LCOV - code coverage report
Current view: top level - third_party/openssl/crypto/rsa - rsa_pk1.c (source / functions) Hit Total Coverage
Test: tmp.zDYK9MVh93 Lines: 28 81 34.6 %
Date: 2015-10-10 Functions: 2 4 50.0 %

          Line data    Source code
       1             : /* crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c */
       2             : /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
       3             :  * All rights reserved.
       4             :  *
       5             :  * This package is an SSL implementation written
       6             :  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
       7             :  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
       8             :  *
       9             :  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
      10             :  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
      11             :  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
      12             :  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
      13             :  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
      14             :  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
      15             :  *
      16             :  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
      17             :  * the code are not to be removed.
      18             :  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
      19             :  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
      20             :  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
      21             :  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
      22             :  *
      23             :  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
      24             :  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
      25             :  * are met:
      26             :  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
      27             :  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
      28             :  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
      29             :  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
      30             :  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
      31             :  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
      32             :  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
      33             :  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
      34             :  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
      35             :  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
      36             :  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
      37             :  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
      38             :  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
      39             :  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
      40             :  *
      41             :  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
      42             :  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
      43             :  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
      44             :  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
      45             :  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
      46             :  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
      47             :  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
      48             :  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
      49             :  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
      50             :  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
      51             :  * SUCH DAMAGE.
      52             :  *
      53             :  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
      54             :  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
      55             :  * copied and put under another distribution licence
      56             :  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
      57             :  */
      58             : 
      59             : #include "constant_time_locl.h"
      60             : 
      61             : #include <stdio.h>
      62             : #include "cryptlib.h"
      63             : #include <openssl/bn.h>
      64             : #include <openssl/rsa.h>
      65             : #include <openssl/rand.h>
      66             : 
      67         381 : int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      68             :                                  const unsigned char *from, int flen)
      69             : {
      70             :     int j;
      71             :     unsigned char *p;
      72             : 
      73         381 :     if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
      74           0 :         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
      75             :                RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
      76           0 :         return (0);
      77             :     }
      78             : 
      79             :     p = (unsigned char *)to;
      80             : 
      81         381 :     *(p++) = 0;
      82         381 :     *(p++) = 1;                 /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */
      83             : 
      84             :     /* pad out with 0xff data */
      85         381 :     j = tlen - 3 - flen;
      86         381 :     memset(p, 0xff, j);
      87         381 :     p += j;
      88         381 :     *(p++) = '\0';
      89         381 :     memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
      90         381 :     return (1);
      91             : }
      92             : 
      93         746 : int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
      94             :                                    const unsigned char *from, int flen,
      95             :                                    int num)
      96             : {
      97             :     int i, j;
      98             :     const unsigned char *p;
      99             : 
     100             :     p = from;
     101         746 :     if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 01)) {
     102           1 :         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
     103             :                RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);
     104           1 :         return (-1);
     105             :     }
     106             : 
     107             :     /* scan over padding data */
     108         745 :     j = flen - 1;               /* one for type. */
     109       49955 :     for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
     110       49955 :         if (*p != 0xff) {       /* should decrypt to 0xff */
     111         745 :             if (*p == 0) {
     112         745 :                 p++;
     113         745 :                 break;
     114             :             } else {
     115           0 :                 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
     116             :                        RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT);
     117           0 :                 return (-1);
     118             :             }
     119             :         }
     120       49210 :         p++;
     121             :     }
     122             : 
     123         745 :     if (i == j) {
     124           0 :         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
     125             :                RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
     126           0 :         return (-1);
     127             :     }
     128             : 
     129         745 :     if (i < 8) {
     130           0 :         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
     131             :                RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT);
     132           0 :         return (-1);
     133             :     }
     134         745 :     i++;                        /* Skip over the '\0' */
     135         745 :     j -= i;
     136         745 :     if (j > tlen) {
     137           0 :         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
     138           0 :         return (-1);
     139             :     }
     140         745 :     memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
     141             : 
     142         745 :     return (j);
     143             : }
     144             : 
     145           0 : int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     146             :                                  const unsigned char *from, int flen)
     147             : {
     148             :     int i, j;
     149             :     unsigned char *p;
     150             : 
     151           0 :     if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
     152           0 :         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
     153             :                RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
     154           0 :         return (0);
     155             :     }
     156             : 
     157             :     p = (unsigned char *)to;
     158             : 
     159           0 :     *(p++) = 0;
     160           0 :     *(p++) = 2;                 /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
     161             : 
     162             :     /* pad out with non-zero random data */
     163           0 :     j = tlen - 3 - flen;
     164             : 
     165           0 :     if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0)
     166             :         return (0);
     167           0 :     for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
     168           0 :         if (*p == '\0')
     169             :             do {
     170           0 :                 if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0)
     171             :                     return (0);
     172           0 :             } while (*p == '\0');
     173           0 :         p++;
     174             :     }
     175             : 
     176           0 :     *(p++) = '\0';
     177             : 
     178           0 :     memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
     179           0 :     return (1);
     180             : }
     181             : 
     182           0 : int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
     183             :                                    const unsigned char *from, int flen,
     184             :                                    int num)
     185             : {
     186             :     int i;
     187             :     /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
     188             :     unsigned char *em = NULL;
     189             :     unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
     190             :     int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
     191             : 
     192           0 :     if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)
     193             :         return -1;
     194             : 
     195             :     /*
     196             :      * PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. See "PKCS #1 v2.2: RSA Cryptography Standard",
     197             :      * section 7.2.2.
     198             :      */
     199             : 
     200           0 :     if (flen > num)
     201             :         goto err;
     202             : 
     203           0 :     if (num < 11)
     204             :         goto err;
     205             : 
     206           0 :     em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
     207           0 :     if (em == NULL) {
     208           0 :         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
     209           0 :         return -1;
     210             :     }
     211           0 :     memset(em, 0, num);
     212             :     /*
     213             :      * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
     214             :      * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
     215             :      * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed  memory access
     216             :      * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
     217             :      *
     218             :      * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
     219             :      */
     220           0 :     memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
     221             : 
     222           0 :     good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
     223           0 :     good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
     224             : 
     225             :     found_zero_byte = 0;
     226           0 :     for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
     227           0 :         unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
     228             :         zero_index =
     229           0 :             constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i,
     230             :                                      zero_index);
     231           0 :         found_zero_byte |= equals0;
     232             :     }
     233             : 
     234             :     /*
     235             :      * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
     236             :      * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
     237             :      * also fails.
     238             :      */
     239           0 :     good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8);
     240             : 
     241             :     /*
     242             :      * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
     243             :      * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
     244             :      */
     245           0 :     msg_index = zero_index + 1;
     246           0 :     mlen = num - msg_index;
     247             : 
     248             :     /*
     249             :      * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could
     250             :      * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding.
     251             :      */
     252           0 :     good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen));
     253             : 
     254             :     /*
     255             :      * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
     256             :      * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
     257             :      * information at the API boundary.
     258             :      * TODO(emilia): this could be addressed at the call site,
     259             :      * see BoringSSL commit 0aa0767340baf925bda4804882aab0cb974b2d26.
     260             :      */
     261           0 :     if (!good) {
     262             :         mlen = -1;
     263             :         goto err;
     264             :     }
     265             : 
     266           0 :     memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen);
     267             : 
     268             :  err:
     269           0 :     if (em != NULL)
     270           0 :         OPENSSL_free(em);
     271           0 :     if (mlen == -1)
     272           0 :         RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
     273             :                RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
     274           0 :     return mlen;
     275             : }

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