return 1;
1737 : }
1738 :
1739 0 : static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1740 : {
1741 : int cmp;
1742 : unsigned int shift;
1743 0 : const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1744 :
1745 0 : cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
1746 0 : if (cmp > 0) {
1747 0 : shift = cmp;
1748 0 : if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1749 0 : bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1750 : else
1751 0 : bitmap->map = 1UL;
1752 : memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, 8);
1753 : } else {
1754 0 : shift = -cmp;
1755 0 : if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1756 0 : bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift;
1757 : }
1758 0 : }
1759 :
1760 0 : int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1761 : {
1762 : int i, j;
1763 : void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1764 : unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1765 : unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1766 :
1767 0 : s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1768 :
1769 : memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1770 0 : *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1771 0 : *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1772 :
1773 : #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1774 : if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
1775 : s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1776 : # if 0
1777 : if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
1778 : /*
1779 : * waiting for a new msg
1780 : */
1781 : else
1782 : s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1783 : # endif
1784 :
1785 : # if 0
1786 : fprintf(stderr,
1787 : "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",
1788 : s->d1->handshake_read_seq, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1789 : # endif
1790 : l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1791 : }
1792 : #endif
1793 :
1794 0 : i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1795 0 : if (i <= 0) {
1796 0 : s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1797 : /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1798 : } else {
1799 0 : if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1800 : #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1801 : || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1802 : #endif
1803 : )
1804 0 : (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1805 :
1806 0 : if (s->msg_callback)
1807 0 : s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1808 : 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1809 :
1810 0 : if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1811 : cb = s->info_callback;
1812 0 : else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1813 : cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1814 :
1815 0 : if (cb != NULL) {
1816 0 : j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
1817 0 : cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
1818 : }
1819 : }
1820 0 : return (i);
1821 : }
1822 :
1823 : static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
1824 : unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1825 : {
1826 :
1827 : *is_next_epoch = 0;
1828 :
1829 : /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1830 0 : if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1831 0 : return &s->d1->bitmap;
1832 :
1833 : /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1834 0 : else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1835 0 : (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1836 : *is_next_epoch = 1;
1837 0 : return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1838 : }
1839 :
1840 : return NULL;
1841 : }
1842 :
1843 : #if 0
1844 : static int
1845 : dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
1846 : unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset)
1847 : {
1848 :
1849 : /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1850 : if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1851 : return 0;
1852 :
1853 : /*
1854 : * Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway. (this implies that
1855 : * Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up immediately)
1856 : */
1857 : if (SSL_in_init(s)) {
1858 : unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1859 : /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1860 : if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1861 : rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1862 : unsigned short seq_num;
1863 : struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1864 : struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1865 :
1866 : if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1867 : dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1868 : seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1869 : *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1870 : } else {
1871 : dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1872 : seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1873 : *offset = 0;
1874 : }
1875 :
1876 : /*
1877 : * this is either a record we're waiting for, or a retransmit of
1878 : * something we happened to previously receive (higher layers
1879 : * will drop the repeat silently
1880 : */
1881 : if (seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1882 : return 0;
1883 : if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1884 : seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1885 : msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1886 : return 0;
1887 : else if (seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1888 : (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1889 : msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1890 : return 0;
1891 : else {
1892 : *priority = seq_num;
1893 : return 1;
1894 : }
1895 : } else /* unknown record type */
1896 : return 0;
1897 : }
1898 :
1899 : return 0;
1900 : }
1901 : #endif
1902 :
1903 0 : void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1904 : {
1905 : unsigned char *seq;
1906 : unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1907 :
1908 0 : if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
1909 0 : seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1910 0 : s->d1->r_epoch++;
1911 0 : memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1912 0 : memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1913 : } else {
1914 0 : seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1915 0 : memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq,
1916 : sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1917 0 : s->d1->w_epoch++;
1918 : }
1919 :
1920 : memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1921 0 : }
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