Line data Source code
1 : /* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
2 : /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 : * All rights reserved.
4 : *
5 : * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 : * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 : * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 : *
9 : * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 : * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 : * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 : * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 : * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 : * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 : *
16 : * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 : * the code are not to be removed.
18 : * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 : * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 : * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 : * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 : *
23 : * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 : * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 : * are met:
26 : * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 : * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 : * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 : * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 : * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 : * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 : * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 : * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 : * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 : * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 : * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 : * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 : *
41 : * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 : * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 : * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 : * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 : * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 : * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 : * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 : * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 : * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 : * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 : * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 : *
53 : * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 : * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 : * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 : * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 : */
58 :
59 : #include <stdio.h>
60 : #include <ctype.h>
61 : #include "cryptlib.h"
62 : #include <openssl/asn1.h>
63 : #include <openssl/objects.h>
64 : #include <openssl/x509.h>
65 : #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
66 :
67 0 : int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
68 : {
69 : int i;
70 : X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
71 :
72 0 : ai = a->cert_info;
73 0 : bi = b->cert_info;
74 0 : i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
75 0 : if (i)
76 : return (i);
77 0 : return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
78 : }
79 :
80 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
81 0 : unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
82 : {
83 : unsigned long ret = 0;
84 : EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
85 : unsigned char md[16];
86 : char *f;
87 :
88 0 : EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
89 0 : f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
90 0 : if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
91 : goto err;
92 0 : if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
93 : goto err;
94 0 : OPENSSL_free(f);
95 0 : if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
96 0 : (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
97 0 : (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
98 : goto err;
99 0 : if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
100 : goto err;
101 0 : ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
102 0 : ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
103 : ) & 0xffffffffL;
104 : err:
105 0 : EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
106 0 : return (ret);
107 : }
108 : #endif
109 :
110 0 : int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
111 : {
112 0 : return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
113 : }
114 :
115 370 : int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
116 : {
117 370 : return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
118 : }
119 :
120 0 : int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
121 : {
122 0 : return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
123 : }
124 :
125 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
126 0 : int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
127 : {
128 0 : return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
129 : }
130 : #endif
131 :
132 2890 : X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
133 : {
134 2890 : return (a->cert_info->issuer);
135 : }
136 :
137 0 : unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
138 : {
139 0 : return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
140 : }
141 :
142 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
143 0 : unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
144 : {
145 0 : return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
146 : }
147 : #endif
148 :
149 2950 : X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
150 : {
151 2950 : return (a->cert_info->subject);
152 : }
153 :
154 0 : ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
155 : {
156 0 : return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
157 : }
158 :
159 0 : unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
160 : {
161 0 : return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
162 : }
163 :
164 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
165 0 : unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
166 : {
167 0 : return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
168 : }
169 : #endif
170 :
171 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
172 : /*
173 : * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
174 : * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
175 : * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
176 : * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
177 : * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
178 : * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
179 : */
180 0 : int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
181 : {
182 : int rv;
183 : /* ensure hash is valid */
184 0 : X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
185 0 : X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
186 :
187 0 : rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
188 0 : if (rv)
189 : return rv;
190 : /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
191 0 : if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
192 0 : rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
193 0 : if (rv)
194 : return rv;
195 0 : return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
196 : a->cert_info->enc.len);
197 : }
198 : return rv;
199 : }
200 : #endif
201 :
202 2517 : int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
203 : {
204 : int ret;
205 :
206 : /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
207 :
208 2517 : if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
209 0 : ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
210 0 : if (ret < 0)
211 : return -2;
212 : }
213 :
214 2517 : if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
215 0 : ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
216 0 : if (ret < 0)
217 : return -2;
218 : }
219 :
220 2517 : ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
221 :
222 2517 : if (ret)
223 : return ret;
224 :
225 1440 : return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
226 :
227 : }
228 :
229 0 : unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
230 : {
231 : unsigned long ret = 0;
232 : unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
233 :
234 : /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
235 0 : i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
236 0 : if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
237 : NULL))
238 : return 0;
239 :
240 0 : ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
241 0 : ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
242 : ) & 0xffffffffL;
243 0 : return (ret);
244 : }
245 :
246 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
247 : /*
248 : * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
249 : * this is reasonably efficient.
250 : */
251 :
252 0 : unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
253 : {
254 : EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
255 : unsigned long ret = 0;
256 : unsigned char md[16];
257 :
258 : /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
259 0 : i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
260 0 : EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
261 0 : EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
262 0 : if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
263 0 : && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
264 0 : && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
265 0 : ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
266 0 : ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
267 : ) & 0xffffffffL;
268 0 : EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
269 :
270 0 : return (ret);
271 : }
272 : #endif
273 :
274 : /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
275 0 : X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
276 : ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
277 : {
278 : int i;
279 : X509_CINF cinf;
280 : X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
281 :
282 0 : if (!sk)
283 : return NULL;
284 :
285 0 : x.cert_info = &cinf;
286 0 : cinf.serialNumber = serial;
287 0 : cinf.issuer = name;
288 :
289 0 : for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
290 0 : x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
291 0 : if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
292 : return (x509);
293 : }
294 : return (NULL);
295 : }
296 :
297 0 : X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
298 : {
299 : X509 *x509;
300 : int i;
301 :
302 0 : for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
303 0 : x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
304 0 : if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
305 : return (x509);
306 : }
307 : return (NULL);
308 : }
309 :
310 4349 : EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
311 : {
312 4349 : if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
313 : return (NULL);
314 4349 : return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
315 : }
316 :
317 0 : ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
318 : {
319 0 : if (!x)
320 : return NULL;
321 0 : return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
322 : }
323 :
324 876 : int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
325 : {
326 : EVP_PKEY *xk;
327 : int ret;
328 :
329 876 : xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
330 :
331 876 : if (xk)
332 876 : ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
333 : else
334 : ret = -2;
335 :
336 876 : switch (ret) {
337 : case 1:
338 : break;
339 : case 0:
340 0 : X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
341 0 : break;
342 : case -1:
343 0 : X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
344 0 : break;
345 : case -2:
346 0 : X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
347 : }
348 876 : if (xk)
349 876 : EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
350 876 : if (ret > 0)
351 : return 1;
352 0 : return 0;
353 : }
354 :
355 : /*
356 : * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
357 : * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
358 : * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
359 : */
360 :
361 : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
362 :
363 0 : static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
364 : {
365 : const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
366 : int curve_nid;
367 0 : if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
368 0 : grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
369 0 : if (!grp)
370 : return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
371 0 : curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
372 : /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
373 0 : if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
374 : /*
375 : * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
376 : */
377 0 : if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
378 : return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
379 0 : if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
380 : return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
381 : /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
382 0 : *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
383 0 : } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
384 0 : if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
385 : return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
386 0 : if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
387 : return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
388 : } else
389 : return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
390 :
391 : return X509_V_OK;
392 : }
393 :
394 370 : int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
395 : unsigned long flags)
396 : {
397 : int rv, i, sign_nid;
398 : EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
399 : unsigned long tflags;
400 370 : if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
401 : return X509_V_OK;
402 0 : tflags = flags;
403 : /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
404 0 : if (x == NULL) {
405 0 : x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
406 : i = 1;
407 : } else
408 : i = 0;
409 :
410 0 : if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
411 : rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
412 : /* Correct error depth */
413 : i = 0;
414 : goto end;
415 : }
416 :
417 0 : pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
418 : /* Check EE key only */
419 0 : rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
420 0 : if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
421 : /* Correct error depth */
422 : i = 0;
423 : goto end;
424 : }
425 0 : for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
426 0 : sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
427 0 : x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
428 0 : if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
429 : rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
430 : goto end;
431 : }
432 0 : EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
433 0 : pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
434 0 : rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
435 0 : if (rv != X509_V_OK)
436 : goto end;
437 : }
438 :
439 : /* Final check: root CA signature */
440 0 : rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
441 : end:
442 0 : if (pk)
443 0 : EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
444 0 : if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
445 : /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
446 0 : if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
447 0 : || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
448 0 : i--;
449 : /*
450 : * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
451 : * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
452 : */
453 0 : if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
454 : rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
455 0 : if (perror_depth)
456 0 : *perror_depth = i;
457 : }
458 0 : return rv;
459 : }
460 :
461 0 : int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
462 : {
463 : int sign_nid;
464 0 : if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
465 : return X509_V_OK;
466 0 : sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
467 0 : return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
468 : }
469 :
470 : #else
471 : int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
472 : unsigned long flags)
473 : {
474 : return 0;
475 : }
476 :
477 : int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
478 : {
479 : return 0;
480 : }
481 :
482 : #endif
483 : /*
484 : * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
485 : * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
486 : * each X509 structure.
487 : */
488 0 : STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
489 : {
490 : STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
491 : int i;
492 0 : ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
493 0 : for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
494 0 : X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
495 0 : CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
496 : }
497 0 : return ret;
498 : }
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